Stalin And Fdr's Relationship

As evidenced by their correspondence and FDR’s actions, some historians argued that Stalin and FDR’s relationship was genuine during the war. To further support this, Roosevelt had been working to build relations with the USSR and Stalin years before the US ever entered the war. In 1933, Roosevelt recognized the Soviet Union, an action that had not been done by the United States government since 1917. This action marked the beginning of Roosevelt’s efforts to strengthen his relationship with the Stalin. Roosevelt also appointed multiple ambassadors to the Soviet Union, such as Joseph Davies, and instructed them to pursue a Good Neighbor policy. This meant that most of what Stalin requested of the ambassadors was fulfilled as swiftly as possible.

Then later, in 1936, US ambassador to the Soviet Union Bullitt, who worked in close contact with Stalin for many years, argued to Roosevelt that he approached communication with Stalin too leniently but FDR continued to believe that patience and friendship were the best tactics. This did not necessarily demonstrate naivety but rather trust that Roosevelt aspired to build with the Soviet autocrat, therefore, the confidence in the development of a relationship.

Roosevelt’s efforts to build a relationship with Stalin before the United States entered the war exhibited his motives of a sincere relationship between the himself and Stalin. FDR also showed his optimism for this friendship through other means within the United States while he the country entered war. One of these projects was to eliminate Russia’s negative connotation from within the society. The film Mission to Moscow (1943), based on the 1941 memoir of Joseph Davies, was the first pro-Stalinism propaganda movie and illustrated the Russian people as heroes rather than communist monsters. There were several allegations that Roosevelt himself commissioned the film and encouraged its development. Both the film’s producer, Robert Buckner, and writer, Howard Koch, accused Roosevelt of asking the Warner Brothers Productions to develop the movie. Roosevelt’s involvement in the development of the film exemplified his attempts to better relations with the Soviet Union by decreasing the United States’ peoples’ ambivalence towards allying with

Stalin. However, the most important insight to their affiliation was their correspondence during the war. The leaders sent over 300 letters to each other over the course of Roosevelt’s involvement in the war. The letters demonstrated Stalin and Roosevelt’s understanding that they required a symbiotic relationship in order to achieve their desired result. One letter in particular, sent from Stalin to Roosevelt on November 4, 1941, revealed Stalin’s efforts to cooperate with Roosevelt’s demands, as he writes, “I express complete agreement with the conditions set forth by you concerning the granting of this loan...” Another letter, sent from Stalin to Roosevelt, on October 3, 1941, provided evidence of Stalin’s trust in Roosevelt, as he wrote, “I have no doubt, that you will do everything necessary to ensure the carrying out of the decisions of the Moscow Conference. . .” Overall, their correspondence demonstrated their efforts towards synergy and a mutual understanding of the necessity of a reliable partnership in order defeat the Axis powers. Despite the evidence that supported a genuine relationship, historians still contended that their friendship was unsubstantiated.
A plethora of historians argued that Stalin’s paranoid nature and immoral motives caused him to exploit his relationship with the illness stricken Roosevelt and inhibited the possibility of a legitimate relationship.

Several of Roosevelt’s ambassadors sent to the Soviet Union returned with stories of Stalin’s maltreatment of them. As a result, the ambassadors’ relationships with Stalin, both positive and negative, acted as a microcosm of the United States and Soviet Russia alliance. Bullitt particularly struggled with carrying out Roosevelt’s policy of appeasement towards Stalin. Accounts of him stated that he believed Stalin exploited FDR’s efforts towards friendliness by requesting an excess of supplies for the Russian army during their war with Japan. On Bullitt’s second trip to Moscow in 1934, he reported to Roosevelt a sense of Soviet hostility towards building relations with the United States and even received note that Stalin instructed his government officials to avoid communication with Bullitt. He claimed to believe that newfound antipathy was a result of Stalin not needing American support in their war with Japan. Although this was before the United States entered the war, it still demonstrated Stalin’s unwillingness to form a relationship with the Roosevelt and supported the argument that his desire to build relations stemmed from a need within his country. American general, General Deane, also reported feeling disdain towards Roosevelt’s endless aid for the

Russian army as he stated, “the Soviets got their supplies and the United States got nothing. . .” Stalin’s manipulative nature prohibited any valid relationship with Roosevelt as he only utilized it when necessary for him. The American public also criticized Roosevelt’s tactics towards Stalin in political cartoons that hinted that FDR succumbed to Stalin’s charm and negative influence. Also, Stalin’s acute paranoia invaded every aspect of his life in that he rarely trusted anyone. One of Stalin’s interpreters from the conference, Valentin Berezkhov, supported the claim that Stalin had bugged the American delegation’s conversations at the Tehron and Yalta conferences, which shows how little trust Stalin had in Roosevelt and his party. Despite Roosevelt’s attempts to build relations with Stalin, Stalin’s actions at the Yalta conference counteracted any effort he had previously made to become friends with United States’ President. One of the most common reports the other members of the conference gave was that Stalin seemed to had taken advantage of Roosevelt’s poor health. It was recorded that in the final months of FDR’s life, his relationship with Stalin became increasingly burdensome. Harry Hopkins, who was one of Roosevelt’s closest friends, claimed to believe that Roosevelt had hardly heard half of what had been said during the Yalta sessions and his sickness limited his ability. The land that Stalin acquired from the Yalta conference was later believed to be Stalin’s successful efforts to manipulate the ill president. The evidence that Stalin exploited the United States of its resources and Roosevelt for land supported the argument that Roosevelt and Stalin’s relationship was false and a mask for Stalin to capitalize off on FDR’s kindness.