Clausewitz defines war as an “act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” The nature of war is enduring yet the character of war changes over time. Current US strategic guidance is advancing the point of view that since the character of war has changed to focus on irregular wars then the US military should prepare for a future of irregular wars. This shift in focus forgets that the nature of war is enduring and in order to be successful, we must prepare for all types of conflict. This paper will define the types of conflict and the likelihood of each followed by a discussion of US strategic guidance and ending with an analysis of the training resources and force structure requirements needed to achieve success for all types of conflict.
Regular or conventional warfare is defined as war “typically between uniformed, state sponsored armies with high casualties, a high tempo, and a high consumption of resources.” Irregular warfare is a broad term that includes many different aspects of conflict against mostly irregular forces. Some of the aspects of irregular warfare include security force assistance, counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, peace keeping, stability operations, and counter-terrorism. Hybrid threats combine aspects of both conventional and irregular forms of warfare. Regular, irregular, and hybrid threats all describe the different characters of war that exist within the enduring nature of war.
Historically, the United States has most often engaged in irregular wars since its conception. Robert Scaife’s article in the Small Wars Journal discusses the few instances the US military has faced regular wars when stating that, “During the 20th Century, the United States arguably engaged...
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...nal war capabilities in the process.
The US military can be successful in future wars if it focuses on, trains to, and adapts its force structure to prepare for full spectrum operations. The most likely challenges to US national security interests include international terrorist organizations, transnational criminal organizations, insurgent rebellions and small wars. The most dangerous challenges to US national security interests come from major conventional threats like Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China. To overcome these most likely and most dangerous challenges, the US needs to focus its strategic guidance on full spectrum operations, increase training in conventional operations while maintaining current training in irregular operations, and improve the force structure with irregular operation enablers while maintaining its conventional power capabilities.
The world’s history is majorly shaped by mega wars that happen both inside and outside the boundaries of individual nations. Almost every sovereign state in the world had to forcefully liberate itself from its colonizers and oppressors mainly through warfare. For instance, America had to fight a long and exhausting revolutionary war against the British before it could attain its independence in 1783, likewise is the fate of many other nations. It is important to understand the two distinct types of wars that exist and their implications. Guerrilla warfare and the conventional military warfare are two types of war that are very different in their execution and military approach. The purpose of this paper is to highlight the similarities and differences existing between the American war in Vietnam and the American Revolution (Vetter, 1997).
Thinking historically while conducting counterinsurgency in the 21st century poses questions regarding how to develop political and strategic plans. This bibliographic essay will examine the political and military aspect of fighting counterinsurgent warfare by 20th century theorists Galula’s, “Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice” and Trinquier’s, “Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice”. Strategy in fighting guerilla wars will be discussed by comparing conflicts in battles and ideologies from the past to current day. Moreover, ways to avoid the one size fits all war mentality when combating modern day insurgents will be recommended.
In today’s operational environments, the U.S. Army is facing a range of problems and mission sets that are arguably more complex than previously encountered. Forces face an array of demands that encompass geo-political, social, cultural, and military factors that interact in unpredictable ways. The inherent complexity of today’s operations has underscored the need for the Army to expand beyond its traditional approach to operational planning. In March 2010 in FM 5-0: The Operations
Singer, Peter W. "War Made New: The History and Future of Technology and Warfare." The Brookings Institution. N.p., 26 Oct. 2006. Web. 15 Apr. 2014.
“Never think that war, no matter how necessary, nor how justified, is not a crime.” As depicted in the quote by Ernest Hemingway war is a difficult situation in which the traditional boundaries of moral ethics are tested. History is filled with unjust wars and for centuries war was not though in terms of morality. Saint Augustine, however, offered a theory detailing when war is morally permissible. The theory offers moral justifications for war as expressed in jus ad bellum (conditions for going to war) and in jus in bello (conditions within warfare).The theory places restrictions on the causes of war as well as the actions permitted throughout. Within early Christianity, the theory was used to validate crusades as morally permissible avoiding conflict with religious views. Based on the qualifications of the Just War Theory few wars have been deemed as morally acceptable, but none have notably met all the requirements. Throughout the paper I will apply Just War Theory in terms of World War II as well as other wars that depict the ideals presented by Saint Augustine.
The just war theory is described by Thomas Massaro in his book Living Justice as the “principle that warfare might be justified under certain conditions” (108). The complexities involved with international relations makes determining a just war very difficult. Even though historically pacifism hasn’t gained much traction within Catholic circles, it currently is gaining popularity with many mainstream Catholics. With so many differing views on military action, one might ask, “What determines a just war? How can we balance the need for peace with self-defense?” An examination of criteria for a just war and critiques written on this topic might shed light on these two questions.
part in official argument about war" (Walzer XI). He proceeds to discuss in a greater
The war strategies of Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine Henri de Jomini are not mutually exclusive philosophies. Clausewitz’s “Trinity of War”, “war as an extension of politics”, and the “unpredictability of war” speak more so to the upper, strategic and political ranges of war. Jomini addresses the operational and tactical levels in the lower ranges of war with his definition of strategy and his “Fundamental Principle of War”. So if one views their work collectively rather than as competitors, the two philosophies complement each other by addressing different segments of the spectrum of war.
Should the government decrease military spending or should it increase military spending? This is a question that many Americans wrestle with, and politically speaking, is a point of great contention since to many, military might evokes a sense of security. However, when considering this question from a foreign policy standpoint, does current military spending really match the current level of threats faced by the United States, or are too many dollars being allocated for an unnecessary level of military strength? There are certainly cons in making the decision to drastically lower military spending, but they are minimal when compared to the positive ramifications such a decision would have. This paper aims to explore these pros and cons
The military is tasked with the duty and responsibility of protecting the nation from external attacks and managing any attacks that may happen. Over the years, countries across the world have engaged in conflicts originating from differences in policies and invasion of privacy and unfair treatment of citizens in foreign countries. In...
Current military leadership should comprehend the nature of war in which they are engaged within a given political frame in order to develop plans that are coherent with the desired political end state. According to Clausewitz, war is an act of politics that forces an enemy to comply with certain conditions or to destroy him through the use of violence. A nation determines its vital interests, which drives national strategy to obtain or protect those interests. A country achieves those goals though the execution of one of the four elements of power, which are diplomatic, informational, military and economical means. The use of military force...
Armed with numerous studies, and intensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in DOD organization and responsibilities in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation significantly expanded the authority and responsibility of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this expanded authority and responsibility was the requirement for the chairman to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces. As operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today's world make the integration of individual service capabilities a matter of success or failure, life or death. Furthermore, the operation Desert One demonstrated the need for a strengthened Joint Warfare Doctrine and the consequent change in Joint Warfare Employment. It is plain to see the benefits of having the greatest navy integrated with the world's greatest army and air force. However, even in the wake of a relatively successful joint operation in the Middle East (Desert Storm), certain weaknesses are evident in the current joint employment tactics and/or capabilities. By analyzing past operations such as Urgent Fury and Desert Storm, we are able to see sufficient evidence that the Joint Warfare Concept can be disastrous in one instance and virtually flawless in another.
... examined the importance of the nuclear weapons military revolution and its lasting impacts on modern day society. Evidence presented supports why this military revolution had the most impact of all on warfare and was carefully illustrated through the immergence of new threats, the shift from total war and high intensity conflict to low intensity conflict and finally, the critical role that technology and innovation has played since the advent of nuclear weapons. This is important in today’s operational and strategic environment due to the fact that American military and political leadership will continue to have taken in account the use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield. As globalization continues to set the conditions for nuclear weapons proliferation worldwide, the restraints and operational risks will dramatically increase and affect all strategic planning.
One thing obviously has not changed: war is still an ongoing part of the life of a nation. The United States especially has been involved in so many wars and conflicts from its formation that one begins to wonder whether it has become embedded in American society. According to Sun Tzu, “Warfare is the greatest affair of state, the basis of life and death, the Way (Tao) to survival or extinction. It must be thoroughly pondered and analyzed”. Sun Tzu stated that there are five factors to take into account when considering who will come out of a conflict victorious. These are: The Tao, Heaven, Earth, the generals and the laws for military organization and discipline. These five overarching themes f...
The previous grand-scale of international wars proved that conventional military strategy relied upon power to establish superiority and create an assumption of inevitable victory (Arreguín-Toft, 2001, p. 94). However the dynamics of the Vietnam War were completely different. Asymmetric conflicts have particular dynamics and cannot be fought in conventional ways. Ivan Arreguin-Toft argues that the best way to predict the outcome of an asymmetric conflict is to compare strategies of each group apart of the war (2001, p. 95). In the case of Vietnam superior conventional military force does not guarantee victory, but in the case of Vietnam it can also be seen as counter-productive (1975, p. 177).