Vertical information sharing:

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Vertical information sharing:

According to Hopwood, (1976, as cited in Parker and Kyj, 2006) sharing of information between superiors and subordinates are one of the main benefits of the budgeting process. Shields and Shields (1998, as cited in Parker and Kyj, 2006) argue that information sharing during the budgeting process between the superior and subordinate is of high importance because both the individual and the organization can potentially benefit from it. Survey results show (Parker and Kyj, 2006) that vertical information sharing plays a huge role in understanding the performance effects of organizational commitment and budget participation. Role ambiguity is the intervening variable between the relation organizational commitment and budget participation (Parker and Kyj, 2006). Vertical information sharing consists of upward information sharing and downward information sharing.

Upward information sharing

The information flow from the subordinate to the superior is called upward information sharing, the subordinate reveals information that is not known for the superior.
The subordinates often know more about their daily operations than their superiors.
Baiman (1990, as cited in Parker and Kyj, 2006) mentions that the agent contains private information about the about the area the agent is responsible for. Chow et al. (1988 as cited in Parker and Kyj, 2006) state that upward information sharing can be valuable because it is difficult or impossible for the superiors to acquire this information without any help of the subordinates. This information is called private information and contains strategic uncertainties that challenge the organization (Simons, 1995, as cited in Parker and Kyj, 2006). Shields and Young (1993, as ...

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...as cited in Fisher et al., 2002) explain that the competition between subordinates can be increased when subordinates feel desire to outperform their co-workers in budget proposals and their actual performance. Subordinates can also decide not to hand in a budget proposal when they feel social pressure because subordinates have less motivation or ability than their co-workers (Young, 1985, as cited in Fisher et al., 2002) The social competition that arises between the subordinates will lead to optimization of the budget.

A possible problem can arise if the superior uses higher budget proposals for subordinates as a standard, the benefits can then be very low when the subordinates submits lower budgets (Fisher et al., 2002). When subordinates submit significant lower budgets than their co-workers, they may even be sanctioned by their superior (Fisher et al., 2002).

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