Is it Irrational to Act Immorally?

Introduction

In this essay I shall seek to outline what has come to be referred to as the Humean Theory of Reasons (HTR). I will subsequently go on to discuss the moral implications of HTR, surrounding the incompatibility with notions of moral absolutism and universalism. A possible Korsgaardian response to Hume will then be proposed, suggesting that it may in some cases be irrational to act immorally, but only if one’s actions are not compatible with one’s desired end. I will conclude that the question of whether it is irrational to act immorally gives rise to a number of issues if HTR or a Korsgaardian position is to be accepted. Nevertheless, I argue that each of these is more compelling in its answer than an externalist alternative due to a potential capacity to explain why one acts in a certain way.

The Humean Theory of Reasons

The Humean theory of reasons falls within the category of reasons internalism, which states that motivational reasons, which explain why an agent carried out a particular act, and normative reasons, which count in favour or against it, are inextricably linked. If an agent has a normative reason for an action, this may tell us something about the agent’s psychology. That is, if an agent has a reason to act then he also has motivation to do so. This is in contrast to reasons externalism, which states that a normative reason exists independently of the agent. Hume refers to the belief-desire pair to suggest that the motivation to carry out an action arises only in the presence of both a desire to achieve a particular end, and a belief that acting in a certain way will enable one to arrive at this end. For example, if an agent is angry at a former lover and has a desire to make him feel pain, whilst also...

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...inction to be made between what is rational and what is correct within society. That is, rational actions may be deemed logical, but nevertheless be judged as condemnable.

Works Cited

Foot, Philippa (1975) “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives” reprinted in Virtues and Vices, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 305-316.

Hume, David (1888) “Treatise of Human Nature”, L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed., London: Oxford, 1888.

Korsgaard Christine M. (1986) “Skepticism about Practical Reason”, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 83, No. 1 (Jan., 1986), Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc, pp. 5-25.

Schroeder, Mark (2007) "The Humean Theory of Reasons", Oxford Studies in Metaethics 2, Oxford, pp. 195-219.

Williams, Bernard (1981) “Internal and External Reasons”, Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 101-113.