The Cult Of The Offensive By Stephen Van Evera Summary

Stephen Van Evera wrote the article the Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War. In this article He makes the claim that as countries in the timeline leading up to World War believes attacking and conquest is easy, they become more likely to carry out an attack, thus increasing the likelihood of war. He discusses this in three chronological sections, and dives deep into the reasoning of each country’s leadership in each section, then he applies this previous mode of thought to the current political climate in America (current in 1984). Evera is a very smart man, he attended Harvard and then the University of California Berkeley. He currently teaches at MIT in Massachusetts. All of Evera’s work centers around the circumstances

He cites a total of one hundred and eighty-two sources. Evera uses many telegrams and first-hand accounts written after the war. He argues that the leaders across Europe all engaged in a false sense of security when it comes to war. The leaders of Europe believed that the attackers almost always held the advantage, despite the new technology and lessons from previous engagements. Thus, if a country could attack first, they would hold the advantage. This advantage was enhanced when combined with the leaders views on mobilization. Mobilizing an army is a delay that any country couldn’t overcome because of the advantage attacking forces were believed to have. Because of this, if a country didn't want to already be invaded before mobilizing, they must be the first to mobilize. Additionally, if a countries armies are already at the border and attackers hold the edge, why not preemptively attack? Europe became a chess match, with countries jockeying for

Germany also held a window belief. That is, Germany was convinced that its power was declining, and Russia’s was increasing. The two states shared a border in 1914, and Germany thought that if they didn't attack now, they certainly stood no chance in the future. Germany’s plan was an aggressive one (lining up with the cult of the offensive), dubbed the Schlieffen Plan, named after its creator. The plan consisted of Germany invading France through Belgium and conquering France as fast as possible, thus eliminating a two front war with France and Russia on either side. One of the appealing factors of this plan to the Germans was that they believed that they could run through France so fast it would stall a British intervention. Because of the Cult of the Offensive, Germany believed this was very feasible and British wouldn't engage in war with Germany without France. The Germans even welcomed the British, saying they would “take care of it.” (92) Of the four reasons Ereva cited for the adoption of the Schlieffen Plan was that it was to be too quick for Britain to react, thus keeping them out of the war. However, when the plan failed and Germany found itself bogged down fighting the British, French, and Russians at the same time, its leaders called out the British, saying that the blame for the war was on Britain, because the Germans wouldn't have invaded because they knew Britain was going to