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Clausewitz’s On War signficance
On war book 1 clausewitz analysis
Clausewitz’s On War signficance
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War termination and the decision of when to negotiate peace are rarely effectively planned before a war. The Russo-Japanese War is one of a few historical exceptions. The Russo-Japanese War provides three enduring lessons about war termination in a conflict fought for limited aims. First, the most effective war termination plans are created before the war. Second, continued military and political pressure can effectively improve your position to negotiate peace. Third, common interests and compromise are required for durable peace.
Clausewitz’s thoughts on war termination effectively summarize the situation for the Japanese and Russian Empires preceding peace negotiations, “Inability to carry on the struggle can, in practice, be replaced by two other grounds for making peace: the first is the improbability of victory; the second is its unacceptable cost.” (Clausewitz, 91). The Japanese effectively identified their culminating point of victory and predicted that continued success would be highly improbable. The Russian Empire had the means to eventually turn the tide of the war, but the cost to do this was unacceptable. As a result, both chose to negotiate peace while continuing to take steps to improve their negotiating position. The Russo-Japanese War highlights the Japanese Empire’s ability to effectively plan, execute and negotiate the termination of a war, despite being considered a vastly inferior power at the onset of war.
The first enduring lesson of war termination in the Russo-Japanese War is that the most effective war termination plans are created before the war. This lesson would appear somewhat obvious, but historically, detailed war termination plans before the start of war are infrequent. Efforts to e...
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...l the way to war termination, not chance, that ultimately allowed the Japanese to achieve their military and political goals.
The Russo-Japanese War has many lessons to offer and this essay has discussed the three most enduring lessons about war termination in a conflict for limited aims. History has and will likely continue to show us the inherent difficulties of successful and durable war termination. The leadership foresight needed to pre-plan war termination that achieves the political goal is often beyond the capabilities of countries and their leadership. The Japanese provide us with a rare scenario where their pre-war plan was nearly identical to the post war results. As a result, the Russo-Japanese War can offer current planners and leaders several valuable lessons on war strategy, planning and termination that are still relevant to today’s conflicts.
... be set at fair prices and therefore successful trading. Also, through commercialization, the Japanese were able to expand on their own lives and embellish their lives more.
The primary goal of this extreme force was to bring a swift end to the war in the Pacific, (Walker) but a secondary goal was to display the military and technological might of the United States to allies and rivals around the world (Walker). The use of multiple nuclear weapons made it clear to Japan and the world that Truman's threat of “utter destruction” was intended to be carried out unless Japan delivered what the United States wantedunconditional surrender (Cite). The potential use of atomic weapons against the Japanese was appealing to the United States because it was seen as a dramatic and decisive way to end the war (Walker, ). Prior to the decision to use nuclear weapons, Japan and the United States were at odds over the terms by which the Japanese would surrender to the Americans, which did nothing but prolong the military conflict (Walker, ). Japanese leadership had expressed its desire to end the war to third parties, but could not come to an agreement over what terms would be acceptable for their surrender (Walker, 47)....
In Prompt and Utter Destruction, J. Samuel Walker provides the reader with an elaborate analysis of President Truman’s decision behind using the atomic bomb in Japan. He provokes the reader to answer the question for himself about whether the use of the bomb was necessary to end the war quickly and without the loss of many American lives. Walker offers historical and political evidence for and against the use of the weapon, making the reader think critically about the issue. He puts the average American into the shoes of the Commander and Chief of the United States of America and forces us to think about the difficulty of Truman’s decision.
Japan led a ruthless assault in the Pacific for fifteen years. This small island was able to spread imperialism and terror to neighboring countries through means of force and brutality. Japan even attempted to combat and overcome European and Western countries such as Russia and the United States. Even with an extreme militaristic government, Japan was unable to achieve the glory it was promised and hoped for. The Pacific War analyzes Japan’s part in the war and what the country could have done to prevent such a tragedy.
Clausewitz emphasizes that “war is a branch of political activity, that it is in no sense autonomous” (Clausewitz, 605). This principle is especially applicable to the post-war period of World War II. The political struggle between the ideologies of democracy and communism would entail global focus for the next 50 years, and the events that brought about the defeat of Germany shaped the landscape of this political struggle.
The Korean War, also known as the forgotten war , was one of the most brutal and violent wars of the 20th century. Less than five million people died during this war. My grandfather, Herbert Victor Sapper, was drafted during the time of the Korean War, but, he wasn’t sent to Korea, he was sent to Japan. Since my grandfather passed away in 1995, I gathered all of my information about my grandfather from my grandmother, Lelia Bell Sapper. Here is their story.
Although WW II ended over 50 years ago there is still much discussion as to the events which ended the War in the Pacific. The primary event which historians attribute to this end are the use of atomic bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Although the bombing of these cities did force the Japanese to surrender, many people today ask “Was the use of the atomic bomb necessary to end the war?” and more importantly “Why was the decision to use the bomb made?” Ronald Takaki examines these questions in his book Hiroshima.
The Japanese government believed that the only way to solve its economic and demographic problems was to expand into its neighbor’s territory and take over its import market, mostly pointed at China. To put an end on that the United States put economic sanctions and trade embargoes. We believed that if we cut off their resources and their source of federal income than they would have no choice but to pull back and surrender. But the
The United States of America’s use of the atomic bomb on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has spurred much debate concerning the necessity, effectiveness, and morality of the decision since August 1945. After assessing a range of arguments about the importance of the atomic bomb in the termination of the Second World War, it can be concluded that the use of the atomic bomb served as the predominant factor in the end of the Second World War, as its use lowered the morale, industrial resources, and military strength of Japan. The Allied decision to use the atomic bomb not only caused irreparable physical damage to two major Japanese cities, but its use also minimized the Japanese will to continue fighting. These two factors along with the Japanese neglect of the Soviet Invasion of Manchuria, proved that the Allied use of the atomic bomb was the definitive factor in the Japanese decision to surrender.
Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. “Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman and the Surrender of Japan.” Taking Sides: Clashing View in United States History. Ed. Larry Madaras & James SoRelle. 15th ed. New York, NY. 2012. 289-298.
Had it not been for Hirohito’s decision to surrender Japan to its allies during World War II in 1945, Japan would have been given the opportunity to thrive both economically and socially as it has to this very day. Hirohito put his people as his foremost priority, and this undivided care led him to make the best decisions for Japan. His military tactics and thought process brought Japan to its success and it is thus why Japan is now one of the most recognized and distinguished countries of the modern-day.
In this example, the realism peace theories are applied to the West European cold peace after the Second World War. The transition of cold war in 1950s to cold peace was due to the emergence of realist mechanisms where the United States (US) pacifying role as the hegemon and the common threat produced from the Soviet Union to the US and Western Europe. The combined effects of hegemony and balance of power produced the cold peace between the key rivals France and West Germany after the World War Two in 1950-1954. The initial caused of conflict was due to a series of disagreements about the status of Germany (Steans, .et.al, 2005). During the cold war, France tried to control Germany and made the state powerless by drawing it into alliance. The states accepted each other’s existence through formal agreements and maintained diplomatic relations. The US and Soviet Union came forward to dictate the change in French policy and the involvement of US had influence the French-German relationship. Nevertheless, there were unresolved conflicts and high extent of mutual insecurity between the two states. At the same time, the Soviet Union took a precaution to ensure that Germany did not pose a threat.
It is interesting and even surprising that the two major strategies regarding war were developed by European contemporaries of the late eighteenth and nineteenth century. Antoine Henri de Jomini (1779-1869) approached his philosophy of war in a structured, scientific manner. Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) took a more fluid, open-ended approach to his philosophy of war. The fact that they lived during the same time period in Europe is also fascinating in that they likely knew of each others’ writings as well as potentially influenced and were influenced by the philosophy of the other. Jomini’s scientific approach is more applicable to the tactical and operational levels of war while Clausewitz approaches war as more of an art or interaction between people that is more appropriate to the strategic and political levels of war. Although their two war strategies are presented as opposing strategies, by comparing concepts from each of the theorists to the other theorist’s work shows that they are actually more complementary than competing in that they are addressing different levels of war. The concepts to be evaluated are Clausewitz’s “Trinity of War”, “war as a continuation of politics”, and the “unpredictability of war” as well as Jomini’s definition of strategy and his “Fundamental Principle of War”.
It is possible that with no other country in the twentieth century clearly on the inevitable road to war has there been as much unpreparedness and complete lack of all comprehension than that of Russia prior to World War I. For the few years before 1914 and the start of the war, especially following the embarrassing loss to Japan, Russia recognized its eminent clash with Germany. The way with which it conducted its international relations and internal affairs is puzzling to say the least.
How do the terms or implementation of treaties determine peace or conflict decades later? Efforts to build a just and lasting peace are complicated not only because past grievances must be addressed, but future interests must be anticipated-even when such future interests were not identified as the cause of war in the first place. Edward Teller, discussing the Manhattan Project, observed, "No endeavor which is worthwhile is simple in prospect; if it is right, it will be simple in retrospect."2 Only if a nation perceives that continuing observance of the treaty will sustain the state over a long period of time and in changing circumstances, the peace and security promised by the treaty will endure. Machiavelli observed that ". . . fear of loss of the State by a prince or republic will overcome both gratitude and treaties."3