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Philosophy paper - what matters for personal identity
Egoism theory
Human analysis of personal identity
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Derek Parfit, one of the most important defender of Hume, addresses the puzzle of the non-identity problem. Parfit claims that there is no self. This statement argues against the Ego Theory, which claims that beneath experience, a subject or self exists. Ego Theorists claims that the unity of a person’s whole life including life experiences is also known as the Cartesian view, which claims that each person is a “persisting purely mental thing.” Parfit uses the Split-Brain Case, which tells us something interesting about personal identity, to invalidate the Ego Theory. During the Split Brain procedure, there are neither ‘persons’ nor ‘persons’ before the brain was split. Within the experiment, the patient has control of their arms, and sees what is in half of their visual fields with only one of their hemispheres. However, when the right and left hemisphere disconnect, the patient is able to receive two different written questions targeted to the two halves of their visual field; thus, per hand, they write two different answers. In a split brain case, there are two streams of consciousness and Parfit claims that the number of persons involved is none. The scenario involves the disconnection of hemispheres in the brain. The patient is then placed in front of a screen where the left half of a screen is red and the right half is blue. When the color is shown to one hemisphere and the patient is asked, “How many colors do you see,” the patient, with both hands, will write only one color. But when colors are shown to both sides of the hemisphere, the patient with one hand writes red and the other writes blue.
There are two cases that Parfit proposes of the Split Brain Case that support the bundle theory and claims that our belief...
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...es. Therefore, the mind then mistakenly infers that this series of impressions is an individual persisting individual thing. Causation can also be explained by reusing the act of looking at a red shirt. When I look at a red shirt I know it is red based off of my earlier perceptions or impressions. I then experience the sensation of the color red, which relates to my ideas that I have of that color. And then when I look away, the memory of red still resides in my mind. In addition to causation, Hume’s also suggests propagation. Propagation is similar to regeneration where sensations occur and then memories of those sensations follow. Thus, due to causation and propagation, later stages of the mind are linked to the earlier. But since time is continuous and constantly changing, everything can change, but what stays constant is the concept of causation continuity.
The concept about the split-brain cases is two hemisphere separate apart, where means the left side focus on the left side, the right side focus on the right side (Parfit 378). He thinks that the concept of the split-brain and the normal brain are both true. Parfit denies that there are no person involved, also the ego theory doesn’t exist. He believes that once the brain has split apart, it has two separate streams of consciousness (Parfit 378). So, he claims that instead of asking “what happened to the original self?,” he says there is no ‘self’ (Parfit 379). Even though there are different events happened at the same time, that is not equal to different egos. “There are not here two different possibilities, one of which be true. These are
The general point behind the homunculi-head introduces consideration to the possibility of brain functions being done by parts which could not together be conscious. Functionalism requires only similar machine instructions which serve out a set of outputs given a set of inputs. Block’s counter arguments shows such an account of
Later Hume asserts that we cannot perceive causation because all we perceive is the “contiguity” and “succession” of events, but not of causation itself. For example, of two events, event A (person A pushing person B) and event B (person B’s falling back), Hume argues that all we are perceiving here are causes and effects; in other words, we here are perceiving the “contiguity” and “succession” of events, but not of causation itself. This is due to Hume’s idea that events are conjoined with one another. Hume argues that when event A occurs, event B happens simultaneously along with event A. For example, the event in which person A pushes person B, and the event where person B fal...
...equence of the fact that certain happenings in the brain cause both. The physical changes observed in Mary after experiencing color may be the result of these enigmatic occurrences. While interactions with qualia may precede physical changes, it is in violation of Humean philosophy to claim that correlation indicates causation.
Hume argues that perception can be divided into two types: impressions and ideas. He states that impressions are our first-hand perception, using all of our senses and emotions to experience them (Hume 2012, 8). For example, an impression of a sensation would be experiencing pain and an impression of reflection would be experiencing anger. Hume states that an idea is thinking about an impression. You cannot use your senses to experience the sensation or emotion, you are just simply reflecting on your experience (Hume 2007, 13). For example, thinking about the pain you felt when you stubbed your toe or thinking about how angry you felt when your football team lost. Hume argues that our thought is limited. He argues that when we imagine things such as an orange sea, we are simply joining two consistent ideas together. Hume argues that ‘all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones’ (Hume 2007, 13). This is called the Copy Principle.
The first argument to be discussed is that of conceivability, which aims to disprove that the mind and
This leaves a particularly large hole in identity theory. From neural dependence and the causal problem, it is almost impractical to endorse any type of dualism. But multiple realizability makes identity theory suspect as well. Also emotional additives, and the fact that epiphenomenalism is self undermining but not impossible, lead to slight suspicion of physicalism in general. Basically, this paper set out to endorse and defend identity theory but has concluded nothing definitively.
Parfit uses a famous case of division (or fission), as imagined by Wiggins (1967), to illustrate his claim that identity is not what matters in survival. When A’s brain is split into two parts, each housed within two separate, brainless bodies (B and C) it seems that we have three options. We either believe that:
In the Second Analogy, Kant argues that we must presuppose, a priori, that each event is determined to occur by some preceding event in accordance with a causal law. Although there have been numerous interpretations of this argument, we have not been able to show that it is valid. In this paper, I develop my own interpretation of this argument. I borrow an insight offered by Robert Paul Wolff. In Kant's argument, our need to presuppose that the causal determination of each event rests not upon our need to impose a 'necessary' and 'irreversible' temporal order upon representations of the states of an object, as Kant is usually interpreted, but upon our need to generate a comprehensive representation that includes a certain a priori conception of events in the world around us. Although the argument I attribute to Kant is valid, it cannot compel the Humean skeptic to accept the necessity of presupposing the causal determination of each event: Kant has not successfully responded to Hume in the Second Analogy.
Personal identity, in the context of philosophy, does not attempt to address clichéd, qualitative questions of what makes us us. Instead, personal identity refers to numerical identity or sameness over time. For example, identical twins appear to be exactly alike, but their qualitative likeness in appearance does not make them the same person; each twin, instead, has one and only one identity – a numerical identity. As such, philosophers studying personal identity focus on questions of what has to persist for an individual to keep his or her numerical identity over time and of what the pronoun “I” refers to when an individual uses it. Over the years, theories of personal identity have been established to answer these very questions, but the
This argument supports the claim that the body and mind are two in the same. Premise 1 explains the reason we feel pain from stubbing our toe is that the mind and body work together. In a Dualist view minds are non-physical and non-spatial. Based on the assumption that our mind can be spatially divided there is no way to prove this because the only way the mind can be divided is in space and we can’t verify this to be true.
Cause and effect is a tool used to link happenings together and create some sort of explanation. Hume lists the “three principles of connexion among ideas” to show the different ways ideas can be associated with one another (14). The principles are resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect. The focus of much of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding falls upon the third listed principle. In Section I, Hume emphasizes the need to uncover the truths about the human mind, even though the process may be strenuous and fatiguing. While the principle of cause and effect is something utilized so often, Hume claims that what we conclude through this process cannot be attributed to reason or understanding and instead must be attributed to custom of habit.
What is personal identity? This question has been asked and debated by philosophers for centuries. The problem of personal identity is determining what conditions and qualities are necessary and sufficient for a person to exist as the same being at one time as another. Some think personal identity is physical, taking a materialistic perspective believing that bodily continuity or physicality is what makes a person a person with the view that even mental things are caused by some kind of physical occurrence. Others take a more idealist approach with the belief that mental continuity is the sole factor in establishing personal identity holding that physical things are just reflections of the mind. One more perspective on personal identity and the one I will attempt to explain and defend in this paper is that personal identity requires both physical and psychological continuity; my argument is as follows:
Hume believes that there is no concept of self. That each moment we are a new being since nothing is constant from one moment to the next. There is no continuous “I” that is unchanging from one moment to the next. That self is a bundle of perceptions and emotions there is nothing that forms a self-impression which is essential to have an idea of one self. The mind is made up of a processions of perceptions.
Truth of oneself makes it visible when faced with absurd events in life where all ethical issues fade away. One cannot always pinpoint to a specific trait or what the core essence they discover, but it is often described as “finding one’s self”. In religious context, the essential self would be regarded as soul. Whereas, for some there is no such concept as self that exists since they believe that humans are just animals caught in the mechanistic world. However, modern philosophy sheds a positive light and tries to prove the existence of a self. Modern philosophers, Descartes and Hume in particular, draw upon the notion of the transcendental self, thinking self, and the empirical self, self of public life. Hume’s bundle theory serves as a distinction between these two notions here and even when both of these conception in their distinction make valid points, neither of them is more accurate.