“After successfully executing operations in the Southeast and the Southwest Pacific by the spring of 1942, what should Japan have done next?”
“I can run wild for six months … after that, I have no expectation of success.”
Unconfirmed quotation attributed to Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief Japanese Combined Fleet.
Setting the stage
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto is believed to have foretold of the suffering that was to befall Japan, and in fact was said to have argued heavily against waking a “sleeping giant.” Did Yamamoto recognize the shortcomings of Japan’s war strategy even before the first shots were fired?
Planners of the first strike at Pearl Harbor, including Admiral Fukodome, argue that the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was as successful as it could have been, stating that the United States needed two full years to begin any significant offensive in the Pacific. 1 pg 83 If their assessment was correct, and many will argue that it was, the question arises of whether any Japanese war strategy could have led to a successful war termination for Japan.
After a quick examination of the recurring theme of Japanese military arrogance, I will argue that the three most compelling strategies that the Japanese could have pursued in the spring of 1942 were, one – to consolidate the most important resource gains that were already made; two – commence immediate planning for a strong anti-submarine warfare campaign; and three – coordinate significant operations with Japan’s Axis partners, particularly in the Indian Ocean and Southwest Asia theaters of conflict.
Recurring theme of arrogance
Once significant recurring theme affecting Japanese planning for war was the psychology of arrogance ...
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...here their interests were indeed greatest, they could have not only held off the Allies for a longer period of time, but perhaps could have actually ended the war on favorable terms. Failing to work with their Axis partners, failing to learn any lessons on warfare from other theaters, and failing to logically prioritize their interests was a combination of strategic errors which proved catastrophic for the Japanese in World War Two.
Works Cited
1. “Eagle Against the Sun,” by Ronald H. Spector, Random House, 1985.
2. “Kaigun,” by David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, Naval Institute Press, 1997.
3. “A World at Arms,” by Gerhard L. Weinberg, Cambridge University Press, 1994.
4. “The Pacific War Companion,” edited by Daniel Marston, Osprey Publishing, 2005.
5. “A War to be Won,” Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, Harvard University Press, 2000.
To begin, the attack on Pearl Harbour was devastating to U.S. naval capabilities in the Pacific at the onset of their entry into the war. Japanese officials had grown tired of the U.S. oil embargo, which was meant to limit their territorial expansion and aggression in South-East Asia as well as China, and as negotiations weren’t reaching any conclusions they decided that the only course of action was a first strike on the aircraft carriers at Pearl Harbour to cripple U.S. naval capability in the Pacific (Rosenberg 1). The attack, which lasted about two hours, had resulted in the sinking of four battleships, among ...
...l the way to war termination, not chance, that ultimately allowed the Japanese to achieve their military and political goals.
... the Japanese were unpredictable. If Harry Truman had not dropped the bombs over Japan it would have only brought on further casualties.
This paper will compare Gordon W. Prange's book "At Dawn We Slept - The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor" with the film "Tora! Tora! Tora!" directed by Richard Fleischer, Kinji Fukasaku, and Toshio Masuda. While the film provides little background to the attack, its focal point is on the Pearl Harbor assault and the inquiry of why it was not prevented, or at least foreseen in adequate time to decrease damage. Prange's book examines the assault on Pearl Harbor from both the Japanese and American viewpoints to gain a global view of the situation and the vast provision undertaken by Japanese intelligence.
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was one of the most atrocious attacks to have ever happened on American soil, starting with disagreement on the Potsdam declaration. Japan’s greed for more land and industrial materials led the Japanese to make a plan to keep the United States out of the war, which consisted the use of kamikaze pilots and bombs to destroy our aircraft carriers and boats in an attempt to control the Pacific. While leaving the drowning, and dead bodies of thousands of American seamen and battleships at the bottom of the sea, seemed to be a good idea to the Japanese; America joined World War II and introduced the first nuclear weapons as reprisal for the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. Had the Japanese agreed to an unconditional surrender and end to militarism during the agreement on the Potsdam declaration, the introduction to nuclear weapons and the death count wouldn’t have been so high and devastating on both the American and Japanese sides.
One of, if not the most influential part, of allowing the bombs to drop is because of the mentality of the Japanese military and the pull they had in politics. As Maddox stated, “[t]he army, not the Foreign Office controlled the situation” (Maddox, pg. 286). Although Japan had an influential leader in regards to their emperor, the military wanted to and would have engag...
Even before the battle started, America saw his attack coming. Japan had bombed the Dutch harbor in Alaska on the days of June 3rd and 4th. Japan landed there instead of on the islands of Attu and Kiska, in fear the United States might be there. There attacks failed when the plan to get the American fleet from Midway to aid the freshly bombed Dutch harbor. At 0900 hours an American patrol boat spotted the Japanese fleet seven hundred miles from Midway. At that point admiral Soroku Yamamoto’s plans of a sneak attack were over. Admiral fletcher commanded the U.S.S. Yorktown before it was sunk by the Japanese. Then at 0750, japan spots nine enemy (American) planes fifteen miles out. Tones, a Japanese cruiser, opened fire on the American pilots. Almost instantly if an American bomber plane were hit it would explode and go down. The bombers dropped their torpedoes to far from their targets, so the torpedoes didn’t land a single blow to Japan. At 1040 japan sent from Hiryu,...
Anderson, F., and R.S Stephenson. The War That Made America. Penguin Group USA, 2005. (accessed December 5th , 2013).
Zimm, Alan D. Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions / Alan D. Zimm ; Graphics by Matt Baughman. Philadelphia, [Pa.: Casemate, 2011. Print.
On December 7th 1941, Japanese Planes and submarines attacked the United States Naval base at Pearl Harbor. This event singlehandedly brought the U.S from its then neutral stance in World War Two to a fighting member of the “Allied Powers.” Pearl Harbor was the first of a long series of confrontations between the U.S and the Japanese in an effort to gain control of the Pacific. Unlike the “War in Europe” the Pacific strategy was dominated by naval and aerial battles, with the occasional land-based “Island Hopping” Campaign. As such, one of the most important factors in the war in the pacific was Fleet Size, the more ships a country could send to war, the better. Pearl Harbor was the Japanese’s way of trying to deal with the massive U.S Pacific fleet. However, Pearl Harbor was not the turning point of the war. After December 7th the United States began work on numerous technological developments which would ultimately help them in one of the most important battles of WWII, the largest naval confrontation of the war, The Battle of Midway. The battle, which took place from June 4th to June 7th , 1942 is widely considered the turning point of the Pacific Theater (James & Wells). Through the Post-Pearl Harbor desire for “Revenge” and various technological advantages including code breaking and radar, the U.S were able to outsmart the Japanese at Midway and ultimately win the battle, eventually leading to a victory in the Pacific.
Japan was quickly on the path to destruction. Grant, Michael J., 1998. Of course, the Allies ignored this for the reason that dropping the atomic bomb on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would intimidate Russia. Had they truly been considering saving more lives and bringing a quick end to the war in Japan, they would have simply waited them out without the major loss of life seen at both Hiroshima and Nagasaki. At the Yalta conference, Franklin Delano Roosevelt asked Josef Stalin for Russian support in the war with Japan.
Introduction – Pearl Harbor was vulnerable to attack because of the obstruction of defense and warning.
It was a Sunday morning, on December 7, 1941 when Pearl Harbor, US naval base located on Hawaii, was attacked by the Japanese. They caught unguarded the whole nation, and for that, this attack is considered one of the top ten failures of the US intelligence. The Japanese were able to attack Pearl Harbor by surprise because of the mindset of US officials, whom they saw Japanese as a weak enemy, who wouldn’t risk attacking US territory, caused by a supremacy factor; As well as the not good enough US intelligence efficiency to encrypt Japanese codes, and the handling of such information. After the negotiations between the Japanese and the United States ended, there was no doubt that they would make an attack, but they didn’t know the target of it.
With the outcome of the Battle of Pearl Harbor not accomplishing Japans ideals and retaliation was for certain. The island of Midway started preparing for a battle, “After the somewhat shaking events of 7 December, Midway, no less than Pearl Harbor, prepared for the worst with full anticipation that it would come” (Heinl, 16). Within two weeks new shipments of aircrafts and US troops to the island had arrived to stockpile resources. The United States was preparing to defend their fleet and resources involved. The attack on Pearl Harbor opened up the idea to American that the war had already started whether people kne...
This paper will exam the strategic options Japan had in the spring of 1942 on the heels of their continued military success in the Asian Pacific against the United States following the attacks on Pearl Harbor. In order to better discuss the validity of these options, it is important view them against the backdrop of the issues facing the Japanese civilian and military leadership by spring 1942. At the time when Japan entered the second phase of their Pacific campaign, they were hampered by their