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Impact of 9/11 on the US
Impact of 9/11 on the US
Impact of 9/11 on the US
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What are the Pros & the cons of executing bilateral & multilateral covert opeNarrative
September 11, 2001 had fashioned a substitute doctrine to the cold war when President George Bush declared “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”1 Ever since that declaration was made 9 days after Al-Qaeda attacked New York, the United States acted unilaterally on many occasions2. It flew tens of armed drones into Afghanistan, Pakistan & Yemen. The U.S. Special Forces killed and captured scores of terrorist inside sovereign countries. American agents snatched suspects off the streets of harboring capitals and brought them to face justice in the U.S. The most spectacular of these operations was operation Neptune Spear, conducted by the
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The covert component is evident in all those operations. That would illuminate a relevant question: Could those operations be as successful if the U.S. adhered to multilateralism and asked others to join in the effort? Consequently, Assuming we observed the traditional norms pertaining to bilateral protocols of intelligence exchange with friends, will Bin Laden be dead today had we informed the Pakistanis before hand? On the other hand; How could we convince other nations to join the campaign against terrorism , under our leadership , but yet dismiss bilateralism and multilateralism as options ? If unilateralism is our choice to conduct covert operations, how could we get other nations to share and reciprocate in exchange of nothing? If we opt to share some of our hard-collected sensitive information, can we grantee secrecy & zero leaks ?If we ascertain ,from past experiences , that some leaks are inevitable to happen ( Berlin Tunnel ) , how can we guard against serious fallout that could spoil clandestine operations and …show more content…
Soon after, the world acknowledged the Bush doctrine and Counter Terrorism was embraced by majority of nations. That left the U.S. with a genuine need to enhance national security on three relevant levels; unilateral, bilateral and multilatera3. A sizable majority of the UN General Assembly were concerned, suspicious or fearful to be a part of the endeavor if it meant risking their own sovereignty. Indeed, that issue was, and still remains to many third world nations as a source of suspicious interpretations of the U.S. intentions. Covert Operations could be confronted with situations that could make trivial gestures, such as getting someone phone number, a vital part of the operation success. Example of that is illustrated in a July 1996 CIA report which complained about efforts to get Bin Laden phone number, “We have no unilateral sources close to bin Laden, or any reliable way of intercepting his communications. We must rely on foreign intelligence services to confirm his movements and activities.”4.
Today, war on terrorism relies heavily on covert operations conducted electronically or through HUMINT. Assessment of the concepts of this paper will have to address specific situations when unilateralism , bilateralism or multilateralism have impacted covert operations in areas such as ; The Use Of Drones, Hot pursuit , Attacking Terrorist Sanctuaries , Attacking Rouge States
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States was incredibly eager to strike back at the nations thought to be responsible for this horrific tragedy. These attacks were quickly attributed to the terrorist group al-Qa’ida, led by Osama bin Laden, and to the Taliban-run government of Afghanistan, which had provided sanctuary to al-Qa’ida. In response, Washington approved a covert plan led by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to directly attack those responsible in their Middle East safe haven. Initiated on 26 September 2001 with the approval of the warlords of the Afghan Northern Alliance, with whom the CIA had formed an intelligence liaison relationship, Operation Jawbreaker resulted in the fall of the Taliban regime, the killing and capture of a significant amount of al-Qa’ida leadership, and elimination of a terrorist safe haven by early December 2001. Moreover, the Taliban’s collapse denied al-Qa’ida a pseudo-nation-state partner, serving to reduce the organization’s sanctuary to areas residing along the Pakistani border. Operation Jawbreaker, one of the first post-9/11 covert operations carried out by the United States in support of its national security interests, had proved successful. Word of the operation’s swift success astounded those back in Washington; dubbed the CIA’s “finest hour,” it signified the first of many victories by deposing the Taliban’s control of Northern Afghanistan.
Richard Immerman bookends his monograph, The Hidden Hand: A Brief History of the CIA, with reflections on the role of public expectations in the shaping of the CIA’s image, both externally and internally. In-between, Immerman attempts to reconcile the antagonism between the CIA’s actions and its fundamental task. Stated otherwise, Immerman reveals a history of the “competition between covert, particularly paramilitary operations, and its core mission of collection and analysis.” Immerman, who currently serves as a Professor of History at Temple University, has held multiple positions within the intelligence network which has granted him access to privy material. He identifies his main questions in regard to the CIA as: What it does and has
September 11, 2001, Osama Bin Laden decided to “wake the sleeping giant.” The US immediately sent SOF units and CIA officers to recon the area and meet with the Northern Alliance. The primary battle leading up to this operation was Tora Bora, which was absent of conventional forces. Up until this point, the war on terror was predominantly a Special Operations fight along with Air Force for overhead support.3 SOF and the Northern Alliance had already displaced Taliban forces out of many towns and villages in northern Afghanistan to gain control of key terrain. Key towns in northern Afghanistan including Taloqan, Konduz, Herat, and Mazar-e Sharif took only three weeks to clear.4 The SOF units were making huge impacts across the country calling in air strikes. At the same time the SOF units were diligently...
Host: On September the 11th 2001, the notorious terror organisation known as Al-Qaeda struck at the very heart of the United States. The death count was approximately 3,000; a nation was left in panic. To this day, counterterrorism experts and historians alike regard the event surrounding 9/11 as a turning point in US foreign relations. Outraged and fearful of radical terrorism from the middle-east, President Bush declared that in 2001 that it was a matter of freedoms; that “our very freedom has come under attack”. In his eyes, America was simply targeted because of its democratic and western values (CNN News, 2001). In the 14 years following this pivotal declaration, an aggressive, pre-emptive approach to terrorism replaced the traditional
For the U.S. policymakers finding the proper balance between the management and the operating command structure was challenging, which poised the question: To what extend did the U.S. engaged in covert actions in Chile, and what if any bearing they have in future re-structuring of the leadership and accountability? What specific covert techniques were used in the operations? To answer those questions an analysis of some of the main U.S. political covert operations covering the leadership, management, and the envisioned result of the actions that consummated between the years of 1963 and 1974 is required.
US forces were already involved in Vietnam when Lyndon Johnson engineered the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 1964, and George Bush Senior agreed in a two-day Senate debate on US intervention in the Persian Gulf, but George W. Bush has surpassed his predecessors in the assumption of imperial powers--most obviously, perhaps, in his tendency to conflate America's war against terrorism with his own existential destiny. "I will not forget this wound to our country," he told the nation shortly after September 11. "I will not yield; I will not rest; I will not relent in waging this struggle for freedom and security for the American people." In assuming this pivotal role, moreover, Bush has made it clear that he will allow no boundaries not even on his exercise of national power. The president made the arbitrary decision to designate as a foreign “enemy combatant” Some Americans are being held incommunicado in a military brig without due process of law and without charges... in suspect of being related to al-Qaeda and possessing a dirty bomb[2].
...that had helped the United States to be one of the greatest counties that it is today. Within the agency, there was no communications where they kept information from each other. The CIA agency had no idea what they were doing in regards to central intelligence and they were compromised where the enemies knew about the attack before the attack was fully implemented. These examples prove that some leaders had some positive outcomes for the United States, but the agency from within could not stay united as well as keeping communications about what was going on in the world. I agree with Tim Weiner’s thesis that the United States is one of the greatest countries in the world, but we cannot seem to create a great and efficient spy service to benefit the United States.
...viewer recognizes that agencies, such as the CIA, are valuable in the War on Terror for the data collecting they’re involved in. On examining of the film, the movie’s setting, agencies involved, and the subject matter targeted, the appropriate historical and social themes were connected to the plot. The circumstances in the film depicting the aftermath of September 11th attacks and the U.S. government’s role in tracking Osama Bin Laden were realistic. After the 9/11 attacks, Americans felt that radicalized Islamic groups and their leaders that encouraged these followers to attack America were enemies to their country. Therefore, the film didn’t have to have a poster of Al-Qaeda or Osama Bin Laden to be used as propaganda to make the point that the radicalized Islamic group was the enemy of the United States; this decision had already been made by the United States.
The transformation of America is often discussed in both popular media and academic dialogue. Each generation has a name, new technologies define new eras, and events seem only notable when they are “historic”. While major events catch the interest of a broad spectrum of the public consciousness, subtle interactions between actors and slight shifts in beliefs are constantly changing the realities of the world. When the twin towers fell in 2001, the United States seemed to be thrust into a new world of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Jihadists, and a global fight against terrorism; bombs were dropped, ground forces were deployed in foreign states, and anyone who publicly questioned the urgency of war was at risk to be labeled a traitor. This one event was indelibly branded on the consciousness of the world and if often seen as a moment of sudden transformation. Most Americans believe that the troop presence in Iraq and Afghanistan are due to the terrorist attacks on the United States and while it is hard to deny that the 9-11 attacks was the impetus for putting boots on the ground, it is imperative that the chain of events following the horror of September 11 are seen to reflect the willingness and wants of actors in control before the towers fell.
For the past several months the United Nations’ Security Council has debated on whether or not to accept the U.S. proposal to force Iraq to comply the new and former resolutions. The new resolution calls for complete disarmament of Iraq and the re-entrance of weapons inspectors into Iraq. If Iraq fails to comply, then military force would be taken in order to disarm Iraq. This proposal met opposition from council members Russia, China, and France. They thought that the U.S. proposal was too aggressive and that the U.S. should not act alone without U.N. approval. For weeks they refused to believe that the only way to make Iraq disarm is through the threat of force and the fear of being wiped out.
Even before the National Security Act, our nation’s officials used spies, secret agents, covert action, and the gathering of intelligence during wars. During the Revolutionary War, George Washington drafted Nathan Hale and other spies to help them acquire independence. Benjamin Franklin and John Jay also created secret missions and operations to ensure their success during this war. These missions included secret agents and double agents, sabotage, raids against British troops, secret codes, propaganda and the spreading of false information (Wagner 13).
The Bush administration was responsible for allowing such “enhanced interrogation” techniques to be used directly following the “9-11” attack. "We used this technique on three people, captured a lot of people and used it on three. We gained value; information to protect the country. And it was the right thing to do as far as I'm concerned," former president Bush told reporters in 2010 (Harnden). It was this information that led them to Bin Laden’s courier, which in turn led them to the terrorist himself.
Retrieved October 1, 2009, from http://www.cd http://www.govtech.com/gt/articles/276683?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email l & utm _ campaign = new % 20 JPS _ 2008_3_26 Hilde Haaland Kramer, & Steve A Yetiv. (2007). The 'Secondary' of the 'Secondary'. The UN Security Council's Response to Terrorism: Before and After September 11, 2001. Political Science Quarterly, 122(3), 409-432.
a comprehensive research service. Retrieved May 2, 2004, from Terrorist Attack by Al Qaeda: http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/033104.pdf. Gunaratna, R. (2005, September). Retrieved September 2005, from http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/05spring/henzel.pdf. Gunaratna, R. (n.d.).
Since the end of the Cold War, non-state actors have risen in both prevalence and apparent power. The presence of non-state entities has caused significant ethical and political problems with Western ideology. Coker discusses issues concerning non-state actors in “Ethics and War in the 21st Century” with special attention given to the conflicting cultural ideas regarding warfare concerning the USA. The ability to label a target as not only an enemy combatant, but a fundamentally opposed force that is willing to ignore common practices and ethics is one that Coker denounces and attempts to explain. The disparity of established ethics between the two groups is only complicated with emerging weapon technologies, most importantly non-lethal weapon systems. In recent decades, the concept of a diffused enemy has proven to be ethically more problematic regarding identification and actions against a combative force with considerations for emerging technologies.