What Was The Turning Point Of The Great Northern War

The Great Northern War was the turning point in the politics of Northern Europe, a result of the great territorial and military advances made by Russia. Russian victory, during the war, led to her superiority in Northwestern Europe, while Swedish defeat effectively ended her imperial ambitions. While blame cannot be placed on any one singular event, arguably the time allowed by Charles XII’s focus on Augustus II allowed Russia to revitalize her military, thereby enabling Russian success in the war.
The Great Northern War took place between Russia along with her co-belligerents (Denmark-Norway and Saxony) and Sweden. Denmark-Norway opened the first front of the war on March 1700, directing her first attack against Swedish ally, Holstein-Gottorp

. The young Swedish king, Charles XII, forced to react, used his country’s superior navy to outmaneuver the Dutch naval blockade and land troops near Copenhagen . This surprise move, which threatened Copenhagen, along with pressure from other maritime powers (England and Dutch Republic) , led to a rapid retreat of Danish forces from Holstein and a cessation of hostilities. Consequently, Danish participation was quickly concluded with the Treaty of Travendal in August 1700 , leaving Charles XII to be able to deal with the Russian and Saxon threats. While these events occurred, Augustus II of Saxony had relatively free reign in Swedish Livonia, rampaging through the territory, and ultimately laying siege to Riga . In addition, a Russian army under the helm of Peter I marched through Swedish Ingria, laying siege to Narva . Now that his flank was secured from the Danish, Charles XII rapidly responded to the combined Saxon and Russian threats by deploying troops along the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea. It was at Narva in November 1700, that the Swedish and Russian armies ultimately clashed, and there that Russia was dealt a crushing defeat at the hands of the Swedes . At this crucial point, Charles XII chose not to pursue Peter the Great. Militarily, Charles felt Saxony’s army was superior to that of Russia’s, an opinion only reinforced by his spectacular victory at Narva. Demonstrative of this contempt for the Russian army was the stamping of a medallion which humorously displayed Peter running from Narva . Ideologically, Charles felt the need to avenge Augustus’ betrayal (the latter had invaded Sweden without a formal declaration of war). Indicative of this feeling is a statement from Charles, “…I would give Augustus peace if I could trust his word… but as soon as peace is made… [he would] attack us in the back…” .
The immediate effects of the time allowed by Charles XII’s decision became apparent with the complete and swift revitalization of the Russian Army following her defeat at Narva. Not having to immediately contend with a Swedish invasion, Peter sought to transform his army from the archaic into a new more modern fighting force that could theoretically hold her own against (and defeat) the Swedish. His initial reformation started with his overhaul of army training, mandating new standards of discipline based on modern European models. In order to execute such a drastic change in the army, Peter was certainly forced to start from the beginning to create new training manuals. This was considering the then modern Russian manual dated to 1647, and this itself was copied from a German manual of 1615 . (Accordingly, Russia’s four years of peace were crucial to this development.) Peter’s novel code was similar to that of many contemporaries, emphasizing a “fear of God”, and a respect for him since he had called them to serve the sovereign . By making God the ultimate sovereign, Peter sought to ensure soldiers would not shirk from their duties (calling on the fervently religious natures of the Russian Orthodox) and maintain a disciplined, responsible attitude towards service. Furthermore, it gives the impression that disobeying the tsar is analogous to challenging God himself, a transgression no religious soldier was eager to commit. The code further notes obedience to the commander, though officers may not mistreat their men or punish without due reason . The importance of this lies in its emphasis on obedience, necessary for any cohesive fighting force seeking to force objectives (as an unorganized mob will simply be a sponge for bullets). Moreover, the latter portion of the directive ensures a strict guideline to the treatment of soldiers, important in the maintenance of morale and willingness to fight. These were just a couple of the many regulations that Peter set forth in his manual, indicating a desire to apply discipline throughout the army. Although this ethos was drilled into soldier’s heads, they were given notice to not cling to this Military Statute, but rather use it to create a “sense of military honor, competition in battle and personal bravery” . Creating such an expansive ethos (and by extension culture) paved the way to modernity, as it created a sense of unity among the soldiers, in contrast to a scenario of “each man for his own”. It emphasized the incentive based nature of war, that those who performed exceptionally well would be rewarded, while the contrary would be true for those who evaded responsibility. Critically, this ethos was not developed quickly, and although haphazardly formed in the chaos of war, required an extensive amount of time to implement. Thus, Peter necessarily used the period of peace to create an effective code of conduct that permeated throughout the military structure and allowed Russia to compete with her equally well- disciplined enemies.
Just as entirely new training was mandated, Peter developed completely new tactics for implementation on the battlefield. Unlike the prior disorganization displayed by the Russian army at Narva, Russian soldiers were taught to fire on command in singular platoons, concurrently . This allowed the army to make the most effective use of ammunition, and unleash devastating volleys of bullets upon the enemy. It also increased the effectiveness of the weapon, reducing weaknesses such as slow loading times and allowing overall faster rates of fire. Men were furthermore taught how to effectively use the before mentioned new bayonets that had been ordered by Peter . Bayonets ultimately increased the versatility of the infantry, which was able to fight in close combat without the necessity for extraneous melee units i.e. pike men. It also allowed musketeers to deal with the bayonet charges by the enemy’s own musketeers (a technique often implemented by the Swedish military). The cavalry, an integral part of the Russian war machine, was given training so that squadrons would only move and wheel on command, attack with swords, and withdraw in an orderly fashion, rather than in a large, vulnerable, and disorganized mass . The essential nature of the latter is evident, for any modern military force must be able to tactically relocate, lest the enemy annihilate the retreating force. The lack of and the vital nature of such effective retreat tactics previously is evident in the Battle of Narva, where the unorganized withdrawal led to the death and capture of thousands of men and horses. In terms of the former, while the army is on the offensive, the cavalry must also be able to coordinate massive charges and attack in a synchronized fashion, or the efficacy of that particular arm of the military would be severely undermined. In addition to preparation in the earlier mentioned tactics, these cavalry were trained as dragoons, which entailed being able to fight as infantry, even while riding to the field in horseback . The dragoons were not necessary for effective combat, but were to support the infantry in the case of attack by the enemy. Furthermore, the dragoons were needed to maintain order within the army, and protect supply and communication lines. Both were essential to the reduction of dissension, which thereby increased the solidarity of the army, and lessened tensions between soldiers. They were also crucial in ensuring the maintenance of an effective fighting force, as an army with low morale is more likely to believe surrender is preferred to the continuation of warfare. Additionally, training the cavalry in the techniques of the dragoons increased the overall flexibility of the army, allowing it to deal with impromptu situations, as was necessary during the course of battle. The new tactics developed by the Russian military helped increase its own efficiency, enabling it to effectively contest Sweden.
In order to complement the new training and tactics of the Russian soldiers, Peter worked to improve the clothing of his soldiers, making it on par with his Swedish enemies. The tsar did not desire the elaborate uniforms of the west, whose soldiers (to Peter) had the appearance of dressed- up dolls; rather he required a solely utilitarian outfit. Consequently, he ordered the country to produce the simple green cloth, which the army’s uniforms would be made of, as quickly as possible . These uniforms would be in the common European style, with a basic set consisting of knee- breeches, long waistcoat, and a three- cornered hat . Peter’s concern for the uniforms of his army was not merely for aesthetic reasons, but also for the sake of uniformity and life and death. In the case of the former, during the midst of battle (especially with hand to hand combat), soldiers must be able to distinguish between allies and enemies without hesitance. If each man has a different uniform, this reaction time is drastically increased, leading even to the deaths of soldiers at the hands of their allies. In reference to the latter, in the harsh northern winter (the primary setting of the war), a lack of clothing could be just as deadly if not more so than the bullets of the enemies. As a result, it was necessary that each soldier have warm clothing to minimize non- combat related casualties. Consequently, the clothing of the Russian soldiers was reformed, leading to uniformity and greater cohesion within the army.
While, the improvements in Russian military uniform were drastic, Peter also improved the production of and the weaponry his army used.

Prior to his reign, much of the Russia’s military equipment was imported from abroad, with minor supplements by local gunsmiths . As a result, Russia’s armies became dependent on foreign expertise, leading to oftentimes inadequate military supplies, and overall inconsistency of gun imports. In order to combat this reliance and accordingly address the weakness of Russia’s forces, Peter led an armaments revolution at home, drastically increasing domestic production of guns and ammunitions . Whereas prior to this development, Russia relied on her often volatile (and sometimes hostile) neighbors, she could now boast that most military goods were domestically produced by 1710. In addition, Russia now had a military- oriented industrial complex which enabled her to endure prolonged periods of war without fear of weapons embargos. Other advancements that were made by the Russians, during the relatively peaceful period enabled by Charles XII’s focus on Augustus II, were in the field of artillery. Russia had lost nearly all of her cannons, both field artillery and siege mortars, at Narva, effectively crippling her fighting capabilities. It was thus necessary to start from essentially zero, leading to a massive production effort in the foundries. The great alacrity and effective use of time displayed by Peter in this extensive endeavor is demonstrated by his time- table; even before Charles XII had crossed the Dvina river (thereby invading Poland) in July, 1701 , the first cannons had already been delivered . The melting of church bells (a source of already refined metal), the fate of around a quarter, to make cannons also remains indicative of this frenzied undertaking . The enormous enterprises, both the melting of bells and manufacture of weapons, paid off in full, leading to the production of 300 new cannons by the end of 1701 . The

importance of this is not to be underestimated, as Russia’s artillery was an integral portion of her army. It was the cannon that caused General Ogilvy, a Scottish observer, to comment that he “never saw any nation go better to work with their cannon” . It is notable that this was at the Battle of Narva, a critical loss for Russia, indicating the extent to which even a spectacular defeat seemed to be representative of the brilliance of Russian armaments. Even without noting the effectiveness of Russian artillery, it is essential to state that artillery in general was significant, if not necessary, to any battle. Without cannon¸ one lost the capability of breaching cities, and thereby taking key objectives. In battle, itself, artillery, although not entirely accurate, was necessary to attack the enemy from afar, thereby weakening and creating disorder in the hostile forces. The production of weaponry, both guns and cannons, was completely revolutionized, which transformed Russia into a true military machine.
Even as the before mentioned developments occurred, it was necessary to actually employ soldiers that would use the new Russian equipment, and be trained in new tactics. Initially, in order to fill the ranks of the common soldier, Peter substantially raised the pay and promised food and drink, hoping to entice volunteerism. When this failed due to insufficient recruits (as it would owing to continuous deaths from disease and wounds), he initiated conscription . In contrast to previous systems, Peter implemented a policy of one recruit from every twenty households, increasing the efficiency of conscription. That recruit was to be fed, clothed and equipped by the Russian government; if he died, the military was to be supplied another from those twenty households . The effectiveness and rapidity of the system was spectacular, and came not a moment too soon. By 1704, Augustus II had been ousted from the Polish throne (Stanislaw Leszczynski was “elected” king), though not yet defeated in his homeland of Saxony . In the year of the conscription system’s implementation, 1705, Charles XII was readying to invade Saxony, Augustus II’s power base. Consequently, the success of the newly developed conscription system was welcome; in 1705, 44,539 men were raised to fight the Great Northern War; in 1706, a further 12,579 men and three cavalry levies were conscripted . These soldiers were absolutely necessary for the war, without them Russia would be unable to maintain its numerical superiority in battle, an indispensable ingredient for Russian victory. This was especially true after Narva, where Russia had suffered at least, if not more than, 8,000 casualties . Furthermore, while Charles XII was fighting Augustus II, these recruits would be absolutely necessary in the capture of strategic Baltic provinces. As such, increasing the efficiency of conscription enabled the military to incur heavy losses and still maintain its advantages. While, conscription was introduced for the masses, even the nobility were subjected to the principle of universal, lifelong service. This was decidedly egalitarian, especially as the nobility would have to serve as rank- and- file soldiers alongside commoners, until they were viable for promotion . This served to provide experience and exposure to modern military procedures for the nobility, serving a practical rather than punitive purpose. Educated nobles would thus not remain in the common army, but would eventually rise to command. (It is important to note that even though the nobles were seen as the natural leaders, any exceptional commoner could theoretically become a leader.) Only the uneducated nobility would be forced to remain common soldiers . As such, this new method of injecting Russian nobility into the army served two primary purposes. The first was to ensure that every nobleman was contributing to the war effort, be it in the army or administration. The second was to guarantee that the officers of the new Russian army would be Russian, rather than foreign. Prior to Peter’s military revolution, Russia’s officer class consisted mainly of foreign- born officials , leading to many disputes between the inherently different Russian soldiers and foreign leaders. Consequently, with the increased influx of Russian nobility into the army, Peter hoped to reduce tension within the army, leading to a greater effectiveness of the army. This new, more efficient system of conscription, along with the training of the new Russian officer corps led to a greater efficacy of the military.
While the advancements Peter made in the peaceful period afforded to him by Charles XII preoccupation with Saxony and The Polish- Lithuanian Commonwealth helped contribute to Sweden’s defeat, the multitude of Russian victories in the Baltic region during this time also played a significant role. The most important aspect to understand about Peter’s victories in the Baltic was that the considerably weak shape of defenses in those Swedish possessions was a direct result of Charles XII campaign in Poland and Saxony. Charles XII had extracted as much as was possible from the Baltic provinces, taking crucial supplies and the most experienced troops for his campaign. Furthermore, he commanded that all reinforcements go to his army in Poland; no recruit was to go to the Baltic provinces . The effect of this can be inferred as crippling, as fortresses (defenses in general) would be severely undermanned, undermining any attempts at resistance against the Russian military machine. In fact, so weakened were the three army corps designated to defend Swedish lands, that Bain called them “half- starving ragamuffins, [only] dignified by the name of army- corps” . The immediate effects of this lack of manpower would be an extreme depletion of morale, as generals, governors, and commoners alike would realize the inevitability of defeat. Furthermore, one could imagine that this would strain relations between the Swedish government/ king and the governors and consequently the governors and the commoners. This, of course, would lead to increased infighting among the Swedish governors and generals, as each would blame the other for the defeats incurred. Thus, the extent to which Swedish forces had little chance of defending the vast swathes of Baltic lands, and the fool- hardiness of Charles XII’s chase of Augustus II is revealed. Regardless, it is important to not forget the important victories that Russia achieved in these provinces, as they helped her regain lost morale and gain strategic territories.
The first engagements against the Swedish army in her Baltic provinces occurred in 1701, after Charles XII had already embarked on his Polish detour . General Boris Sheremetev was sent by Peter the Great in order to destroy the Swedish defenders, thereby facilitating the capture of Swedish territory. The initial engagements achieved mix results, as Swedish general Schlippenbach managed to hold out, even with his stretched forces. This, however, would not be maintained as Sheremetev managed to surprise Schlippenbach at Erastfer in December, 1701. Using his superior numbers and newly created armaments, Sheremetev’s victory was overwhelming and significant; the Swedes were massacred . The triumph primarily boosted Russian morale, indicating to the Russian people that the Swedes were not invincible, but too were susceptible to defeat. It also served to indicate the revitalization of Russian forces; no longer was the Russian army as fragile as it had been at Narva. Now, it would be able to inflict devastating losses upon her enemies. Moreover, the Swedes had lost valuable men that could not be replaced, further taxing the already thinned Swedish defenders. Following his victory at Erastfer, Sheremetev launched further incursions into Sweden, ravaging Ingria and Livonia, and decimating any who dared resist . These incursions led to his victory at Hummelshof in July, 1702. There the 7,000 Swedes were crushed by a Russian army more than double its size , as Schlippenbach was unable to replicate the miracle that had simultaneously occurred at Klissow (where a Swedish army had defeated a Saxon army twice its number). The victory highlighted the increase in the effectiveness of the Russian forces, that each Russian soldier was more than a match for his Swedish counterpart. As a result of the outcome at Hummelshof, all Swedish control in Livonia and Estonia, apart from the few major cities, had been removed; the Russians had free reign . Success perpetuated success, as Sheremetev continued to weaken Sweden’s grip on her Baltic provinces. Victories at the port cities of Dorpat and Narva, both of which were achieved through artillery , strained Sweden, especially as Charles was still chasing Augustus II in Poland. Further fiscal pressure was placed on the Swedish Empire by the wholesale destruction of Livonia’s economy by the Russian army and the loss of the important port city of Narva . Russia’s engagements in Sweden’s Baltic territories significantly improved the morale of the Russian army, while further enabling Peter to place immense pressure on the occupied Charles XII.