Metaphysics is a branch of philosophy that deals with abstract concepts such as being, substance and time. Under this branch of philosophy there is a puzzle used to illustrate challenges with our beliefs of change over time called Theseus’s ship. Philosophers have come up with two responses to the puzzle: an affirmative answer which argues that the ship remains the same, and a negative answer which argues the ship is different. In this paper I argue that John Locke is incorrect in his belief that the ship at the beginning and end of the voyage are different. This paper has four parts beginning with an explanation of Theseus’ ship (1). I then discuss why John Locke would have believed the ship at the end of the voyage is different (2) and follow …show more content…
John Locke is a philosopher who wrote one of the first responses to the question of personal identity. Locke writes that you cannot say if something is the same or different unless you define what kind of identity you are looking at, he calls this relativity of identity. He then mentions that there are three different criterion for identity: bodily, human being, and personhood. Bodily states that if any matter has changed then it is no longer the same mass, human being states that the identity of a man stays the same as long as it continues the same life and personhood states that if something has a consciousness then it remains the same as longer as it consider itself itself. Now, when his view on identity is applied to Theseus’ ship one can see that he would believe that the ship at the destination would not be the same ship because it is only a body of matter and has no consciousness. One verify this by looking at one of his essays; he is talking about identity concerning animals and he states “there may be a manifest change of the parts; so that truly they are not either of them the same masses of matter, they be truly one of them the same oak and the other the same horse.”2 In this passage it shows that Locke believes the body of the living thing has changed and that they are classified as the same living thing is because of the life they …show more content…
In the objection to his views I mention that people give “life” to inanimate objects. This life consists of the ownership and history of it which is more important than the physical aspect of the ship. Relating this to the puzzle of Theseus’ ship it is correct to say that the ship remains the same because anyone discussing the ship would say that it Theseus still owns the ship and that it was on the voyage the entire time. In addition, since the wood be placed in the same position as the wood it was replacing if someone looked at the ship before and after they would not be able that the wood had been replaced and would state that it is the same ship. Due to the similar appearance and the important of the history and ownership of the ship it is correct to state that Theseus ship is the same at the beginning and the end of the
7. John Wisdom, Paradox and Discovery (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1969), p. ix.
In Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, by George Berkeley, has various arguments to explain what the physics and metaphysics are. Berkeley strains the link between the physics and metaphysics in may ways that all are connected through the first two dialogues. The first dialogue talks about sensible qualities and the second talks about how God and the mind are connected. Berkeley gives the question of is the object in the mind or does it exist on its own. It is this question that makes us think about how we perceive the world today. Berkeley expresses many opinions through two people, Hylas and Philonous. For Hylas he believes in the matter aspect of things while Philonous believes in the
In his essay “An Essay Concerning Human Understanding” John Locke makes a connection between memory and consciousness and called this connection the memory theory. The memory theory states that if “a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, [and is] the same thinking thing, in different times and places” then it is continuously the same rational being has a consciousness (Locke 1959). Locke ties the consciousness and memory together by saying that “as far as … consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person”; meaning that if a person has memories of their existence and actions they are the same person. Locke connects the memory
(1) Kelly, Thomas (2005). “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.” Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Eds. Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pg.1 – 36.
Smith, Q., & Oaklander, L. N. (1995).Time, change, and freedom an introduction to metaphysics. London: Routledge.
Locke and Hume both agree that memory is key to define personal identity. Locke believes that memory and consciousness define personal identity. While Hume’s thinks it is the source of personal identity, he does not fully agree with Locke and thinks that memory reveals personal identity, it does not create it. They both agree that there is a change; Locke understands that a person changes and what relates everything to who we are is
Locke viewed the identity of living entities in a different light. Above, change in mass constituted a change in identity. But, in living entities a change in mass does not affect the identity of the object. Locke uses the example of the oak tree. It starts off as a sapling and grows into a huge oak tree, with a massive change in mass. That oak tree could be subjected to the cutting of branches, and the winter fall of leaves, however it still remains an oak tree because it continues the life of a tree. It maintains the same functional arrangements of components (Blackburn, 1999: 125-126). An interesting example is raised by Blackburn in assessing “how much change to tolerate while still regarding it as the same ‘thing’” (Blackburn, 1999:127). ‘Theseus’ ship’ is used to illustrate this. The ship goes on a long voyage and is in need of constant repair and maintenance. By the end of the voyage, all the components of the ship have been changed.
The personal identity continues to be same since a person is the same rational thing, same self, and thus the personal identity never changes (Strawson, 2014). Locke also suggests that personal identity has to change when the own self-changes and therefore even a little change in the personal identity has to change the self. He also provides an argument that a person cannot question what makes something today to remain the same thing it was a day ago or yesterday because one must specify the kind of thing it was. This is because something might be a piece of plastic but be a sharp utensil and thus suggest that the continuity of consciousness is required for something to remain the same yesterday and today. John Locke also suggests that two different things of a similar type cannot be at the same time at the same place. Therefore, the criteria of the personal identity theory of Locke depends on memory or consciousness remaining the same (Strawson, 2014). This is because provided a person has memory continuity and can remember being the same individual, feeling, thinking, and doing specific things, the individual can remain to be the same person irrespective of bodily
John Locke's, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), was first criticized by the philosopher and theologian, John Norris of Bemerton, in his "Cursory Reflections upon a Book Call'd, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding," and appended to his Christian Blessedness or Discourses upon the Beatitudes (1690). Norris's criticisms of Locke prompted three replies, which were only posthumously published. Locke has been viewed, historically, as the winner of this debate; however, new evidence has emerged which suggests that Norris's argument against the foundation of knowledge in sense-perception that the Essay advocated was a valid and worthy critique, which Locke did, in fact, take rather seriously. Charlotte Johnston's "Locke's Examination of Malebranche and John Norris" (1958), has been widely accepted as conclusively showing that Locke's replies were not philosophical, but rather personal in origin; her essay, however, overlooks critical facts that undermine her subjective analysis of Locke's stance in relation to Norris's criticisms of the Essay. This paper provides those facts, revealing the philosophical—not personal—impetus for Locke's replies.
No sooner had Shakespeare penned these lines than the theatre metaphor was emptied of its metaphysical charge. In very short order, it found itself functioning under the aegis of a new and more powerful image of the world: "the book of the world." It was Galileo and Descartes who gave this metaphor its currency, which was to have far reaching consequences for the history of metaphysical thinking in the West.
What is personal identity? This question has been asked and debated by philosophers for centuries. The problem of personal identity is determining what conditions and qualities are necessary and sufficient for a person to exist as the same being at one time as another. Some think personal identity is physical, taking a materialistic perspective believing that bodily continuity or physicality is what makes a person a person with the view that even mental things are caused by some kind of physical occurrence. Others take a more idealist approach with the belief that mental continuity is the sole factor in establishing personal identity holding that physical things are just reflections of the mind. One more perspective on personal identity and the one I will attempt to explain and defend in this paper is that personal identity requires both physical and psychological continuity; my argument is as follows:
I will argue that Locke believed that if you remain the same person, there are various entities contained in my body and soul composite that do not remain the same over time, or that we can conceive them changing. These entities are matter, organism (human), person (rational consciousness and memory), and the soul (immaterial thinking substance). This is a intuitive interpretation that creates many questions and problems. I will evaluate Locke's view by explaining what is and what forms personal identity, and then explaining how these changes do conceivably occur while a human remains the same person.
John Locke believes that A is identical with B, if and only if, A remembers the thoughts, feelings, and actions had or done by B from a first-person point of view. This shows that the important feature, memory, is linking a person from the beginning of their life to the end of their life. Locke’s memory theory would look something like this: The self changes over time, so it may seem like personal identity changes too. However, even if you are changing, you are still retaining past memories. Therefore, if you can retain memories, memories are the link between you and an earlier you, so personal identity persists over time. So, memory is the necessary and sufficient condition of personal
Many accounts support the possibility for objects genuinely to persist yet change their intrinsic, natural properties. Intuitively we think that it would be possible: the assumption that this claim is true, Loux argues, ‘underlies some of our most fundamental beliefs about ourselves and the world around us’ (1998: 203). In this essay I shall focus solely on the account of David Lewis’s ‘Doctrine of Temporal Parts’ that it is possible for objects to persist through change by having different temporal parts. By briefly examining intrinsics and extrinsics and the problem of change you will be able to see how successful Lewis’s solution is to this problem, before viewing some weaknesses of the account and then ultimately concluding that Lewis solution successfully achieves the possibility that objects genuinely persist yet change their intrinsic, natural properties.
Locke first begins by making an important distinction between the nature of identity as being relative, rather than absolute. Through this distinction Locke claims that, the questioning of something being identical to another will be relative to the “category” or context we are discussing it in. Without identifying “the category” or classifying the thing we are discussing, it is unreasonable to assume questions or explore