Foundationalism, Coherentism, and the Justification of Knowledge

794 Words2 Pages

In this short paper I will examine the positions of foundationalism and coherentism, and argue that a form of weak foundationalism is the most satisfactory option as a valid theory of justification for knowledge and is therefore a viable way of avoiding any sort of vicious regress problem and skepticism.

Foundationalism addresses the infinite regress problem in the following way: if person O is to be justified in having belief X, X must be justified by a further belief Y, which must inferentially justify belief X. Furthermore, Y must be justified by another belief, Z. Instead of following this line infinitely, the foundationalist argues that eventually there must be a foundational belief that is self-justified and capable of justifying any belief that relies on it in turn for its own justification. Accordingly, as an example, belief Z must be able to justify itself without a belief Z1, and be able to justify belief Y at the same time. Thus, inferential justification must be possible for non-foundational beliefs; noninferential justification must also be possible as well. How one arrives at noninferentially justified beliefs is one of the biggest problems for the foundationalist.

In my opinion, it is hard to accept that there can be foundational beliefs that are self-justified because, as has been pointed out, if a belief is to be self-justified, person O must “know” in some sense what characteristic of that belief makes it self-justified, otherwise the belief is arbitrary. So, supposing that characteristic Q is what makes belief P justified, person O would then have to know that belief P has characteristic Q. Thus, belief P is no longer noninferentially justified because it relies on person O’s knowledge of characteristic Q. I...

... middle of paper ...

...re some foundational beliefs that possess some degree of intrinsic justification, but as it was noted, accepting these beliefs as completely self-justifying is difficult to accept. Therefore, these foundational beliefs that possess a low degree of justification can rely on other minimally-justified beliefs for support, consequently creating a coherent foundation of sorts.

In the end, the pursuit of an unproblematic theory of justification seems like a Sisyphean task. All of the major theories have glaring weaknesses and it appears that a compromise between certain elements of the different views will be necessary to move closer to a more acceptable view. In this paper I have tried to show some of the principal weaknesses with the two chief theories of justification and to look for an alternate, weak foundationalism, which seems to me to be a legitimate way forward.

Open Document