In “The Necessity of Context but not Belief States” Emery Staton argues that John Perry’s argument for belief states is unnecessary, “although context is important in solving the problem of the essential indexical” (Staton 2017, 1). She does so by breaking down each point to Perry’s argument, and subsequently refuting his main premises. In this paper I will argue that Staton is right to have qualms with Perry’s argument in favor of belief states, but against relativized propositions. John Perry’s argument in “the Problem of the Essential Indexical” is very long winded. He goes through numerous points and counterpoints before coming to a conclusion about belief states. Staton begins her essay by explaining Perry’s original issue with the essential indexical. An essential indexical is a term that when replaced by other terms “destroys the force of motivation” (Staton 2017, 1). One possible solution to the problem of the essential indexical is a de re belief. Staton summarizes using an …show more content…
Staton explains that a belief state is the state someone is in when they have a belief, but is not contingent upon what is actually believed (Staton 2017, 3). The example given is that when one believes “a meeting starts at noon, you can go from state to state corresponding to ‘the meeting will begin’ to ‘the meeting is beginning’ to ‘the meeting has begun’” (Staton 2017, 3). Staton does think that this reliance on context is necessary, but does not believe that belief states are the best way to solve the problem. Staton first argues that Perry does not actually give a definitive definition of a belief state. This is a problem because it is then up to the reader to infer from the text; something that can get confusing quite easily. She then points out that Perry is very quick to dismiss context in the idea of relativized propositions, despite his entire idea of belief states being backed by context (Staton 2017,
It is crucial that every belief must be thoroughly explored and justified to avoid any future repercussions. Clifford provides two examples in which, regardless of the outcome, the party that creates a belief without comprehensive justification ends up at fault. It is possible to apply the situations in The Ethics of Belief to any cases of belief and end up with the conclusion that justification is of utmost importance. Justifying beliefs is so important because even the smallest beliefs affect others in the community, add to the global belief system, and alter the believer moral compass in future decisions.
The concept of belief perseverance (Myers, 82) can be found in the film, “12 Angry Men”. Throughout the film, the jury members discuss the verdict of a young, Mexican boy. It is essential to note that all twelve men serving on the jury are Caucasian. Somewhat because of the boy’s ethnicity, many of the jurors are initially in support of submitting a guilty verdict. This is made clear in the film when Juror #10 verbalizes what he ‘thinks’ is the opinion of the group; “Now, look - we're all grown-ups in here. We heard the facts, didn't we? You're not gonna tell me that we're supposed to believe this kid, knowing what he is. Listen, I've lived among them all my life - you can't believe a word they say, you know that. I mean
Population 485 describes Michael Perry’s life as he searches for his niche in his community. There are three criteria that build an evaluation argument, which consist of ethical, practical, and aesthetic criteria. Throughout the book Perry provides multiple detailed stories that use two of the three criteria quite often. The practical criterion focuses on practical considerations and appears more throughout his book than the aesthetic criterion, which is based off of how engaging the story is to the reader, and the picture the story paints in the readers’ heads. As a whole Michael Perry creates a successful book that uses his personal experiences to convey his message of the importance of community in someone’s life.
He says that Perry, who grew up without love, direction, or moral values, is “. a very oriented, hyper-alert to things going on about him, and shows no sign of confusion.
The first being whether a hypothesis is live or dead, a live hypothesis is one that could be considered, and a dead one being one that would not be considered. A dead hypothesis could be that it’s raining chocolate bars, a live one could be that it is raining normally. The second one is if a belief is forced or avoidable. If you were told to jump or sit, it would be an avoidable one as you could decline to do either. If you were told to jump, then it would be a forced decision as you would either jump or not jump, which is the alternative to it. The last instance is when it is momentous, which means it is of great importance or significance, especially in its bearing on the future. A momentous instance could be that if you were called up and told that you were offered an all-expense paid trip to Europe, and have to accept
In Fixation of Belief Charles Sanders Pierce discusses logic, knowledge, reason, and how we come about to believe what is true and others may decide to believe it is not true. According to the question of Peirce wants everybody to understand and to wade their thought and express their feelings that to give them an idea which methods of fixing the people use to make them to beliefs. Peirce also addresses in four methods of fixating belief which is tenacity, authority, a priori and science.
ABSTRACT: Davidson argues (1) that the connection between belief and the "constitutive ideal of rationality" (2) precludes the possibility of their being any type-type identities between mental and physical events. However, there are radically different ways to understand both the nature and content of this "constitutive ideal," and the plausibility of Davidson’s argument depends on blurring the distinction between two of these ways. Indeed, it will be argued here that no consistent understanding of the constitutive ideal will allow it to play the dialectical role Davidson intends for it.
Togelius, J. (2011). A procedural critique of deontological reasoning. Paper presented at the Proceedings of DiGRA.
In “The Fixation of Belief”, Charles S. Peirce attempts to explain his four methods of establishing belief, in which he says all people have. These methods can be put to the test with any subject matter, and one shall always fit.
Blind faith is hard for many. Clifford takes the side of Evidentialism, which is the assertion t
This paper will dispute that scientific beliefs are not the right way to accept a belief and it will question if we should let one accept their rights to their own beliefs. In Williams James article Will to Believe, we accept his perspective on how we set and fix our beliefs. This paper will first outline his overview on the argument that someone does not choose their belief but rather one just has them. Following, it will outline my perspective on how we set our beliefs and agreement with purse. Then it will explain how other methodologies such as science cannot conclude to one’s true beliefs. Science has been seen as a way to perceive life and taken to consideration as the truth. This paper should conclude that humans define ourselves by
Bertrand Russell, one of the most influential philosophers of the modern age, argued extensively in his book, “The Problems of Philosophy”, that the belief in inductive reasoning is only rational on the grounds of its intrinsic evidence; it cannot be justified by an appeal to experience alone (Russell 1998). Inductive reasoning refers to a form of reasoning that constructs or assesses propositions that are generalizations of observations (Russell 1998). Inductive reasoning is thus, in simple terms, probabilistic. The premises of an inductive logical argument provide some degree of support for the conclusion, but that support is in no way definitive or conclusive (Browne, 2004). Yet even if one agrees with Russell and concludes that there are no rational justifications for the principle of induction in and of itself, one can still maintain that there is a pragmatic justification for maintaining a belief in the principle. Simply put, there are still perfectly sound reasons for behaving as if the principle of induction holds true, regardless of whether or not the principle itself is rationally justifiable (Browne, 2004). This type of justification can be used across many of the belief systems that we as human beings hold, even stretching to the playing field of religion. In this paper I will outline not only why it is pragmatically justifiable to believe in the principle of induction, but also why it is equally as justifiable to believe in an infinite God, regardless of whether or not deductive reasoning provides us with definitive support for such conclusions.
These concerns are the problem of 'generality ' and the problem of 'extent '. Before these concerns can be understood, we need to understand the two forms of belief forming processes, namely, belief forming process 'type ' and belief forming process 'token '. A 'type ' is a form of belief forming process whereas a 'token ' is individual sequence of events that lead to a certain belief formation. In other words a token is an instance of type. Between them only belief forming process type is repeatable and hence can be used for reliability test.
Hollis, M., & Lukes, S. (1982). Apparently Irrational Beliefs.Rationality and relativism (pp. 149-180). Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Some of the objections, such as the ones made by Edmund Gettier, claim that three conditions are not nearly enough to justify a true belief, and that at the very least a fourth must be added. Gettier presents a very valid criticism of the JTB theory of knowledge, and his counter examples highlight flaws in the JTB theory that make it an inadequate theory of knowledge. Gettier claims takes an issue with the third part of the JTB theory, which states that proposition P must be true. Gettier makes the interesting observation that person S may very well be justified in believing in proposition P even if P is false