Thomas Orton's Purpose To Serve His Employees

C. Thomas Orton’s conduct was not motivated by a purpose to serve his employer
Thomas Orton’s actions were not motivated by a purpose to serve his employer, because backing over Martin did not serve a purpose to serve Kingsport. For Kingsport to be found liable for Thomas Orton’s actions under a theory of respondeat superior, his actions must be within the scope of his employment. Lev v. Beverly Enters.-Massachusetts, 457 Mass. 234, 238, 929 N.E.2d 303, 308 (2010) The rule for scope of employment, as stated in Lev v. Beverly Enterprises-Massachusetts, is “the 'conduct of an agent is within the scope of employment . . . and if it is motivated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer”. Id. at 238.
The application of this rule can

be found in Wang Laboratories. v. Business Incentives 398 Mass. 854, 501 N.E.2d 1163, 1167 (1986). The case revolves around the termination of an employee by another employee of a business. A question came up about whether it was in the scope of employment for the employee to fire the other employee, and hold the business responsible under respondeat superior. The court finds that the first two elements of scope of employment are found, “These findings establish that Joseph's conduct was the kind of conduct he was employed to perform and that it occurred within the authorized limits of time and space.” Id. at 860. Therefore, the question of whether the termination was motivated to serve the purpose of the employer became the determining factor. The court holds, “that although Joseph was motivated by self-interest, he acted with an intent to serve Wang.” Id. at 860. The court then finds that this does fall under the third element, of motivated by a purpose to serve the employer.
To bring it closer to the facts of the present case. An analysis of whether tortious actions can be used as a purpose to serve the employer is presented. The case of Worcester Ins. Co. v. Fells Acres Day Sch., Inc., 408 Mass. 393, 558 N.E.2d 958, 967 (1990), has been documented above. The case facts are about plaintiffs suing a school for sexual assault that was inflicted onto their children as a result of an employee at the school. The court brings up the factors of scope of employment to see whether the employer is liable for the employee’s actions. The court finds that the acts were not of the kind they were employed to perform, “nor were they "motivated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer." Id. at 405.
Applying the rules to the fact of the case, it is clear that Thomas Orton’s actions was not motivated by a purpose to serve Kingsport.

There is a small aside that needs to be brought up. It’s the fact of whether the garage was down before or after Martin was backed over. If it was found that the garage was not down yet, then there might be room to say that Thomas Orton was motivated by a purpose to serve his employer. The act of closing the garage was a response to Martin asking him to do so. Serving Martin would then be in the purview of serving Kingsport by performing duties for its clients. However, the more likely scenario that the garage was down and then Martin was backed into. With that in mind, backing into Martin would have not have served a purpose to Kingsport. This is given credence by the holdings in Worcester and Wang Laboratories. Even if the act of backing over Martin served to further the interests of Thomas Orton, those interests cannot be imported on to Kingsport. See Wang at 860. Also, the mere fact of a tortious action did not serve some purpose of Kingsport in of itself. Therefore, a judge should find that Thomas Orton’s action were not motivated by a purpose to serve his employer,

Kingsport.
Conclusion & Recommendations
Ursula Kahn most likely doesn’t have a strong case for suing Kingsport using respondeat superior.

While the relationship between Kingsport and Thomas Orton allows for a finding of respondeat superior, there is still the issue of scope of employment. A finding of scope of employment needs all three elements to be met. If the contract between Kingsport and Thomas Orton was discovered. Then the contends could be used to determine if the first element of, “being of the kind he was employed to perform”, could be met. Since that is not the case, the “going and coming” rule stands in the path of the first element being met. In its present state the third element, “motivated in part by a purpose to serve the employer” is not met, because performing a tortious action doesn’t serve a purpose to Kingsport. Ursula could introduce the question of whether the garage was down before or after Martin was backed over. This could allow a judge to find that the closing of the garage and use of the car were related enough. Therefore, the third element could be met. However, the second element makes all of the conjecture moot, because it is clearly not satisfied. He had already clocked out which was not in the authorized time and space limits of his employment. A judge should find there are no grounds to sue for respondeat superior, because the rule of scope of employment is not met. Ursula Kahn could always sue Thomas Orton individually for damages to

Martin.