9/11 Informative Speech

Host: On September the 11th 2001, the notorious terror organisation known as Al-Qaeda struck at the very heart of the United States. The death count was approximately 3,000; a nation was left in panic. To this day, counterterrorism experts and historians alike regard the event surrounding 9/11 as a turning point in US foreign relations. Outraged and fearful of radical terrorism from the middle-east, President Bush declared that in 2001 that it was a matter of freedoms; that “our very freedom has come under attack”. In his eyes, America was simply targeted because of its democratic and western values (CNN News, 2001). In the 14 years following this pivotal declaration, an aggressive, pre-emptive approach to terrorism replaced the traditional

methods of warfare. Covert operations and interrogations became the primary source of acquiring Intelligence; diplomacy and military involvement was changing the game of counterterrorism. However the legality and justification of these measures often sparks controversy and contention among many. While some remain adamant that bending the rules to protect democracy is necessary, others have expressed serious distaste to the current course of action. To many, following September 11, the US embarked on a series of legal and covert military measures that only served to undermine democracy; creating a widespread and often violent opposition to US Foreign Policy.
Host: Good evening ladies and gentlemen.

As always, I’m your host Damien Carrick and welcome to yet another instalment of ABC’s The War on Terror: Behind the Battlelines. Tonight the ABC welcomes 2 very distinguished guests to explore this looming issue. We will be discussing the truth behind the lines: the grey-areas surrounding American foreign policy, the scepticism over extraordinary renditions and covert operations, and the role of hidden agencies such as the CIA. Has the United States government been fighting terrorism effectively and justifiably? To discuss all this I welcome Mr Jeremy Scahill, accredited author and journalist made famous for the Oscar nominated documentary Dirty Wars, based off the novel, and Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Powerful Mercenary Army. Joining Mr Scahill, I am pleased to welcome Mrs Lisa Monaco from Harvard University, former assistant Attorney General for National Security and current Homeland Security Advisor to President Obama

himself.
Host: Straight into it then. Let’s start with you Lisa. What impact did September 11 have upon counterterrorism?
Monaco: I think there are still a lot of people who still don’t understand how significant September 11 really was. Agencies such as the FBI were in utter disarray; we as a nation were unsure of what was going to happen next. Understandably, attacks of this magnitude have rarely been witnessed in United States history. Nevertheless, in that respect, I also think these attacks exposed an element of carelessness – we were not vigilant of radical terrorist attacks within our boarders. According to Michael Chertoff, attorney general of the time, there was a shift in “paradigm” for national security which highlighted “something we hadn’t recognised and which the law had not adequately accounted for”. Chertoff, a republican conservative, maintained the perspective that we needed to be more offensive in policy and direction. In my opinion, I think Chertoff managed to piece the situation together accurately: “government actions were what prevented further terrorist attacks” (The Harvard Gazette, 2011). Despite the undue criticism presented by some, this point of view was reinforced by many at the time. For instance, Michael Scheuer, CIA official for over 22 years, in an interview with the nation recognised US affairs organisation CounterPunch.org, recollected that the US needed to explore other avenues. While being critical of the government in regards to “anti-terrorism politics”, he held a nationalist point of view upon the necessary nature of offensive counterterrorism. Insistent that the CIA humanely treated its subjects and never took part in interrogations, Scheuer predictably maintained that while things changed after September 11, it was in no way “out of control” (CounterPunch, 2006). Alternatively however, it must be acknowledged that congressional control over situations was steadily diminishing. Aki Peritz, who presented an academically neutral perspective of events, forecasted that congressional oversight was indeed reduced after 9/11 but firmly stated that actions were “approved by the President” (Harvard University, 2009). While you could concede that September 11 was becoming more pre-emptive, it is unmistakably clear that this shift in approach was justified considering the circumstances of the time.
Host: Lisa, when you mentioned congressional involvement, what exactly where you referring to? How exactly did oversight change? Was this understandable considering the situation?
Monaco: Well you see the United States Congress has previously had the role of overseeing covert and intelligence acquiring operations. While presidential involvement has always been paramount, Congress as a collective were previously obligated to watch over counterterrorism measures conducted abroad. But as situations permitted, and I do think they did, Congress was not notified with the same regularity. Notably, through the situation in the ColdWar and in more modern operations prior to September 11, Clinton’s covert regime in Kenya and Tanzania in the 1990’s for example, Congress was notified regularly (The Washington Post, 2002). In hindsight however, it is easy to forget that while Congress was less active, there were very clear parameters on action. In 2005, the Defense Appropriations Bill was enacted by Congress to safeguard the treatment of detainees; where “cruel techniques” were “violations of law” (Human Rights Watch, 2005). Furthermore, presidential power was adequate and an efficient measure alone because of the well-established nature of prominent counterterrorism agencies – the FBI, CIA, the National Security Agency, the Joint Special Operations Command – which were all managed directly by the Defense Department.
Host: Now Jeremy, would you firstly agree that congressional oversight has changed since September 11? Was this change a positive one for the United States?
Scahill: Well to my understanding that in itself is a matter of perspective.

Yes, Lisa is correct in saying that congress support did progressively diminish, expanding presidential control over situations. With this said, I think that opens the doors to the possibility of error. From the traditionally left-wing news company The New Yorker, my colleague Jane Mayer was one of many to reveal that brutality was often the product of aggressive policy by the US. When former vice president Dick Cheney contended in 2002 that “it’s going to be vital for us to use any means at our disposal…to achieve our objective”, I don’t think people fully comprehended the seriousness of these words (The New Yorker, 2015). Unbelievably, it was reported that programs such as the extraordinary renditions and covert operations “expanded beyond recognition”. However it wasn’t just the anti-war outlets which were reporting on this. The prestigious and world renowned publication company The Washington Post directly reinforced Mayer’s statements. A primary account written by Washington Post in 2002, reporting after the very launch of George W. Bush’s declaration of war on terror, illuminated that since 2001, 600 detainees had already been confined to Guantanamo Bay for terrorist questioning. This is a colossal figure – 600 supposed terrorists in merely one year. Furthermore, the article also publicized that while the Clinton administration “pioneered” often violent interrogation procedures –known as

extraordinary renditions – this was conducted with full acknowledgement of Congress (The Washington Post, 2002). Now not to discredit the legitimacy of the charges against those 600 detainees in 2001-2, but I think the irregularities are more than apparent. 14 years on a CIA inquest, detailing the congressional oversight from the 1940’s to present, indicated that the numbers of interrogations and detainees increased exponentially. Moreover, there was no strong or overpowering disapproval for post-September 11 pre-emptivity – “congress paid little attention”. But questions must be raised over the legitimacy of covert operations and renditions without Congressional oversight. This is undemocratic in itself. For this reason, the failing Vietnam War of the 1970’s was withdrawn because of congressional disapproval. Similarly, the “secret” Laos War of the same time was kept in check because of consistent congress consultation (The Central Intelligence Agency, 2015). The September 11 shift in direction and lack of Congress approval was downright dangerous to say the least.
Host: So I’m assuming that it is fair to say that foreign policy played a great deal in counterterrorism. How significant was its role though? Jeremy?