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Plato and the theory of knowledge
Plato and the theory of knowledge
Plato and the theory of knowledge
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One of the most widely accepted definitions of knowledge was once that of knowledge being justified true belief (JTB). It is used to define propositional logic which involves knowing whether something is or is not true. Specifically, it sets out that knowledge is a belief which happens to be true such that there exists significant justification for holding said belief. This supposed definition can be traced back to Plato’s Theaetetus and remained unchallenged until Edmund Gettier published a paper in 1963 entitled ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’ In it, Gettier demonstrates that the three conditions which must hold for knowledge outlined in the JTB definition are not sufficient for knowledge to be attained. His short paper caused a major …show more content…
This means that S’s belief in P cannot be caused by falsehoods. On the surface it seems like an excellent contender to solve the Gettier problem. While false beliefs are already ruled out, this condition eliminates true beliefs based on false premises too. This condition also appears to solve Gettier’s counter examples for JTB. In the Smith and Jones job hunt, Smith’s belief that the man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job originates from his false thought that Jones will get the job. As a result, the fourth condition is not satisfied and so knowledge cannot be claimed. However, Robert Chisholm demonstrates in his famous ‘Sheepdog’ example that this too is an unsatisfactory definition for knowledge. Consider a field where in the middle is a dog dressed as a sheep. As a man drives by, he the forms the justified belief based on his perception that there is a sheep in the field. His belief turns out to be true as behind rocks in the field there are some sheep which are hidden from the man. Furthermore, the no false lemma condition is satisfied because his belief is not based on any falsehood, only from his perception. Unfortunately, one cannot say the man knew there were sheep in the field as he was unaware about the obscured sheep, only the disguised dog. This is yet another example of a lucky guesser. While this proposed solution attempts to solve the Gettier problem, it does so unsuccessfully. Another solution is
The term justified belief refers to belief that is formed by the existence of proper evidence and logic. William K Clifford tells us of a story of a ship owner and deaths caused by his unjustified beliefs.
How we approach the question of knowledge is pivotal. If the definition of knowledge is a necessary truth, then we should aim for a real definition for theoretical and practical knowledge. Methodology examines the purpose for the definition and how we arrived to it. The reader is now aware of the various ways to dissect what knowledge is. This entails the possibility of knowledge being a set of truths; from which it follows that one cannot possibly give a single definition. The definition given must therefore satisfy certain desiderata , while being strong enough to demonstrate clarity without losing the reader. If we base our definition on every counter-example that disproves our original definition then it becomes ad hoc. This is the case for our current defini...
In this short paper I will examine the positions of foundationalism and coherentism, and argue that a form of weak foundationalism is the most satisfactory option as a valid theory of justification for knowledge and is therefore a viable way of avoiding any sort of vicious regress problem and skepticism.
There is no concrete definition of knowledge, but there is a definition that is widely agreed upon, or a standard definition. This definition may be widely accepted, but just like most things in philosophy, it is controversial and many disagree with it. The definition involves three conditions that must be met in order for one to truly say that they know something to be true. If one were to state: “The Seattle Mariners have never won a world series,” using the standard definition would look like this: first, the person believes the statement to be true. Second, the statement is in fact true. Third, the person is justified in believing the statement to be true. The three conditions are belief, truth, and justification. There are the “necessary and sufficient conditions” for knowledge. Necessary and sufficient conditions are linked to conditional statements, ‘if x, then y’ statements.
...e theory already allows for knowledge. This does not follow as we are not justified in holding step one without a proper method. Step one is needed to justify three and four, you are not justified in holding either three or four as they both require that we have a justified step one. Thus the steps do not allow for complete justification.
This essay attempts to capitalize on Goldman 's “What is justified belief?” to form an opinion about his ideas. Goldman makes a break from traditional views of knowledge to form a theory of externalism. He gives the reader a new point of view for observing the relationship between knowledge and justification. The following passage will weed out some important aspects of his theory and how they relate to his theory as a whole.
Beliefs are a condition of said knowledge. Davidson’s argument deals a lot with the concept of objective trut...
Plato and Aristotle propose theories of knowledge in which they both agree that the knower is measure by the known and that knowledge is an exchange within the world. However, their respective theories may be considered polar opposites of one another especially when considering that Aristotle rejects Plato’s theory and admits that ‘informed opinion’, is a form of knowledge whereas Plato rejects opinion as a form of knowledge.
Gettier undermines the traditional understanding of knowledge by showing that a person can make an apparently proper inference from a belief one is justified in holding, but which is false. He proves that we can arrive at a justified true belief, but the truth of which is unrelated to the premises that it was inferred from. It is “possible for a person to be justified in believing a proposition that is in fact false”. In his first example Gettier shows that one can infer a true statement from a false proposition. To briefly outline the case, Smith has strong evidence...
Some may have a belief that they are strongly agreeing with but they do not necessarily comprehend the correspondence of the argument when there is one; a theory that states the criterion of truth with right propositions. In the beginning of the text, Manuel Velasquez opens with an assumption of a male having a female mate and the likelihood of the male partner understanding whether or not his so called soul-mate truly loves him or not. This situation is very crucial in terms of the perplexity that one side is battling while the other side is neutral in such circumstances; obviously, all actions are done in a practical manner, but going in depth about justification of truth, one person cannot become convinced because of mental insecurity. So, can knowledge be considered a justified belief?
A priori knowledge is knowledge that rests on a priori justification. A priori justification is a type of epistemic justification that is, in some sense, independent of experience. There are a variety of views about whether a priori justification can be defeated by other evidence, especially by empirical evidence, and a variety of views about whether a priori justification, or knowledge, must be only of necessary, or analytic, propositions, or at least of ones believed to be necessary or analytic (Russell, 2011).
The Justified True Belief (JTB) theory of knowledge, often attributed to Plato , is a fairly straightforward theory of knowledge. It states that something must be true if person S believes proposition P, proposition P is true, and S is justified in believing in believing that P is true . While many consider the JTB theory to be vital to the understanding of knowledge, some, such as American Philosopher Edmund Gettier, believe that it is flawed. I tend to agree with Gettier and others who object to the JTB theory as an adequate theory of knowledge, as the JTB theory allows for a type of implied confirmation bias that can lead people to be justified in believing they know something even though it isn’t true.
In this paper, I offer a solution to the Gettier problem by adding a fourth condition to the justified true belief analysis of knowledge. First though, a brief review. Traditionally, knowledge had been accounted for with the justified true belief analysis. To know something, three conditions had to be met: first, you had to have a belief; second, the belief had to be justified; third, this justified belief had to be true. So a justified true belief counts as knowledge. Gettier however showed this analysis to be inadequate as one can have a justified true belief that no one would want to count as knowledge.
In this paper, I will investigate the logical progress of Socrates’s proof “virtue is knowledge”. The reason why Socrates shows Meno how to prove “virtue is knowledge”, is because it can answer Meno’s question “can virtue be taught”, if virtue is knowledge, thus it can be taught. In brief, first Socrates proves someone who has virtue, knows what is good, then he proves someone who knows what is good, has virtue. Therefore, virtue is knowledge. I divide this whole progress into seven parts, and I will explain them step by step.
Whether someone's belief is true is not a prerequisite for belief. On the other hand, if something is actually known, then it categorically cannot be false. For example, if a person believes that a bridge is safe enough to support him, and attempts to cross it, but the bridge then collapses under his weight, it could be said that he believed that the bridge was safe but that his belief was mistaken. It would not be accurate to say that he knew that the bridge was safe, because plainly it was not. By contrast, if the bridge actually supported his weight, then he might say that he had believed that the bridge was safe, whereas now, after proving it to himself, he knows it was