There are many arguments for moral realism, one of which is presented by David Enoch, who posits a unique explanation of how normative truths can exist. He argues for moral realism by using his Indispensability Argument, which explains the necessity of normative facts in deliberation. I will argue that Enoch’s claim is valid in that it fairs well against opposition, however it shows weakness by not addressing moral subjectivity.
To begin, David Enoch defends moral realism using his Indispensability Argument. Firstly, Enoch argues that universally objective and irreducible normative (and by extension moral) truths do exist, or at the very least people are justified in believing in them. His argument for their existence encompasses the idea that normative truths are indispensable to human deliberation and decision making. That is to say, when people are deliberating they make reference to these universal normative truths, about what they ought and not ought to do in certain situations. This type of deliberation is separate from such acts as simply “picking” or following something such as desire, although both have phenomenal characteristics. Picking, he argues, is more or less like making an arbitrary decision, such as which flavor of chips to buy. However, deliberation is different, wherein it aims to make the “right” or “correct” decision, which is why it is related to morality. An example of this might be something as simple as figuring out which bus gets from point A to point B faster, which involves there being a correct answer, as well as something more complex, such as whether one should lie to his/her friend in order to protect them from emotional pain. Basically, intuitively, people tend to feel what the “right” and “...
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...argument for moral realism is strong, however, as he says, it leaves room for improvement. In separating deliberating from other kinds of decision making, and then showing how normative facts meet the criterion of indispensability, he easily meets Harman’s challenge. Additionally, he refutes what I regard as the major objections against him by showing how normative truths can still play a role in deliberation, even when other things such as desires and disbelief are factored in. He also makes a strong case as to why his indispensability argument is better than its alternatives, although some vagueness begins to show in terms of subjective truths. So, overall, it seems that he does a good job of justifying the existence of normative truths by explaining their indispensability to deliberation, however, whether they are objective or not still remains questionable.
Clifford makes a very strong and valid case for justifying every decision, regardless of how insignificant. Using his view of thinking, it is easy to understand why everyone has a moral right to justify decisions. Without the cooperation of society in making every decision a justified one, it is useless to hold someone accountable for an immoral belief.
Rossian Pluralism claims that there are multiple things that we have basic, intrinsic moral reason to do, which he names as the prima facie duties. These duties are not real, obligatory duties that one must follow under all circumstances, but are “conditional duties” (Ross 754) that one should decide to follow or reject upon reflection of their circumstances. This moral theory has faced criticisms, most strongly in the form of the problem of trade-offs. However, I will demonstrate that the problem of trade-offs is an issue that can be neglected as a valid objection to Rossian Pluralism because it is applicable to other theories as well and it is a factor that makes a moral theory more valuable than not.
Though individuals live by and react similarly to various situations, not all people have the same morals. I can relate to instances where I have supported a belief, regardless of the criticisms that arise, all because my choice is based upon personal morals. The same can be said regarding Debra J. Dickerson as she expresses in her novel, An American Story. In Carol Gilligan’s “Concepts of Self and Morality,” she states, “The moral person is one who helps others; goodness in service, meeting one’s obligations and responsibilities to others, if possible without sacrificing oneself” (170). After considering this statement, I strongly feel that Gilligan’s proposal lacks the depth to accurately characterize the moral person, but I am able to accept the argument raised by Joan Didion. Her essay entitled, “On Morality,” clearly provides a more compelling and acceptable statement in describing the moral person by saying, “I followed my own conscience, I did what I thought was right” (181). Joan Didion’s proposal is precise and acceptable. It is obvious that as long as people follow what they believe is the right thing to do, and approach the situation maturely, their actions can be considered examples of morality, and they can then be considered moral human beings.
The basis of this paper is centered around two somewhat conflicting moral theories that aim to outline two ways of ethical thinking. The theory behind both rule consequentialism and Kantian ethics will be compared and evaluated. These theories can then be applied to a relatively complex moral case known as the “Jim and the Indians” example.
This requires always taking into account the rational goals of moral agents when making decisions that may affect them. The more important the goals are to the agents, the greater the importance of not obstructing them. Since Sally’s theory has two separate principles, she accounts for the possibility that they will overlap. To do so, she includes an option on how to resolve the conflict. According to the theory, if the principles lead to conflicting actions, then moral agents should resolve the conflict on a case-by-case basis by deciding which principle should be followed given the proposed actions and circumstances.
The question of what constitutes morality is often asked by philosophers. One might wonder why morality is so important, or why many of us trouble ourselves over determining which actions are moral actions. Mill has given an account of the driving force behind our questionings of morality. He calls this driving force “Conscience,” and from this “mass of feeling which must be broken through in order to do what violates our standard of right,” we have derived our concept of morality (Mill 496). Some people may practice moral thought more often than others, and some people may give no thought to morality at all. However, morality is nevertheless a possibility of human nature, and a very important one. We each have our standards of right and wrong, and through the reasoning of individuals, these standards have helped to govern and shape human interactions to what it is today. No other beings except “rational beings,” as Kant calls us, are able to support this higher capability of reason; therefore, it is important for us to consider cases in which this capability is threatened. Such a case is lying. At first, it seems that lying should not be morally permissible, but the moral theories of Kant and Mill have answered both yes and no on this issue. Furthermore, it is difficult to decide which moral theory provides a better approach to this issue. In this paper, we will first walk through the principles of each moral theory, and then we will consider an example that will explore the strengths and weaknesses of each theory.
In this paper, I will argue that Kant provides us with a plausible account of morality. To demonstrate that, I will initially offer a main criticism of Kantian moral theory, through explaining Bernard Williams’ charge against it. I will look at his indulgent of the Kantian theory, and then clarify whether I find it objectionable. The second part, I will try to defend Kant’s theory.
J. L. Mackie makes his position explicit by opening his article "The Subjectivity of Values" with this terse statement: "There are no objective values." Mackie had found recent dialogue in moral philosophy to be fraught with misunderstandings and conflations of various moral positions, so he felt it necessary to rigorously define his position as well as the boundaries of his concerns. Thus his article has two major parts: First, Mackie defines the nature of his moral skepticism, and, second, he defends his position by showing the implausibility of moral realism with a series of arguments.
...’ new elaboration on the deliberative model of its substantive force; once again confronting it with the Hegelian charge of emptiness and ineffectiveness.
With Campbell’s argument entirely laid out, the final question remains: is it sound? Based on the premises of his arguments as I see them, I believe I am safe in saying that yes, his argument is sound. Campbell has explained his premises clearly enough to persuade me into his manner of thinking. The only threat to his argument that I see lies in the his rebuttal of the meaninglessness criticism. I feel that he did not respond to this critique head on. Campbell claims that only the person making the moral choice can be aware of the reasons he made that choice. He, also, claimed that even a Determinist placed in a position of moral choice, has to be aware of his freedom of decision, but, if that is true, how do the advocates of meaninglessness fail to see the reason behind the choices they have made? This is the only point I am aware of that can jeopardize the soundness of Campbell’s argument. If he can explain this, he will have made a libertarian out of me.
James Rachels expresses his thoughts on what a satisfactory moral theory would be like. Rachels says a “satisfactory theory would be realistic about where human beings fit in the grand scheme of things” (Rachels, 173). Even though there is an existing theory on how humans came into this world there is not enough evidence to prove the theory to be correct. In addition to his belief of knowing how our existence came into play, he also has a view on the way we treat people and the consequences of our actions. My idea of a satisfactory moral theory would be treating people the way we wish to be treated, thinking of what results from our doings, as well as living according to the best plan.
Harman, G. (2000). Is there a single true morality?. Explaining value and other essays in moral philosophy (pp. 77-99). Oxford: Clarendon Press ;.
When we are little, we worry about what we are going to get out of something, so what is right or wrong is based on what is going to give us most in return. Then, we grow up a little, and realize that, being apart of society, that we should live as one of society 's figures. We decide what is right or wrong based on social norms. That is the conventional stage of morality, mostly when we are teens. Then, we realize that an individual is more than a figure of society, but a totally separate entity of society. We have now developed our own, real moral reasons to what is right or
The history of our world is not only a succession of events, but also a chain of ideas. It is impossible to know the true sense of the present and the aims of the future unless we take a look at the past. There many great minds whose philosophies had a profound effect on western political thought. However, in a discussion of epistemology that informs ethics, it would be wise to consider Hume's, Descartes’, and Camus's theoretical approaches that give us the basic understanding of epistemology and advice on ethical belief.
HIS essay presents the key issues surrounding the concepts of partiality and impartiality in ethical theory. In particular, it argues that the tension between partiality and impartiality has not been resolved. Consequently, it concludes that the request for moral agents to be impartial does demand too much. To achieve this goal, this essay consists of four main parts. The first part gives an overview of the concept of impartiality. The second deals with the necessity of impartiality in consequentialism and deontology. The third deals with the tension between partiality and impartiality (Demandingness Objection). Specifically, how a duty to perform supererogatory acts follows from impartial morality. The fourth and final part refutes positions that maintain that partiality and impartiality have been reconciled. Therefore, it demonstrates that current ethical theories that demand moral agents to behave in a strictly impartial fashion are unreasonable.