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Reflection philosophy
Reflection philosophy
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Practical reason defines a distinctive standpoint of reflection. When agents deliberate about action, they think about themselves and their situation in characteristic ways. What are some of the salient features of the practical point of view? A natural way to interpret this point of view is to contrast it with the standpoint of theoretical reason. The latter standpoint is occupied when we engage in reasoning that is directed at the resolution of questions that are in some sense theoretical rather than practical; but how are we to understand this opposition between the theoretical and the practical? One possibility is to understand theoretical reflection as reasoning about questions of explanation and prediction. Looking backward to events …show more content…
That is, it involves reflection with an eye to the truth of propositions, and the reasons for belief in which it deals are considerations that speak in favor of such propositions' being true, or worthy of acceptance. Practical reason, by contrast, is concerned not with the truth of propositions but with the desirability or value of actions. The reasons in which it deals are considerations that speak in favor of particular actions being good, or worthy of performance in some way. This difference in subject matter corresponds to a further difference between the two forms of reason, in respect of their consequences. Theoretical reflection about what one ought to believe produces changes in one's overall set of beliefs, whereas practical reason gives rise to action; as noted above, it is practical not only in its subject matter, but also in its …show more content…
Accounts of this kind offer interpretations of the normative and evaluative language that distinctively figures in practical reflection. As was seen in section 1, such reflection addresses an agent's reasons for acting in one way or another; conclusions about such reasons are characteristically couched in evaluative terms, as claims about what it would be good to do, or as normative conclusions about the actions that one ought to perform. According to the expressivist, however, evaluative and normative claims of these kinds do not represent genuine cognitive achievements, judgments that are literally capable of being true or false. Rather they give expression to desires, sentiments, plans, and other pro-attitudes, the sorts of goal-directed noncognitive state that move people to action. The expressivist contends that we can make sense of the capacity of practical reason to generate states with the peculiar structure and function of intentions only if evaluative and normative assertions are understood along these
ABSTRACT: In light of interpreting a paradox of irrationality, vaguely expressed by Donald Davidson in the context of explaining weakness of will, I attempt to show that it contains a significant thesis regarding the cognitive as well as motivational basis of our normative practice. First, an irrational act must involve both a rational element and a non-rational element at its core. Second, irrationality entails free and intentional violation of fundamental norms which the agent deems right or necessary. Third, "normative interpretation" is only possible for objects that are both natural events and capable of mental operations which presuppose some freedom of will as well as constructive representation of the surrounding reality. Fourth, there is always a question of whether we strike the best balance between fitting individual mental items consistently with the overall behavior pattern and keeping our critical ability in following certain normative principles which constitute our rational background. Fifth, the paradox of irrationality reflects and polarizes a deep-seated tension in the normative human practice under the ultimate constraints of nature. Finally, the ultimate issue is how we can find the best lines on which our normative rational standards are based-"best" in the sense that they are close enough to limits of human practical potentialities and are not too high as to render our normative standards idle or even disastrous.
The main argument that Galen Strawson puts forward attempts to find the truth in that no agent can fulfill the demands for real moral responsibility. Strawson’s argument assumes that if an agent is totally morally responsible for his or her actions, the agent also has to bear the responsibility of his or her reasons for doing those actions. In this regard, Strawson finds it impossible for an agent to be responsible for his or her reasons arguing that this action calls for an unending regress of totally responsible decisions for the agent to bear the responsibility of his or her reasons. The thesis statement governing this paper argues that, Galen Strawson’s basic argument is hardly persuasive to individuals who oppose that an individual’s reasons are the cause of the individual’s action. In this regard, there is a high possibility that an agent can avoid the infinite regress threat especially in situations where two similar choices seem to explain each other. The paper will introduce the basic argument by which that Galen Strawson stands. An argument that opposes Strawson’s argument will follow and the next section will object the arguments that oppose Strawson’s argument. A conclusion that restates the thesis and one that sums up the whole argument in the paper will conclude the paper.
In the end, the pursuit of an unproblematic theory of justification seems like a Sisyphean task. All of the major theories have glaring weaknesses and it appears that a compromise between certain elements of the different views will be necessary to move closer to a more acceptable view. In this paper I have tried to show some of the principal weaknesses with the two chief theories of justification and to look for an alternate, weak foundationalism, which seems to me to be a legitimate way forward.
In “What is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics” Sharon Street claims every individual has the ability to decide what is valuable to them and what is not valuable. She also claims that a single desire can be irrational and at the same time can not be intrinsically irrational. I will argue against this in my paper. In Section 1 I will explain Street’s point of view, and in Section 2 I will object her view.
In Korsgaard’s article on The Authority of Reflection, Korsgaard presents the idea that all rational beings have a unique ability to reflect on our actions and how it plays a role in determining what obligations we have. This means that rational beings can weigh the pros and cons of our options before we decide on what to do, influencing what obligations we will have. This is opposed to acting on one’s first instinct without reflecting on the action first. This essay expands on Korsgaard’s argument on practical identity, moral identity, and the different characteristics of these identities that influence how one acts.
The main idea of this perspective is that people make goal-directed decisions based on their rational thinking. (Hutchison, 2015) In this case study, rational choice perspective is used by Laura, Danny, and Kid. Each member provides a strong example of rational choice based on their own self-interest.
Stocker begins his paper by arguing that modern ethical theories fail because, by and large, they deal only with the reasons and justifications for people’s actions and ignore people’s motivations. This failure to address the role of motivation has led to a form of schizophrenia in an important area of value;22 people are unable to reconcile their motives with the moral justifications for their actions. Stocker highlights the constraints that motives impose on both ethical theory and the ethical life in order to show that only when justifications and motives are in harmony can people lead the good life.
Normative ethics have received much praise and criticism from well-respected philosophers for many years. Structured by Immanuel Kant, arguably one of the greatest minds in history, Kantian ethics have changed the way people look at what truly makes an action “right.” Kant believed that developing a moral system that was consistent and based entirely on reason was achievable. He urged ethics that are knowable without reference to sense experience, or as he calls “a priori” claims, because they are universal and binding. Kant argued that it is impossible to ground ethics on religion. Instead, he turned to a vague sense of natural law and states that rules exist to rational beings, whether on this universe or any other, simply because they are rational beings.
In Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant argues that human beings inherently have capability to make purely rational decisions that are not based on inclinations and such rational decisions prevent people from interfering with freedom of another. Kant’s view of inherent ability to reason brings different perspective to ways which human beings can pursue morality thus it requires a close analytical examination.
In the late eighteenth century, with the publication of his theories on morality, Immanuel Kant revolutionized philosophy in a way that greatly impacted the decades of thinkers after him. The result of his influence led to perceptions and interpretations of his ideas reflected in the works of writers all around the world. Kant’s idealism stems from a claim that moral law, a set of innate rules within each individual, gives people the ability to reason, and it is through this that people attain truth. These innate rules exist in the form of maxims: statements that hold a general truth. Using this, Kant concluded with the idea of autonomy, in which all rational human wills are autonomous, each individual is bound by their own will and in an ideal society, people should operate only according to their reason. Influenced by Kant’s ideas, an american writer by the name of Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote his own call to individual morality through an essay on Self-Reliance. In “Self-Reliance”, Emerson tells individuals to trust in their own judgments, act only according to their own wills, and to use their own judgment to determine what is right. Emerson’s Self-Reliance and Kant’s autonomy differ to the extent of where reason comes from. However, they agree on its purpose in dictating the individual’s judgment and actions. As a result, Autonomy and Self-Reliance have essentially the same message. Both Kant and Emerson agree that the individual should trust only their own reason, that they are bound only by their own free will, and that the actions of an individual should be governed by reason.
Gilbert Harman lays out his moral relativism theory with “inner judgments”, the statements concerned with “ought”, in Moral Relativism Defended. However, he assumes an important premise of his theory to be true, which is the reason that I will prove the missing premise – that moral relativism is true – in this paper. Moreover, his form of moral relativism with his “four-place predicate ‘Ought(A,D,C,M),’ which relates an agent A, a type of action D, considerations C, and motivating attitudes M,” has brought about both meta-ethical and practical concerns. He argues that these inner judgments are only possible if agent A acknowledges considerations of the circumstance C, invokes motivating attitudes M, and supports the action D with C and M. In
Through his discussion of morals in the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant explores the question of whether a human being is capable of acting solely out of pure duty and if our actions hold true moral value. In passage 407, page 19, Kant proposes that if one were to look at past experiences, one cannot be certain that his or her rationalization for performing an action that conforms with duty could rest solely on moral grounds. In order to fully explain the core principle of moral theory, Kant distinguishes between key notions such as a priori and a posteriori, and hypothetical imperative vs. categorical imperative, in order to argue whether the actions of rational beings are actually moral or if they are only moral because of one’s hidden inclinations.
There are many arguments for moral realism, one of which is presented by David Enoch, who posits a unique explanation of how normative truths can exist. He argues for moral realism by using his Indispensability Argument, which explains the necessity of normative facts in deliberation. I will argue that Enoch’s claim is valid in that it fairs well against opposition, however it shows weakness by not addressing moral subjectivity.
During Michael Sandel’s lecture, the two moral reasoning’s he described was Consequentialist and Categorical moral reasoning. According to Sandel, Consequentialist moral reasoning locates morality in the consequence of an act, while Categorical moral reasoning located morality in certain duties and rights. (Harvard University (Producer), n.d.)
HIS essay presents the key issues surrounding the concepts of partiality and impartiality in ethical theory. In particular, it argues that the tension between partiality and impartiality has not been resolved. Consequently, it concludes that the request for moral agents to be impartial does demand too much. To achieve this goal, this essay consists of four main parts. The first part gives an overview of the concept of impartiality. The second deals with the necessity of impartiality in consequentialism and deontology. The third deals with the tension between partiality and impartiality (Demandingness Objection). Specifically, how a duty to perform supererogatory acts follows from impartial morality. The fourth and final part refutes positions that maintain that partiality and impartiality have been reconciled. Therefore, it demonstrates that current ethical theories that demand moral agents to behave in a strictly impartial fashion are unreasonable.