The Battalion S2 (BN S2) section deployed is defined as a battalion intelligence staff. Operations include ground forces visually conducting operations in a infantry battalion at Baghdad, Iraq. Irregular warfare provides a defining amount of visualization on the enemy threat. The tactical level of intelligence will exist on BN S2 battle rhythm, lethal targeting process, system applications and usage, and intelligence assets. This definition shares in a tradition for dominating target development. The BN S2 intelligence superiority is defined by a specific targeting structure for developing the enemy threat.
The BN S2 battle rhythm process is a technical sequence for parallel staff planning. BN S2 intelligence superiority is established by continuous reporting of the battle rhythm. The working groups are reported by platoon leaders, Assistant Battalion S2 (BN AS2), BN S2, Brigade Assistant S2 (BCT AS2), and Fires and Effects Coordination Cell (FECC). The connections are made to working groups for brigade targeting of 4 x BN S2/AS2, BCT AS2, and FECC. Working groups continue on one weekly meeting for target development. Continuous working groups provide targeting structure importance. Thereafter intelligence products connect to continue planning. The connections are made to working groups for battalion targeting of Company Intelligence Support Team Officer (COIST) and BN S2. Working groups continue on three weekly meetings for target development. Those areas of reporting will be marked by current intelligence reports. Robert Clark writes,
Because all participants share knowledge of the target, they are better able to identify gaps in knowledge and understand the important issues surrounding the target. Th...
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...urveillance areas. Maximizing effectiveness of signal intelligences while executing patrols. The areas will be synchronized to battalion assets. Patrols are made by all possible assets during employment. The intelligence assets are to include information for the targeting development.
The BN S2 section deployed provides emphasis as directing intelligence information. Operations include ground forces sharing in a tradition of dominating enemy threats. Intelligence superiority is therefore established by a specific targeting process. The Iraq war provides a visualization of conducting the targeting processes. Intelligence value is made evident by completing a continuous targeting process of working groups. Connecting to intelligence superiority at all levels of command. The tactical level of intelligence thereafter seeks to define target development.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the Battle of Kamdesh and provide an alternate outcome based on the utilization of intelligence and intelligence assets. Many battles could have had a different outcome if they would trust intelligence reports without needing to validate the intelligence with another source or simply have other intelligence assets available. The Battle of Kamdesh was certainly one of those battles. The battle started just before 0600 on October 3, 2009 on Combat Outpost (COP) Keating and nearby Observation Post (OP) Fritsche in the Kamdesh district of Nuristan Province, Afghanistan. About 70 Soldiers of Bravo Troop, 3rd Squadron, 61st Cavalry Regiment, along with 30 Afghan National Army Soldiers (ANA), fought an enemy force of about 300 Anti-Afghan Forces (AAF) fighters. (Nordland, 2010) The battle took place in the Consolidation II portion of the Operation Enduring Freedom Campaign in Afghanistan. The AAF likely
The 2nd Brigade of 101st Airborne Division found out in the summer of 2004 that they had to prepare for the war in the Middle East more particularly for Iraq. With Colonel Todd Ebel in Command of the 2nd Division with a year to prepare over 3,400 men and woman he got right to work. Colonel Ebel started by choosing his staff and who he thought was fit to take charge and lead this ever more complicated war. It was a huge religious civil war taking place in Iraq at the time with the Sunnis at war against the Shi’ite and after the capture of Saddam insurgency started uprising immediately. This uprising along with the uprising of Muqtada al-Sadr a key leader that had lots of violent followers that soon grew into a form of a militia called Mahdi Army which became another huge problem for the U.S. because the line between a legitamite populist movement and a huge theocratic organized-crime and terror ring was a thin one. The 2nd Brigade Infantry Battalions consisted of 1-502nd (First Strike) and 2-502nd (Strike Force) and 2nd brigade as a whole is known as the “Black Hearts”. Ebel’s mission was to deny insurgent’s access to Baghdad through his AO and as intelligence increased to uproot and destroy insurgent safe havens, while also training the IA so they could ensure the stability of the region later on. Ebel chose Lt. Col. Kunk as commander of “First Strike” 1-502nd and Lt. Col. Haycock as commander of “Strike Force” 2-502nd. By Ebel’s personality evaluations of Kunk and Haycock he decided that Kunk would work in the area that involved him being more engaging where populist centers were and work with local officials and Haycock more in the fighting areas. Kunk was in command of 3 rifle companies, 1 weapons company, 1 logistics company...
Effective planning is impossible without first understanding the problem. Commanders rely on personal observations, experiences, and input from others to develop understanding. They also prioritize information requests and incorporate additional information as those requests are answered. A complete understanding of the problem and environment builds the foundation for the operational process and ...
Compare and Contrast the Army Problem Solving Model (Process) with the Rapid Decision making and Synchronization Process. (C100)
In order to receive a victory in the Battle of the Bulge, General Patton used Mission Command Analysis in order to understand how he can be successful for this mission. The first thing of understanding t...
I have organized this paper into five distinct sections; mission, task organization, capabilities, limitations, and finally the conclusion. After the reading and comprehension of this paper, you should have gained a basic understanding of the Special Forces (SF) Chemical Reconnaissance Detachments (CRD). The following paper is mixed with Unclassified (UCI) and For Official Use Only (FOUO) information. FOUO is annotated at the beginning of all For Official Use Only information, the rest of the paper is UCI. If you wish to share this information paper with others, please at a minimum; confirm identity of the person prior to providing (FM 380-5, 2000). For further handling instructions please refer to FM 380-5, or contact me, I will gladly answer all questions.
Linda Robinson’s One Hundred Victories: Special Ops and the Future of American Warfare is a study of the changing role of America’s Special Forces. It shows how the role of Special Forces has changed during the war in Afghanistan. The book is a meticulous look at the difficulties faced by special operation forces in their effort to implement the strategy of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Additionally, it covers the general strategy of Village Stability Operations. Moreover, she explored what exactly Special Forces were and how they operated in Afghanistan. Finally, the author makes her prediction on the future role of Special Forces.
The Technical Escort Unit (TEU) now provides the Department of Defense and other federal agencies to include the Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation with an immediate response capability for chemical and biological warfare material. Its mission is to provide a global response for escorting, packaging, detection, rendering-safe, disposing, sampling, analytics, and remediation missions. This does not only include chemical weapons for which it was originally created, but now incorporates biological weapons, state sponsored laboratories, small independent laboratories and small non-weaponized radioactive materials. Most recently, they have been task organized to assist Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) as a force multiplier; the objective of this is to give the Battle Field Commander instant on the ground intelligence regarding Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) hazards within their Area of Operations (AO). With this new mission with the BCT, the TEU is becoming an expeditionary force.
In this paper, I will provide a Battle Analysis and outline the events leading up to and surrounding the Battle of 73 Eastings (refers to a north-south grid line). In addition, I will describe how the United States Army’s (USA) 2nd Armored Calvary Regiment (ACR) defeated forces from the Iraqi Republican Guard (IRG) using speed, technology and superior combat power. Although some consider the Battle of 73 Eastings extremely successful, some consider it a failure due to the large amount of Iraqi forces that retreated towards Bagdad. Lastly, I will analyze how each side used their intelligence assets and what they could have used to change the outcome.
...these intelligence failures, more emphasis is now placed on the creation of intelligence products used on the battlefield. All possible enemy courses of actions are now red teamed in an attempt to produce a much accurate analytical product.
2. Battle Management, Command, Control, and Communications (BM/C3): The BM/C3 component is divided into two main parts. First, the Command and Control (BM/C2) system controls the overall NMD system. Information from sensors is forwarded to the BM/C2, which processes the data and determines the targets for the GBI to intercept. Second, the In-Flight Interceptor Communications System (IFICS) is a network of ground systems that relay communications to the GBI while in flight to guide it to the incoming warhead.
(U) Background: Over the course of United States history the Army has made changes to how it engages its foreign enemies. These tactics techniques and procedures are the result of lessons learned during conflict, mistakes made under fire, and the results of a nation at war. As a result the IPB process has changed to accommodate a dynamic and often fluid battlefield. However this has not changed the core concept behind IPB, the four steps still remain an integral part of the Commanders Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), and are essential in war gaming. IPB assist in providing valuable Intelligence to the War Fighter throughout all phases of operations. This paper will cover each step of the IPB Process as well as discuss products associated with each of those steps and how these products can be an asset to the Commander and the War Fighter.
Shalikashvili, J.M. (n.d.). Shape, Respond, Prepare Now -- A Military Strategy for a New Era. National Military Strategy. Retrieved September 14, 2004, from http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/nms/index.html#Top
Intelligence failure was one of the main reasons why the Tet offensive happened. The allies undergo a failure of intelligence before Tet, a failure that helped plan the stages for changes in the strategies of the US. The four parts of intelligence are crucial in determining the actions of the enemy. The four tasks consist of collection of information, the analysis of the information, the decision to respond to a warning issued in the analytical stage, dissemination of the order to respond to the field co...
Armed with numerous studies, and intensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in DOD organization and responsibilities in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation significantly expanded the authority and responsibility of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this expanded authority and responsibility was the requirement for the chairman to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces. As operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today's world make the integration of individual service capabilities a matter of success or failure, life or death. Furthermore, the operation Desert One demonstrated the need for a strengthened Joint Warfare Doctrine and the consequent change in Joint Warfare Employment. It is plain to see the benefits of having the greatest navy integrated with the world's greatest army and air force. However, even in the wake of a relatively successful joint operation in the Middle East (Desert Storm), certain weaknesses are evident in the current joint employment tactics and/or capabilities. By analyzing past operations such as Urgent Fury and Desert Storm, we are able to see sufficient evidence that the Joint Warfare Concept can be disastrous in one instance and virtually flawless in another.