Analysis Of An Impartial Spectator

Adam Smith’s moral theory explains that there is an “impartial spectator” inside each of us that aids in determining what is morally and universally good, using our personal experiences and human commonalities. In order to judge our own actions, we judge and observe the actions of others, at the same time observing their judgments of us. Our impartial spectator efficiently allows us to take on two perceptions at once: one is our own, determined by self-interest, and the other is an imaginary observer. This paper will analyze the impartiality of the impartial spectator, by analyzing how humans are motivated by self-interest.

Smith’s man in the breast observes our individual experiences and aids in determining what is morally and universally

According to Smith, the impartial spectator is located within the breast of the individual (TMS I.I.4). The spectator relies on sentiments and feelings to discover whether something is morally right or wrong. If the spectator has the ability to sympathize, then therefore, it has emotions and cannot be completely impartial if it uses sentiments instead of assigning reason as the root of its judgments. (Fleischacker). Smith explains that reason only informs the sentiments instead of the other way around. Paul Kelleher, Professor of English at Emory University, supports this criticism of the impartial spectator using sentiments to make moral judgements. He mentions a paragraph written by Smith that is only written in the first edition of the Theory of Moral Sentiments referring to our man in the breast. The passage reads:

“Unfortunately, this moral looking-glass is not always a very good one. Common looking-glasses, it is said, are extremely deceitful, and by the glare which they throw over the face, conceal from the partial eyes of the person many deformities which are obvious to everybody besides. But there is not in the world such a smoother of wrinkles as is every man’s imagination, with regard to the blemishes of his own character” (112).” (Kelleher

However, even those with the strictest virtue of self-command may not be able to ignore the passions and remain completely objective. Smith writes, “It may be laid down as a general rule, that the passions which the spectator is most disposed to sympathize with…are those of which the immediate feeling or sensation is more or less agreeable to the person principally concerned” (TMS VI.III.14). From my understanding, this quote is saying that the spectator is more likely to sympathize with passions that the agent agrees with the most. It explains that the impartial spectator chooses the degree of sympathy, based on how the degree of approval or disapproval of an action. This can be considered biased of the man in the breast. Smith is saying that we would need extreme self-command in order to ignore our intense desires if we want our spectator to be completely impartial, however it is unlikely to have that amount of control over the