Coward Conscience

Bonetto, Sandra. "Coward Conscience and Bad Conscience in Shakespeare and Nietzsche." Philosophy and Literature, vol. 30, no. 2, 2016, pp. 512-27. Project MUSE, doi: 10.1353/phl.2006.0024. Accessed 20 Sept 2016.
“Coward Conscience and Bad Conscience in Shakespeare and Nietzsche," Sandra Bonetto maintains that Nietzsche’s "consciousness of guilt" associates ideas of debt, sin, punishment, and God that lead to moral hypocrisy. Bonetto structures her argument in five sections, much like a Shakespearean play: section one focuses on Nietzsche’s attribution of bad consciousness that is similar to guilt and sin, which manifests from suppressing impulses and causes people to wound others; section two centers on applying Nietzschean philosophy to Shakespeare’s

To begin, Morgan identifies the apostolic calling in which men and women embraced life of voluntary poverty, rejecting urban trade practices and accepting Christian spiritual communities. He asserts that apostolic people believed that the slightest act toward God constitutes exalted moments of contemplation. According to Morgan, women especially were attracted to this monastic life for many reasons, one of which was socioeconomic. One key point he summarizes from I.M. Lewis is the higher prevalence of visions from powerless groups (particularly women). As a result, Morgan assesses that the medievalists believed women possessed a bodily inheritance to connect to God. Called beguines, these women broke traditional gender roles and preach. Moving from general information about beguines, Morgan explains the relationship between Margaretha Ebnor who experienced visions and screamed uncontrollably and Heinrich von Nordlingen shared a symbiotic relationship where Nordlingen turned to Ebner to embody the spiritual life. In turn, Ebner suffered psychosomatically for her visions. In the section titled, "Meister Eckhart's Daughters," Morgan reveals conflicting sexual impulses

Moving into her argument, Newman explores various academic studies about Medieval asceticism. Focusing most of her article on an unnamed nun whom Bernard of Clairvaux addressed in a letter, Newman introduces this controversy by documenting Lease's view that Italian women loose [sic] their autonomy and authority by privileging others over themselves. The author claims that one way medieval women gained autonomy over their bodies is through anorexia. She recounts a conflicting view from Caroline Walker Bynum that rather than being a path to agency, this demonstrates dissolution of the self. At the same time, Newman equates medieval mysticism with freedom as bodily pains help form the individual. Upon contextualizing the conditions facing medieval women, Newman recounts Bernard's commentary about an unnamed nun's selfish motivations for wearing the habit, condemning her for having lived alone in the past and not conforming to community discipline. Through this anecdote, Newman explores whether the "death to life" philosophy annihilates the autonomous self, documenting the belief that internalizing the community discipline is liberating through honoring God and community. as the domain where specialists' behaviors, prayers, and disciplined will contrast with the general society's even