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How culture influences cultural intelligence
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It is critical to initiate change in the culture of intelligence professionals in this new changing support environment. Setting the conditions and training to a strategically deployable capability must be embraced by the TIB/MIBs in each operational theater. Moving beyond the imprinted habits of Cold War intelligence support to the GCC, the MI culture must change to meet future challenges. The MIB must expand its intelligence support beyond the ASCC headquarters in order to truly fulfill its role as a modular intelligence unit. Emergent threats or critical intelligence requirements require an in depth knowledge of a geographical area and groups or individuals that operate in them. This level of detail can only be provided by analysts that are dedicated to one particular geographic area on a steady basis. The TIB/MIBs must be able to support and direct the intelligence collaboration, with both regionally aligned forces and expeditionary elements such as the global reaction force (GRF). This is a new concept and in FY11, this new type of remote intelligence support was still being charted for the TIB/MIB. Intelligence commanders in coordination with both parent and supported commands began looking for the most efficient employment of the Intelligence Enterprise to support rapid deployments of the GRF. The prospect of additional intelligence consumers outside of the Theater added to pressure on the TIB/MIBs to task organize to support. Previously, the TIB/MIBs had produced intelligence analysis for only one combatant command in theater and now, in some cases, have over a dozen consumers plus the global reaction force. The requirement for TIB/MIBs to provide intelligence for two Theater commanders and to begin moving toward a regiona... ... middle of paper ... ...and analyst that will work the RFI is put in direct liaison with the requester to coordinate the parameters and focus of the analysis. At completion, the RFI is reviewed by the senior analyst or ROC chief and transmitted to the RM&D for format quality control and formal release to the serviced unit. Previously RFI management was decentralized in the MIB where each section was responsible for its own RFI management. The 24th MIB in Europe remedied this by establishing a RM&D at Battalion level that reports directly to the MIB commander for asset management (see figure 1). This required the development of tracking software and some form of report to track efficiency, which were developed and tested. Manning is difficult and had to be taken from other slots within the TIB. The most efficient manning of the RM&D section was to place an O4 level officer as the Collection
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the Battle of Kamdesh and provide an alternate outcome based on the utilization of intelligence and intelligence assets. Many battles could have had a different outcome if they would trust intelligence reports without needing to validate the intelligence with another source or simply have other intelligence assets available. The Battle of Kamdesh was certainly one of those battles. The battle started just before 0600 on October 3, 2009 on Combat Outpost (COP) Keating and nearby Observation Post (OP) Fritsche in the Kamdesh district of Nuristan Province, Afghanistan. About 70 Soldiers of Bravo Troop, 3rd Squadron, 61st Cavalry Regiment, along with 30 Afghan National Army Soldiers (ANA), fought an enemy force of about 300 Anti-Afghan Forces (AAF) fighters. (Nordland, 2010) The battle took place in the Consolidation II portion of the Operation Enduring Freedom Campaign in Afghanistan. The AAF likely
The boundaries for the RM plan would be defined by the criteria and requirements set forth by the RM plan mandate. An independent audit of the current RM situation should be undertaken in order to establish the RM status quo. A new RM Plan will comply with all current Federal and DOD regula...
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), III-1.
I have organized this paper into five distinct sections; mission, task organization, capabilities, limitations, and finally the conclusion. After the reading and comprehension of this paper, you should have gained a basic understanding of the Special Forces (SF) Chemical Reconnaissance Detachments (CRD). The following paper is mixed with Unclassified (UCI) and For Official Use Only (FOUO) information. FOUO is annotated at the beginning of all For Official Use Only information, the rest of the paper is UCI. If you wish to share this information paper with others, please at a minimum; confirm identity of the person prior to providing (FM 380-5, 2000). For further handling instructions please refer to FM 380-5, or contact me, I will gladly answer all questions.
The Technical Escort Unit (TEU) now provides the Department of Defense and other federal agencies to include the Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation with an immediate response capability for chemical and biological warfare material. Its mission is to provide a global response for escorting, packaging, detection, rendering-safe, disposing, sampling, analytics, and remediation missions. This does not only include chemical weapons for which it was originally created, but now incorporates biological weapons, state sponsored laboratories, small independent laboratories and small non-weaponized radioactive materials. Most recently, they have been task organized to assist Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) as a force multiplier; the objective of this is to give the Battle Field Commander instant on the ground intelligence regarding Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) hazards within their Area of Operations (AO). With this new mission with the BCT, the TEU is becoming an expeditionary force.
John Colvin was not an Ambassador, but he knew his operational environment inside and out. Colvin was an OSS agent during World War II and was deployed to Sarkhan. By the very nature of his profession he was required to understand his operational e...
Team leaders again represent that commanding leadership of their troops and will have to report that to their commander and so on and so forth. We risk not only one soldiers life, but the many others who need that soldier to have their battle buddies back in the face of combat. The keys to a solider system are the policy letters and army regulations that dictate every given bit of information on the army and its moral history. Within each article and sub articles the information is pertinent to the success of the soldier and shares the history as well, this can provide lessons to those who instruct other soldiers in training.
LM06, Strategic Planning Student Guide. (2013). Maxwell-Gunter AFB. Thomas N. Barnes Center for Enlisted Education (AETC).
In past instances the ability to control forces outside of territorial borders has been difficult, and can still be a challenge at times. Getting information to where it is needed when it is needed was just as much of a problem in the 1990’s as well, but with the advent of technologies such as the satellite phone and the global positioning system, directing the military outside of The States had become easier than ever before. Forward power projection is the control of military forces outside of its territory, and during the Operation Desert Shield and Storm this was effectively displaye...
... of Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 August 2011),III-10
The DIA started in 1958. The organizational structure of the DoD and U.S. foreign intelligence came to a new shape with the establishment of DIA. It was Robert McNamara, then Secretary of Defense, who came up with the concept of DIA in 1961. DIA gathers human source intelligence, analyzes technical intelligence, distributes intelligence/reports to the intelligence agencies, provides advice and support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with foreign military intelligence, and provides military intelligence to combatant commands as its operational functions. A DIA director is supposed to be a three-star military general and DIA is believed to have employed at least 7,500 staff worldwide today. The DIA is a defense intelligence agency that prevents strategic surprises and delivers a decision advantage to warfighters, defense planners, and to policymakers. This paper will try to evaluate DIA’s role in US national security in present condition of massive budget deficits and increased congressional oversight, plus the intelligence capabilities of the Regional Combatant Commanders and the individual services like CIA and NSA.
The Battalion S2 (BN S2) section deployed is defined as a battalion intelligence staff. Operations include ground forces visually conducting operations in a infantry battalion at Baghdad, Iraq. Irregular warfare provides a defining amount of visualization on the enemy threat. The tactical level of intelligence will exist on BN S2 battle rhythm, lethal targeting process, system applications and usage, and intelligence assets. This definition shares in a tradition for dominating target development. The BN S2 intelligence superiority is defined by a specific targeting structure for developing the enemy threat.
... linguistic and physical differences between our personnel and theirs sources (i.e. Iran, North Korea, China, etc.). This is why I believe that overt HUMINT collection is where our focus should be: the legality and relative ease of acquiring open source intelligence can give us a vast array of indicators that can be converted into complete information with significant intelligence value. It is the result of overt collection that constitutes the context that should lead to consideration for clandestine operations. One of the IC’s biggest challenges is eliminating our government’s Cold War mentality: I worry that the U.S. still spends way too much on ineffective clandestine programs when it would be better served by investing those funds in more analysts and analysis instruments to improve the noesis of vast amounts information obtainable through overt collection.
There are numerous accounts of the successful gathering of Signal Intelligence that prove to be of use. The rapid advancements in microelectronic technology forces the government to design and manufacture sophisticated new radars, airborne reconnaissance, and surveillance platforms; they offer superior capabilities over previously employed systems. Having accredited systems and networks, in accordance with Department of Defense guidance, will ensure that units are within regulations while collecting signals. To obtain the most beneficial information, analysts need to be properly trained in the latest and greatest data sets. Staffing 100% qualified personnel in strategic locations will lead to optimal performance in signals analysis; commanders should provide the capability of target redundancy with different forms to ensure that collection requirements are met. Lastly, understanding commander’s intent and the focus of effort are critical ingredients for success.
Lowenthal (2006) proposed several strategic implications associated with the myths and realities of the intelligence community. He implied OSINT is unable to offer the intelligence community with all the information it needs because there is still a large gap between what is collected and processed. Until there is a dedicated focus OSINT will always stay adjunct rather than a contributor b...