Obr Pros And Cons

Yet this serves to underline the limitations of interpreting the significance of the OBR only through the lens of depoliticisation, that is, the extent of its independence from elected politicians. It is probably broadly correct to conclude that the willingness of Chote (and of course the statutory responsibility of the OBR to Parliament) to honestly and very publicly appraise progress along the coalition and Conservative governments’ deficit reduction schedule has compelled Osborne to frequently postpone the point at which a balanced budget will be achieved. However, to conclude that this significant hampers the austerity agenda assumes that Osborne is highly motivated by deficit reduction – –this appears not to be the case. Similarly, while

Furthermore, while the OBR’s statutory functions may necessitate a greater degree of honesty about the failure to date of deficit reduction, it does not assess the underlying economic problems that have led to the government failing to cut spending, or increase revenues, as quickly as it might have liked. This becomes especially problematic, however, if simply by existing, the OBR creates the sense that fiscal policy decisions are being ‘supervised’ by apolitical experts, thereby helping to shield the government from wider scrutiny. It should be noted that, by legislating for the Charter for Budget Responsibility, and introducing measures such as the welfare cap, Osborne has imposed rule-based constraints on his fiscal policy approach reminiscent of those employed by New Labour, even if they differ markedly in content. Yet the existence of the OBR in an apparently supervisory role appears to be deflecting some of the critical attention away from Osborne in terms of whether such rules are adhered

With probity in the public finances elevated to a first-order political issue, it is not difficult to appreciate why public discourse appears to have assimilated seamlessly the notion that elected governments inherently misappropriate ‘taxpayers’ money’. Greater independence for the OBR may occasionally lead to embarrassment for Osborne, but also reinforces such trends, ultimately benefiting the Conservative agenda and how policy elites more generally have sought to respond to growth model failure. Indeed, former Cabinet Secretary Gus O’Donnell (commonly referred to as ‘GOD’ because of the range of his influence within the UK civil service in the 2000s) advocated in 2013 the creation of an Office of Taxpayer Responsibility to sit alongside the OBR. The new body would appraise the worth of all large items of public expenditure before they are implemented (effectively exercising a veto over spending decisions by directly elected governments), similar to the way that the National Audit Office appraises many policies with fiscal implications after they have been implemented (O’Donnell, 2013, pp. 384–-5; see also Berry and Berry, 2014). It is highly unlikely that any government would agree to create such a body, as O’Donnell well knows – –but that it has been advocated by such a prominent figure within the UK policy elite