Argument of the Hume's Response to the Missing Shade of Blue

In this essay, I will argue that Hume’s response to the “missing shade of blue” example is satisfactory. Firstly, I shall explain Hume’s account of the relationship between impressions and ideas and the copy principle. I shall then examine the “missing shade of blue” and its relation to this account. I shall then explore Hume’s response to his own counter-example and evaluate his position by considering possible objections and responses to his view. I shall then show why Hume’s response to the “missing shade of blue” example is satisfactory.

Hume argues that perception can be divided into two types: impressions and ideas. He states that impressions are our first-hand perception, using all of our senses and emotions to experience them (Hume 2012, 8). For example, an impression of a sensation would be experiencing pain and an impression of reflection would be experiencing anger. Hume states that an idea is thinking about an impression. You cannot use your senses to experience the sensation or emotion, you are just simply reflecting on your experience (Hume 2007, 13). For example, thinking about the pain you felt when you stubbed your toe or thinking about how angry you felt when your football team lost. Hume argues that our thought is limited. He argues that when we imagine things such as an orange sea, we are simply joining two consistent ideas together. Hume argues that ‘all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones’ (Hume 2007, 13). This is called the Copy Principle.

Hume supports his claim with two arguments. Firstly, he states that when we reflect on our thoughts, they always become simple ideas that we copied from a first-hand experience of something, thus the idea has been copie...

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...sions and ideas. This is because it acts as a counter-example to this account. I believe that Hume’s response to the “missing shade of blue” is satisfactory because the arguments of atomism and the non-genetic thesis are more convincing than Morreall’s objection. The two arguments cause the “missing shade of blue” to no longer be a counter-example.

Word Count: 1497

Works Cited

Fogelin R. J. (1984) ‘Philosophy and Phenomenological Research’, International Phenomenological Society, Vol. 45, No. 2, pp. 263-271

Hume, D. (2007) An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. New York: Oxford University Press

Hume D. (2012) A Treatise of Human Nature. Seattle: Loki’s Publishing

Morreall, J. (1982) ‘Philosophy and Phenomenological Research’, International Phenomenological Society, Vol. 42, No.3, pp. 407-415

Noonan, H. (2007) Hume. Oxford: One World Publications