JAPANESE STRATEGIC FAILURES IN THE SPRING OF 1942

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“After successfully executing operations in the Southeast and the Southwest Pacific by the spring of 1942, what should Japan have done next?”

“I can run wild for six months … after that, I have no expectation of success.”

Unconfirmed quotation attributed to Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief Japanese Combined Fleet.

Setting the stage

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto is believed to have foretold of the suffering that was to befall Japan, and in fact was said to have argued heavily against waking a “sleeping giant.” Did Yamamoto recognize the shortcomings of Japan’s war strategy even before the first shots were fired?

Planners of the first strike at Pearl Harbor, including Admiral Fukodome, argue that the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was as successful as it could have been, stating that the United States needed two full years to begin any significant offensive in the Pacific. 1 pg 83 If their assessment was correct, and many will argue that it was, the question arises of whether any Japanese war strategy could have led to a successful war termination for Japan.

After a quick examination of the recurring theme of Japanese military arrogance, I will argue that the three most compelling strategies that the Japanese could have pursued in the spring of 1942 were, one – to consolidate the most important resource gains that were already made; two – commence immediate planning for a strong anti-submarine warfare campaign; and three – coordinate significant operations with Japan’s Axis partners, particularly in the Indian Ocean and Southwest Asia theaters of conflict.

Recurring theme of arrogance

Once significant recurring theme affecting Japanese planning for war was the psychology of arrogance ...

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...here their interests were indeed greatest, they could have not only held off the Allies for a longer period of time, but perhaps could have actually ended the war on favorable terms. Failing to work with their Axis partners, failing to learn any lessons on warfare from other theaters, and failing to logically prioritize their interests was a combination of strategic errors which proved catastrophic for the Japanese in World War Two.

Works Cited
1. “Eagle Against the Sun,” by Ronald H. Spector, Random House, 1985.

2. “Kaigun,” by David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, Naval Institute Press, 1997.

3. “A World at Arms,” by Gerhard L. Weinberg, Cambridge University Press, 1994.

4. “The Pacific War Companion,” edited by Daniel Marston, Osprey Publishing, 2005.

5. “A War to be Won,” Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, Harvard University Press, 2000.

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