Richard Brandt will agree that there are definitely faults in Firth’s Ideal Observer theory such as an Ideal Observer being absolutist, omniscient, omnipercipient, consistent, disinterested, and dispassionate. Brandt argues that there can be other multiple Ideal Observers who may disagree with the main Ideal Observer’s observation of “X is right.” Firth in response to Brandt has counter argued that “it seems to me that if I thought that I were an ideal observer, I should refuse to admit that someone who had conflicting moral experience was also an ideal observer: I should assume that one of us lacked complete knowledge, disinterestedness, or dispassionateness, and by hypothesis it would have to be the other person” (Firth 416). It seems that Firth is …show more content…
His critique is Firth’s description of an Ideal Observer being such and such a being. He states that “unless there is a God, and He is an Ideal Observer in Professor Firth’s sense, it is quite certain that nothing answers to the description of an ideal observer which Professor Firth has given” (Harrison 256). Since an Ideal Observer does not need to exist this as a solution by Firth trying to make us understand it is nothing more but just a thought experiment makes his proposition questionable. The unnecessary need for an Ideal Observer to exist brings a problem of null classes which are universal propositions regarding non-existent classes. “If A is an ideal observer, he will approve of X,' which can only be known to be true if in fact all ideal observers do approve of X, just as we can know that if A did not have an operation, he would have died, only if we know that all people who have A's disease, and are not operated upon, die” (Harrison 256.) If an Ideal Observer does not need to exist then an Ideal Observer approving that “X is right” does not mean anything if it is a thought experiment as Firth implies since there are no Ideal
However, David Hume, succeeds in objecting this argument by claiming that the experience is a necessary factor for understanding the creation of the universe. Lastly, I argued that Paley’s argument was not sufficient for proving God’s existence with the argument by design because we cannot assume the world will comply and work the way we wish
Rossian Pluralism claims that there are multiple things that we have basic, intrinsic moral reason to do, which he names as the prima facie duties. These duties are not real, obligatory duties that one must follow under all circumstances, but are “conditional duties” (Ross 754) that one should decide to follow or reject upon reflection of their circumstances. This moral theory has faced criticisms, most strongly in the form of the problem of trade-offs. However, I will demonstrate that the problem of trade-offs is an issue that can be neglected as a valid objection to Rossian Pluralism because it is applicable to other theories as well and it is a factor that makes a moral theory more valuable than not.
According to Smith, the impartial spectator is located within the breast of the individual (TMS I.I.4). The spectator relies on sentiments and feelings to discover whether something is morally right or wrong. If the spectator has the ability to sympathize, then therefore, it has emotions and cannot be completely impartial if it uses sentiments instead of assigning reason as the root of its judgments. (Fleischacker). Smith explains that reason only informs the sentiments instead of the other way around. Paul Kelleher, Professor of English at Emory University, supports this criticism of the impartial spectator using sentiments to make moral judgements. He mentions a paragraph written by Smith that is only written in the first edition of the Theory of Moral Sentiments referring to our man in the breast. The passage reads:
Overall, memories does not provide certainty because what we see or remember may not be reality. Also, the way we remember something can be changed throughout time and that memory will eventually fade away. Although certainty is blessing because it provides us warmth, comfort and secure, it is more of a great danger because it gives out false information and tricks our mind into believing something that is not real or true. Therefore, I am fully convinced by Gould’s essay because I completely doubt what people observe or remember since memories does not provide certainty.
The first premise of his argument (P1) states Most people would agree with this premise, regardless of their specific reasoning. Connecting suffering and death to a lack of basic needs seems clear and its characterization as bad seems to be in alignment with our common sense. However, some might still object for reasons that would be challenging or impossible to refute. In spite of any such objections, the premise can be accepted and those who disagree should step away at this point.
I will show that Kelly's response to the question of epistemic significance of peer disagreement is not compelling. In my explanation of Kelly's argument, I will show that it is contradictory of him to assert the first persons perspective and the right reasons view. I will then examine the third person perspective, and show that this is more compatible with the right reasons view. Nevertheless I will propose an objection in the form of a question. Specifically, why should the difference between first person and third person change my thinking skeptically? Would this view only be attractive from the third person view? The third person perspective, the right reasons view as Kelly explains it, plus what I will call external Validation of a belief makes a more compelling argument.
I wish to defend and support John Locke's "The Causal Theory of Perception" because it is a logical argument with many useful applications. Primarily, this argument allows us to make more objective judgments about the world we perceive - it allows us to more accurately see reality by telling us how to separate the object itself from our own opinions or qualitative value judgments about the object. However, just the fact that a particular theory is useful does not mean that the theory itself is correct, even though that might be the motive for trying to prove its correctness. Therefore, I must also address George Berkeley's argument, put forth by his character Philonous in Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, that "to exist is to be perceived."
basic charge of this criticism can be stated in the words of a recent critic,
“A reviewer who wanted to find some fault with this work has hit the truth better, perhaps, than he thought, when he says that no new principle of morality is set forth in it, but only a new formula. But who would think of introducing a new principle of all morality, and making himself as it were the first discoverer of it, just as if all the world before him were ignorant what duty was or had been in thoroughgoing error? But whoever knows of what importance to a mathematician a formula is… will not think that a formula is insignificant and useless which does the same for all duty in general.”
Johnston's essay, which has been widely accepted, clearly shows the interrelatedness of the texts; however, her appraisal of them as a response to Norris, incorrectly devalues their philosophical seriousness by overestimating the importance of a personal quarrel between Norris and Locke. She concludes her essay with this summation: "the stimulus for these three papers came directly from Norris, from his criticisms of the newly published Essay, and still more from his personal relationship with Locke"; otherwise, "Locke's opposition to the theory of vision in God would surely have remained unexpressed, since he felt the notion to be sufficiently absurd to die of its own accord.
Mills starts out in his first argument by being concerned that people were being silenced when voicing their opinions. He voices that by saying: “First, if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for aught we can certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume our own infallibility”(50). Mills means that when someone’s opinion is being silenced by another, the latter will assume that their believes are to be true.
In the beginning of the book he decribes that his intention of writing the book are not that of to prove factual accounts, for there are many of those already, but to explain their experiences in present day knowledge. He goes on to say ,”No explanations are needed for those who have been inside, and others will understand neither how we felt then of how we feel now.
William Rowe has provided some good arguments and examples for his arguments. However, I find one example in particular to be unfitting in consideration to his argument.
One of the strongest points Dr. Lennox presented that the both of us agreed on was his argument during the first thesis, “Faith is blind, science is evidence based”. During the discussion, Dawkins criticized the nature of faith, saying that it was blind as it was not supported with evidence like how science was. This argument is valid and is accepted by many as it is often used to deny the existence of God. However, Lennox argued that not all faith is blind faith. He stated that his faith in the Christian God is no delusion, it is rational and evidence based. He also added that if faith needed evidence, it would not be considered as faith in the first place. This statement bridges the gap between faith and evidence and it can be considered a winning rebuttal of this
His first statement is that “Literary criticism is a description and evaluation of its object” (Brooks 19). The literary critic reports on the work that he is criticizing and picks out the meaning that he deems important, which might be different from what the next critic would pick out. To describe the work it is therefore already a subjective exercise, such as in Doctor Faustus, in the A-version of the text, some people ...