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Canadian senate reform
Canadian senate reform
Canadian senate reform
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The Canadian Senate is a distinct legislative body that differs from other administrations of government. Its role of careful analysis as well as deliberation within the government is fundamental to democracy as it ensures progression of government initiatives. However, controversy of the functionality of the Senate lingers regarding its position as a “sober second thought” representing the general Canadian population in government action (Mintz, Close, & Croci, 2013; Canadian Bar Association, 2012; Brooks & Menard, 2013). Concern has also ensued on whether or not specific reform ideas and other bills considering such reform are constitutional (Canadian Bar Association, 2012; Brooks & Menard, 2013). It is clear that scrutiny of the Senate is …show more content…
commonly present. This brief paper will analyze various aspects of the Senate, including its composition; perspectives on why the Senate should and should not be abolished, considering representation, appointment as well as examples from the past and present accompanied by recommendations on reform for this unique body. Therefore, an analysis on the Senate, drawing on both the setbacks and benefits is necessary to illustrate how the Senate does not need to be abolished, but instead have a universal covenant on the body through firm reform. The Senate has been a legislative body since confederation in 1867. The initial goal was to take regional concerns into account and provide special representation (Lawlor & Crandall, 2013). This objective is still present, however, the House of Commons does have superiority over the Senate. The government is not bound by any decisions the Senate makes (Brooks & Menard, 2013). The Senate, then, may not be a necessity. Furthermore, it is argued that the Senate should be abolished as senators chosen to represent Canada are appointed by the Prime Minister, who can serve a maximum of 45 years as a senator (Brooks & Menard, 2013; Docherty, 2002; Mintz, Close, & Croci, 2013). Canada’s current legislature is bicameral, meaning that one body (the House of Commons) is elected, whereas the other (the Senate) is appointed (Brooks & Menard, 2013; Mintz, Close, & Croci, 2013). Those in favor of abolishing the Senate suggest that having representatives who are not elected strike down legislation is outdated protocol (Mintz, Close, & Croci, 2013). Next, there are deliberations that the Senate is just there for the Prime Minister to counterbalance potential losses in the House of Commons (Brooks & Menard, 2013). If a minority government makes up the House, a majority, one-sided Senate could be compiled at the right time, causing gridlock in the parliamentary process (Brooks & Menard, 2013). As well, the Senate should be abolished based on the idea that although attempts at reform have been presented, they have been regularly inconsistent. One example of this is that reforming the Senate has been a topic since its induction as a formal body in 1867 (Docherty, 2002). More recently, Stephen Harper has attempted to reform the Senate. To elaborate, he attempted to implicate Bill C-7, which was deemed unconstitutional. It set out to limit a senator’s tenure to 8 years and have Senators elected (Canadian Bar Association, 2012). Conversely, the Senate should not be abolished in Canada, and if followed through with, would cause more problems.
To elaborate, the Canadian Senate has evolved from having a mere 72 seats to now having 105 seats, encapsulating the equal representation. 24 Senators are appointed from the Maritimes, Ontario, Quebec and the Prairie Provinces, while 6 are chosen from Newfoundland and Labrador, and 1 Senator from each territory make up the Senate. (Brooks & Menard, 2013; Docherty, 2002; Mintz, Close, & Croci, 2013). While this may not seem democratic, it has been found that the Senate is more representative than the elected House of Commons (Lawlor & Crandall, 2013). If there were elected Senators, they would analyze legislation on behalf of the constituents they represent, rather than looking at the legislation with government influence (Brooks & Menard, 2013). An elected Senate would drive it further to abolition. The Senate should also not be abolished as it does provide a second opinion on issues, or legislation sent through the House of Commons. Although they serve as a ‘review’ group, it is uncommon for Senators to be discordant regarding proposed legislation (Cornell, 2014; Lawlor & Crandall, 2013). In addition, Senate committees are tasked with reviewing the legislation which needs to be passed, while also providing reports in areas like business and social investigation (Lawlor & Crandall, 2013). Next, the Senate should not be abolished considering deliberations about abolishing the Senate cannot be agreed on. To explain, Carver (2013) outlines the perspectives of the Prairie Provinces regarding the abolishment of the Senate by a vote under the ‘7 + 50 rule,’ while the remaining seven provinces believe that the vote should be unanimous. If the abolition process can not be agreed on, the Senate should not be
abolished. The consideration of reform is an alternative notion to improve the deficiencies apparent in respect to the Senate (Carver, 2013). The persistent efforts of reform suggest that Canadian politicians agree that the Senate is an integral body involved in the Canadian political process (Docherty, 2002). Senate abolitionists argue that the constitutional amendment process and amending formula is too complicated to use for the Senate, due to the abundance of specific adjustments (Brooks & Menard, 2013; Docherty, 2002). In summary, senate reform is a protracted process that requires careful planning with a focus on the agreement of varying perspectives to resolve conflicts regarding the roles of the senate. Simply removing this, essential government sector threatens Canadian democracy. It is not proactive in nature (Flanagan, 2009). In the final analysis, it is evident that the Senate is widely debated for its benefits and drawbacks. This controversy examines the intentions of the Senate’s interest of ensuring prosperity for the common good or government officials. Despite previous attempts, universal reform may still be considered the first order of business when discussing the Senate. Simply abolishing it may have risks that outweigh the benefits in years to come.
However, there are inherent problems with this type of senate reform, where it asks both federal government and certain provinces to lessen their power so that all provinces have an equal platform to broadcast their issues and regional interests. The idea that these two conflicting governments are involved in the national legislation process would form problems, and even this idea of change would change the normal practices of parliament. This idea a triple E Senate calls for constitutional changes, which are difficult to do, and why so far the Prime Minister has only made informal changes since they would need a 7/10 provincial approval with at least 50 percent of the Canadian population on top of the approval of both parts of parliament. It calls for a complete overhaul of the current senate, to become better suitable for regional representation of the Canadian population (gibbins
...e observed now as easily as it might be in it's final form. The prevailing notion is that through judicial interpretation or legislative act it should be more onerous to affect legislative override, not to the level of constitutional amendment of the rights in question, but perhaps a moderated super majority . The dialogue created by judicial-legislative interplay is truly indispensable to the democratic process, however the possibility exists that the dialogue could be circumvented and replaced with a legislative diatribe. As equally unappealing is the judicial monologue, the disdain for which increasingly dominates legislative analysis in the United States. The override provision effectively eliminates such concerns in Canada. The inevitable democratization of our override provision will in time perfect the dichotomy so vital to legislative-judicial conciliation.
A more sudden, but perhaps equally profound event is the adoption in 1982 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Whereas before the adoption of the Charter Canadian legislatures were supreme, having power without limit within their jurisdictions, they now have debatable supremacy within altered jurisdictions. Moreover, although no powers or rights have been explicitly ‘reserved’ to the people, supporters of the charter nevertheless appear to give Canadians hope that the possibility may exist.
Canada’s parliamentary system is designed to preclude the formation of absolute power. Critics and followers of Canadian politics argue that the Prime Minister of Canada stands alone from the rest of the government. The powers vested in the prime minister, along with the persistent media attention given to the position, reinforce the Prime Minister of Canada’s superior role both in the House of Commons and in the public. The result has led to concerns regarding the power of the prime minister. Hugh Mellon argues that the prime minister of Canada is indeed too powerful. Mellon refers to the prime minister’s control over Canada a prime-ministerial government, where the prime minister encounters few constraints on the usage of his powers. Contrary to Mellon’s view, Paul Barker disagrees with the idea of a prime-ministerial government in Canada. Both perspectives bring up solid points, but the idea of a prime-ministerial government leading to too much power in the hands of the prime minister is an exaggeration. Canada is a country that is too large and complex to be dominated by a single individual. The reality is, the Prime Minister of Canada has limitations from several venues. The Canadian Prime Minister is restricted internally by his other ministers, externally by the other levels of government, the media and globalization.
Prime Minister Stephen Harper is attempting to further decentralize Canadian government with, what he calls, open federalism. This essay will begin with a discourse on the evolution of Canadian federalism, then exclusively compare Harper’s approach to the proceeding Liberal governments approach, and ultimately explain why Stephen Harper’s “open federalism” methodology is the most controversial form of Canadian federalism yet.
Senate reform in Canada has been a popular topic for decades but has yet to be accomplished. Since the Senates formation in 1867 there has been numerous people who call for its reform or abolishment due to the fact it has not changed since its implementation and does not appear to be fulfilling its original role. An impediment to this request is that a constitutional amendment is needed to change the structure of the Senate, which is not an easy feat. Senate reform ideas have developed from other upper houses in counties such as the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany. From those two different successful governments emerges examples of different electoral systems, state representation, and methods of passing legislations.
Canada is a society built on the promise of democracy; democracy being defined as “government by the people; a form of government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised directly by them or by their elected agents under a free electoral system.” In order to operate at full potential, the people of Canada must voice their opinions and participate fully in the political system. This is why it’s shocking to see that people are becoming less engaged in politics and the voter turnout has steadily been declining over the last 20 years. This lack of participation by Canadians is creating a government that is influenced by fewer people, which is detrimental to the democratic system Canada is built on.
However, the proposed systems must be thoroughly examined for their compatibility with Canada’s needs and their ability to resolve the issues outlined in this paper. From distortion in representation to Western alienation and to making the voices of minorities heard, the new system must also ensure that Parliament fulfills its role in representing, legislating, and holding the government. More importantly, after the current government abandoned its promise on electoral reform, it is important for researchers and future governments to build on the knowledge acquired by the Special Committee on Electoral Reform as well as previous experiences of the provinces with electoral
Democracy is more than merely a system of government. It is a culture – one that promises equal rights and opportunity to all members of society. Democracy can also be viewed as balancing the self-interests of one with the common good of the entire nation. In order to ensure our democratic rights are maintained and this lofty balance remains in tact, measures have been taken to protect the system we pride ourselves upon. There are two sections of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms that were implemented to do just this. Firstly, Section 1, also known as the “reasonable limits clause,” ensures that a citizen cannot legally infringe on another’s democratic rights as given by the Charter. Additionally, Section 33, commonly referred to as the “notwithstanding clause,” gives the government the power to protect our democracy in case a law were to pass that does not violate our Charter rights, but would be undesirable. Professor Kent Roach has written extensively about these sections in his defence of judicial review, and concluded that these sections are conducive to dialogue between the judiciary and the legislature. Furthermore, he established that they encourage democracy. I believe that Professor Roach is correct on both accounts, and in this essay I will outline how sections 1 and 33 do in fact make the Canadian Charter more democratic. After giving a brief summary of judicial review according to Roach, I will delve into the reasonable limits clause and how it is necessary that we place limitations on Charter rights. Following this, I will explain the view Professor Roach and I share on the notwithstanding clause and how it is a vital component of the Charter. To conclude this essay, I will discuss the price at which democr...
Canada itself claims to be democratic, yet the Canadian Senate is appointed to office by the current Prime Minister rather than elected by the citizens. The original purpose of the Senate was to give fair representation between provinces and to the citizens. Having failed its purpose, clearly there are issues within the Senate that need to be addressed. Because of the Prime Minister appointing the Senators, they will now serve the Prime Ministers needs rather than the people who they should have been listening to. As if this were not enough of a show of power for the Prime Minister, the Senators cannot be lawfully kicked out of office until the age of seventy-five. An example of Senate idiosyncrasy in Canadian government is Ross Fitzpatrick, who was appointed to office by former Prime Minister Jean Chretien of the Liberals in June 1990. His official opponent, Preston Manning, rightfully questioned the circumstances regardin...
First, some background on the subject. Canada is divided into 308 ridings, and each riding elects one person to represent all the citizens in that riding. The party that wins the most ridings forms the government, and if that party has gained more than half the seats, as is usually the case, they form a majority and have the ability to pass any bill in the House of Commons that they wish, regardless of the opinions that other representatives have. This SMP system has remained unchanged in Canada since Confederation in 1867. On the other hand there is proportional representation, which is broken down into two main forms: Mixed Member Proportionality (MMP) and Single Transferable Vote (STV). MMP was first put into use ...
Proportional representation is almost always acknowledged as the fairest electoral system. With this in mind, many still reject a mixed member proportional system. Critics argue that the current method has produced a stable and effective government, while MMP would create an ineffective government. Wiseman feels that since Canada has been consistently stable, our electoral system does not need to be changed. Hiemstra and Jansen disagree with the plurality system that is currently in place for it does not produce fair representation and devalues citizen’s votes. Canadians must make a choice between the value of effectiveness and the values of justice and equity. Although a switch is not anticipated in the near future, Canadian citizens can hope that it is at least in the minds of many voters and on the discussion list of the government.
Stilborn, Jack. Senate Reform: Issues and Recent Developments. Ottawa: Parliamentary Information and Research Service, 2008.
Democracy is defined as government by the people; a form of government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised directly by them or by their elected agents under a free electoral system (Democracy, n.d.). Canadians generally pride themselves in being able to call this democratic nation home, however is our electoral system reflective of this belief? Canada is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary democracy that has been adopted from the British system. Few amendments have been made since its creation, which has left our modern nation with an archaic system that fails to represent the opinions of citizens. Canada’s current “first-past-the-post” (FPTP) system continues to elect “false majorities” which are not representative of the actual percentage of votes cast. Upon closer examination of the current system, it appears that there are a number of discrepancies between our electoral system and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Other nations provide Canada with excellent examples of electoral systems that more accurately represent the opinions of voters, such as proportional representation. This is a system of voting that allocates seats to a political party based on the percentage of votes cast for that party nationwide. Canada’s current system of voting is undemocratic because it fails to accurately translate the percentage of votes cast to the number of seats won by each party, therefore we should adopt a mixed member proportional representation system to ensure our elections remain democratic.
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was enacted under the Pierre Trudeau government on April 17, 1982. According to Phillip Bryden, “With the entrenchment of the Charter into the Canadian Constitution, Canadians were not only given an explicit definition of their rights, but the courts were empowered to rule on the constitutionality of government legislation” (101). Prior to 1982, Canada’s central constitutional document was the British North America Act of 1867. According to Kallen, “The BNA Act (the Constitution Act, 1867) makes no explicit reference to human rights” (240). The adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms significantly transformed the operation of Canada’s political system. Presently, Canadians define their needs and complaints in human rights terms. Bryden states, “More and more, interest groups and minorities are turning to the courts, rather than the usual political processes, to make their grievances heard” (101). Since it’s inception in 1982 the Charter has become a very debatable issue. A strong support for the Charter remains, but there also has been much criticism toward the Charter. Academic critics of the Charter such as Robert Martin believe that the Charter is doing more harm than good, and is essentially antidemocratic and UN-Canadian. I believe that Parliament’s involvement in implementing the Charter is antidemocratic, although, the Charter itself represents a democratic document. Parliament’s involvement in implementing the Charter is antidemocratic because the power of the executive is enhanced at the expense of Parliament, and the power of the judiciary is enhanced at the expense of elected officials, although, the notwithstanding clause continues to provide Parliament with a check on...