The Origins of the Second World War, by A.J.P. Taylor, proposes and investigates unconventional and widely unaccepted theories as to the underlying causes of World War Two. Taylor is British historian who specialized in 20th century diplomacy, and in his book claims that as a historian his job is to “state the truth” (pg. xi) as he sees it, even if it means disagreeing with existing prejudices. The book was published in 1961, a relatively short time after the war, and as a result of his extreme unbias the work became subject to controversy for many years. Studying history through his lens of objectivism, Taylor’s theory is that Hitler’s design wasn’t one of world domination; rather his methods, especially his foreign policies, didn’t differ from his predecessors. However, when confronted with a strict policy of appeasement, by both the French and the English, the stage was set for a second World War. Taylor constructs a powerful and effective argument by expelling certain dogmas that painted Hitler as a madman, and by evaluating historical events as a body of actions and reactions, disagreeing with the common idea that the Axis had a specific program from the start. The book begins with the conclusion of the First World War, by exploring the idea that critical mistakes made then made a second war likely, yet not inevitable. Taylor points out that although Germany was defeated on the Western front, “Russia fell out of Europe and ceased to exist, for the time being, as a Great Power. The constellation of Europe was profoundly changed—and to Germany’s advantage.” (p.20-21) As a result of the war, Russia was severely weakened, which greatly upset the balance of power in Europe. Taylor claims that, “What gave France independence as a ... ... middle of paper ... ... him to conciliate.” (pg. 216) Finally, Taylor explains, after Britain’s failure to help reach an agreement, the aggression dragged both France and Britain into war with Germany. Taylor’s perspective on the origins of the Second World War, although controversial, is not one so easily dismissed. Taylor’s approach is one of, “innocent until proven guilty,” which allowed him to distribute accountability to both the Allied and Axis powers. Taylor carefully constructs a historical chain of cause and effect through his unbiased evaluation. The First World War left a structurally sound Germany bent on restoring its independence, and a weakened balance of power in Europe. These facts, along with a morally revolting yet rational leader, faced only with a strict policy of appeasement combined to form the perfect storm, one that would ravage the world in the Second World War.
These were pivotal times in the annals of world history in the 20th century. Mussolini and Hitler’s rise to power was clearly a threat to the freedoms of the United States and its Allies. Through God’s grace and omnipotence, the US alliance, industrialization and intellectual might, we have the resources required to overcome the fierce and mighty threat of Fascism in the Free World. In the 1930s, European governments found it necessary to appease Hitler and Mussolini. Appeasement is the word that clearly sums up the policies and actions that were taken by the European governments.
Hauner, Milan. "Did Hitler Want World Dominion?" Journal of Contemporary History 13.1 (1978). JSTOR. Web. 19 Mar. 2010.
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The war would lead Prussia to the forefront on the European continent, however Britain clearly gained much more than any other did. France would not recover, and Louis knew all too well what lay in store when he said “ After me, the deluge.”
Hitler's Aims and Actions as the Cause of World War II When considering the reasons for the outbreak of war in 1939 it is easy to place the entire blame on Hitler’s aggressive foreign policy in the late 1930s. One British historian, writing a few years after the end of the war, claimed that ‘the Second World War was Hitler’s personal war, in that he intended it, he prepared for it, he chose the moment for launching it.’ In this assignment it is my intention to show that Hitler’s foreign policy was a major factor in causing the conflict but that other reasons, both long term and short term, need to be recognised as well. Probably the first factor that need considering is the Treaty of Versailles, of 1919.
So when asking the question what the causes of World War One are its important to remember that the rivalries between European states were intensified by the imperialism of the 19th century. Which lead to tension which became fear of invasion that in turn resulted in an intricate system of alliances “ensured what might have been an isolated crisis in the Balkans became a general war”. Whilst the effects of imperialism may not be the single cause of the war, it was undoubtedly a contributing
Gesink, Indira. "Fascism, Nazism and Road to WWII." World Civilizations II. Baldwin Wallace University. Marting Hall, Berea. 3 April 2014. Class lecture.
...on of these harsh terms on their nation. These Treaty of Versailles conditions together with Adolf Hitler’s proficient propaganda campaign prompted World War Two.
The debate as to whether Hitler was a ‘weak dictator’ or ‘Master of the Third Reich’ is one that has been contested by historians of Nazi Germany for many years and lies at the centre of the Intentionalist – Structuralist debate. On the one hand, historians such as Bullock, Bracher, Jackel and Hildebrand regard Hitler’s personality, ideology and will as the central locomotive in the Third Reich. Others, such as Broszat, Mason and Mommsen argue that the regime evolved out from pressures and circumstances rather than from Hitler’s intentions. They emphasise the institutional anarchy of the regime as being the result of Hitler’s ‘weak’ leadership. The most convincing standpoint is the synthesis of the two schools, which acknowledges both Hitler’s centrality in explaining the essence of Nazi rule but also external forces that influenced Hitler’s decision making. In this sense, Hitler was not a weak dictator as he possessed supreme authority but as Kershaw maintains, neither was he ‘Master of the Third Reich’ because he did not exercise unrestricted power.
Historians are often divided into categories in regard to dealing with Nazi Germany foreign policy and its relation to Hitler: 'intentionalist', and 'structuralist'. The intentionalist interpretation focuses on Hitler's own steerage of Nazi foreign policy in accordance with a clear, concise 'programme' planned long in advance. The 'structuralist' approach puts forth the idea that Hitler seized opportunities as they came, radicalizing the foreign policies of the Nazi regime in response. Structuralists reject the idea of a specific Hitlerian ideological 'programme', and instead argue for an emphasis on expansion no clear aims or objectives, and radicalized with the dynamism of the Nazi movement. With Nazi ideology and circumstances in Germany after World War I influencing Nazi foreign policy, the general goals this foreign policy prescribed to included revision of Versailles, the attainment of Lebensraum, or 'living space', and German racial domination. These foreign policy goals are seen through an examination of the actions the Nazi government took in response to events as they happened while in power, and also through Hitler's own ideology expressed in his writings such as Mein Kempf. This synthesis of ideology and social structure in Germany as the determinants of foreign policy therefore can be most appropriately approached by attributing Nazi foreign policy to a combination as both 'intentionalist' and 'structuralist' aims. Nazi foreign policy radicalized with their successes and was affected by Hitler pragmatically seizing opportunities to increase Nazi power, but also was based on early a consistent ideological programme espoused by Hitler from early on.
The thesis in the article ‘The origins of the World War’, by Sidney B. Fay, can clearly be stated as the explanation for World War I. Fay states that no one country is responsible for the creation of the war. Furthermore, he goes on to explain that each of the European country’s leaders did, or failed to do ‘certain’ things to provoke the other countries into a war. Fay states, “One must abandon the dictum of the Versailles Treaty that Germany and her allies were solely responsible. It was a dictum exacted by victors from vanquished, under the influence of the blindness, ignorance, hatred, and the propagandist misconceptions to which war had given rise.” (Fay, The Origins of the World War). His main arguments are his explanations of how each country was responsible for the creation of the war. His first explanation is that of how Serbia was partly responsible. Fay explains that Serbia knew that by not co-operating with the Austrian government over the implications of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand assassination they were indirectly preparing for a war they would fight but did not want. Fay says that Austria was more responsible for the war than any other power but not in military attack, but more in the form of self-defence. He makes it clear that Austria was justified in their battle and that they didn’t have to, “sit back and await the dismemberment at the hands of its neighbors.” (Fay, The origins of the World War). Fay believes that Berchtold wanted a local war with Serbia but knew and was content with the fact that the rest of Europe could very easily become involved with the war. Fay’s third country’s explanation was that of Germany. He believed that Germany did not want a war and tried to avert one completely. It is his belief that since Austria was Germany’s only dependable ally, they were dragged into the war. Furthermore, he explains that Germany’s geographical location, being in the middle of the conflict between France and Russia, they had little choice in the matter and had to defend their territory as well as Austria-Hungary’s. Fay’s fourth country and major power discussed, was Russia. He believed that Russia supported Serbia because of the frequent guidance and encouragement given at Belgrade, and if a war were to break out they would more than happy to fight along with the belief of France and Britain helping out. Furthermore, at the same ...
France aimed to get revenge on Germany for the Franco - Prussian war of 1970 - 1971 where France were disastrously defeated, Germany aimed to stay free from an invasion from France and keep Austria-Hungary happy as France and Austria- Hungary were on either side of German, and Russia wanted an ally so it could feel safe form Germany.
O’Neill, William L. World War II A Student Companion. 1 ed. William H. Chafe. New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.