Why Did The Schlieffen Plan Fail

The Schlieffen Plan is one of the first military plans people learn about when studying World War I. Despite, the plan being common knowledge to individuals who have studied Western military, there is much controversy over why the plan failed for the Germans. In recent decades the main question over Schlieffen’s war plan, whether the plan was meant to be used as a military strategy or not. Since, the reunification of Germany in 1989, document that were once lost are now resurfacing, and with more information, there are more arguments about the reason the Schlieffen Plan failed. The recent argument on why the Schlieffen Plan failed was because Schlieffen was not creating a military plan to follow for war and destroy the French military in one blow, instead he was sketching out the possible ways Germany could defend themselves

against France and Russia because Imperial Germany did not have the proper amount of men in the army. The conclusion that the Schlieffen Plan was not meant to be used for war because the requirements to fulfill the plan were unachievable in early twentieth century Germany.
Schlieffen’s concern about a two front war was not an individual concern but a problem shared with most Germans. Prior to 1871, the area between France and Russia were made of dozens of different nation states. Germans, after unification, were primarily concerned with remaining a unified state without interference from France and Russia. Otto von Bismarck, Chancellor of Germany from 1871 to 1890, created multiple treaties with intent of allying with Russia and isolating France from making any powerful allies. An example of Bismarck’s attempt to isolate France was through the Three Emperor’s League, which consisted of Austria-Hungary Empire, Russian Empire, and Imperial Germany. In 1887, Russia left the Three Emperors League due to tensions between with Austria-Hungary over the Balkans, which led to Bismarck creating a Reinsurance Treaty with Russia. When Bismarck, resigned as Chancellor in 1890, the new Chancellor Leon von Caprivi did not renew the Reinsurance Treaty. Caprivi did not renew the treaty because Russia was a czarist nation, thus they would not ally themselves towards a Republic such as, France, and Russia’s military was inferior towards Germany and other nation states. Schlieffen knew about the political sphere in late nineteenth century and early twentieth; thus he decided to create a blueprint of how to protect the Fatherland.
Historians have assumed Schlieffen viewed the Russian army as inferior. Due to the Russo-Japanese War and the Russian Revolution in 1905, the Russians were ineffective in combat; thus could be dealt with at a later date. German intelligence of 1906 stated that Russians could deploy around twenty-five infantry against Germany and twenty-two against Austria-Hungary. The Russians were redeploying on the western front immediately after the war with the Japanese. The majority of the Russian army, minus one regime, were loyal to the Russian government; thus the Russians were still a threat to Imperial Germany. Schlieffen knew that East Prussia could not be left unprotected against the Russians because the Russian would be ruthless against the Germans. When Schlieffen considered the possibility of a two-front war, he made it so two-thirds of the German army was on the western front, while one-third was on the eastern front. Schlieffen did not like the idea of Germany being split into two parts because the German army was not equipped with enough men and infantry to defend themselves against both, the French and Russians. The Schlieffen Plan required 106 divisions for a two-front war, but Imperial Germany had seventy-two in total in 1906. When World War I started in 1914, the Germans only had sixty-eight divisions on the west, which left sixteen divisions on the eastern front. Thus, the possibility of a sweeping victory for Germany within six weeks was unpractical because the number of men to fulfill the plan were nonexistent.
Kaiser Wilhelm II strained the budget of Germany’s Imperial Army through waging war with China, in the Boxer Rebellion, and the imperialized area of Herero. Since, Imperial Germany’s military budget was over exhausted, which led towards a lack of preparedness when war approach. The military budget helps prepare for war is through hiring quality personnel, updated equipment, and training. Each of the military efforts of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, forced the German army dwindled in numbers and the ability to fight, their neighbors in a military battle. Thus, when Schlieffen created his plan to defend Imperial Germany, the amount of men he suggested were unavailable, due to the small number of the German Imperial army. The 1906 draft of the Schlieffen Plan required ninety-six divisions, or 960,000 men, for a one front war with France but the Germany Imperial Army had only seventy-two divisions, or 720,000 men, the years prior and post 1906. Since, Schlieffen was the Chief of the German General Staff, there is no question he knew the amount of men in the Imperial Army. Thus, the conclusion can again be made that Schlieffen did not intend for his plan to be used for battle, instead he was sketching what the German army would need to win a battle against France.
Historian Terence Holmes argues that Schlieffen could have created forty-eight corps, which would have included ninety divisions instead of ninety-six, in 1906. Holmes argument is weakened, since the Imperial army remained with seventy-two divisions in 1909. Erich Ludendorff joined the Second Section of the Great General Staff in Berlin in 1905; he was designated to test the minute details of Schlieffen’s Plan. Ludendorff noted that Schlieffen argued with war ministers von Grossler and von Einem over the correct amount of men for the reserve and Landwehr units. The war ministers declined Schlieffen’s proposal for more men because the army did not have the proper funds to finance the men needed in the operation. Thus, the amount of men required for the Schlieffen plan were nonsexist, despite Holmes belief that Schlieffen could have raised up enough men to fulfill ninety divisions.
Schlieffen knew the Imperial German Army was not strong enough in numbers to attack France, thus he planned for counter-attacks. France had to initiate war with Imperial Germany, for the Germans to have a chance of winning, due to lack of men in the army. The primary reason an advance into France with fewer than 96 divisions would not succeed, because the Germans had to be strong enough to advance towards the west of Paris in order to outflank the river lines of: Aisne-Oise, or the Marne, or the Seine. The area of Metz is where Schlieffen planned the majority of the battles would occur because the Germans could use the area a jumping in point. The German army would have an upper hand because they knew the terrain the battles were being fought and would not have to travel as far for goods and ammunition. Schlieffen also figured that the French and Russians would launch a coordinated and nearly-simultaneous joint offensive Germany would use the rail mobility to mass and counterattack against one of these offensives, then use Germany's interior position and rail mobility to mass on the other front and counterattack there. In either case, it was important to fight near the German border, close to the German railheads, and not plunge into the interior of either France or Russia. Thus, the separation of the German army to head around the west of Paris would have made the German army weaker and easier to destroy.
Annika Mombauer argues that Schlieffen did intend for Imperial Germany to attack offensively towards the French. Since, the Schlieffen plan aimed for offensive attacks than Germany deserves war guilt. The argument that Germany planned for offensive attacks, which makes them guilty of war, is easily refutable. In order for the Germans to attack offensively, the requirement for men in the military would be high. The recent interpretation of the Schlieffen plan states that the plan was inoperable because it required twenty-four divisions, the German army did not have. Thus, the possibility that Imperial Germany had the necessary amount of men to attack offensively is ludicrous. Then, if war guilt is based on who attacks offensively than the French and Russians are guilty. Based on the first couple battles of World War I, one can see that France and Russia were attacking Germans were on the defensive..
Schlieffen realized that separating German troops on the western front, would be the downfall for the Germans against the French, which is another reason the plan was not meant for actual military use. There are Historians who argue that Schlieffen believed the Germans were capable of blockading Paris, and meeting the rest of the army in the south of France. Historians are incorrect in this association because in 1905, the Germans had around seventy-two divisions, which is not enough men to pull off such a great feet. Schlieffen knew that the Germans were not well equipped enough, he never created the famous map, which outlined his famous sweep across the northern part of France. In not creating an outline map, Schlieffen shows that he did not believe the Germans were able to attack anywhere but near the borders of France and Germany. Since, the German army was not strong enough to fight the French, then in Schlieffen’s point of view the Germans would be decimated. No, high ranking official in the army would allow their men to be decimated, if there was a way to avoid it. Thus, Historians are inaccurate in the assumption that Schlieffen would want a quick defeat in France, because there was high probability of Imperial Germany getting destroyed. Schlieffen created his plan to show German officials how weak the Imperial army was, not how to actually siege Paris.
The primary focus of the plan Schlieffen created in 1905, was how Imperial Germany was to defend themselves with such a small number of men. In the draft, which Schlieffen created, he also outlined how the Germans were to mobilize across the French border. The mobility, which was required to fulfill the Schlieffen Plan, was unrealistic, and had the plan been made, as a war plan then Schlieffen would have created realistic goals and possible outcomes had part of mobilization failed. The success of the strategy Schlieffen created in 1905, relied heavily on quick mobilization, in which the execution and deployment of the plan was executed within a forty-two days. The railway system, which allowed high-capacity travel, offered the German army to head to battle at the pace Schlieffen had planned. Since, the Imperial German army was heading to battle through the railway system then the Germans were tied towards a vulnerable form of transportation. Schlieffen was aware of the problems of relying on the railway system towards his plan; nonetheless he did not create a solution. Schlieffen was the General of the German Army, which meant he knew the risks of not creating alternative solutions, or ways to fix a highly likely problem, in a war plan. Thus, the conclusion can than be made that Schlieffen was not creating a war strategy, but a rough draft of how to defend the Germans against France and Russia.
Gerhard P. Gross is one of many Historians who argue that Schlieffen planned to plan say that the Germans were to have annihilated the French in 30 to 40 days. The concept that there could be a quick battle of annihilation in France is ridiculous. The map which outline the Schlieffen plan states it takes the German army thirty-one days to march to the Somme, the north of Paris. The time it would take to march around Paris and then through Switzerland would have been even longer, from six to eight weeks. The Germans would then have to foot-march back to the railheads in Germany. According to the 1914 Aufmarschanweisungen, the Germans had the rail capacity to move seven corps at once, thus moving even part of the army towards the eastern would take weeks. Even if everything went according to plan, the Schlieffen plan would have taken four or five months. In two or three months the Russians could have deployed 110-120 divisions against nine German and forty Austrian divisions. Prior to what Historians believed, the Schlieffen plan could not have provided a quick victory against France and Russia. Since, the Schlieffen plan could not provide a quick victory, meant that the plan was inoperable because Russia and France would mobilize their armies fast enough to attack a helpless Germany.
Majority of Historians agree that General Alfred von Schlieffen created the Schlieffen Plan in 1906, to fight a two front war occurred with France on the west and Russia on the east.

The objective of the plan was to attack France with all of the power the Imperial Germany Army had, which would make a quick victory for Germany on one side. After the victory in France, Germany would than attack Russia because Schlieffen believed the Russian military was frail and not a real threat. Thus, the war would be over by Christmas with a German victory. When World War I broke out in July of 1914, the Germans implemented the Schlieffen Plan with slight changes made by Colonel-General Helmuth von Moltke, and lost the Battle of the Marne on the western front and the Russian army nearly decimated the German army on the east. There are recently discovered documents from Schlieffen that suggest that he did not plan for his strategy to be used in war, but was a rough draft. There is evidence that suggest that Schlieffen was outlining a way Imperial Germany could defend themselves because the requirements to fulfill the Schlieffen Plan were not

achievable.