Canadian Senate Reform

The Canadian Senate is continuously called into question as reform becomes increasingly popular among members of society who question its validity. Originally created to provide a “sober second thought” on the House of Commons, the Senate is meant to introduce and vote on legislation (excluding money bills) and provide protections for provincial rights. Senators are chosen by the Prime Minister, but appointed by the governor general, usually along party lines; “almost all senators have declared loyalties to a political party and highly political career backgrounds.” The current qualifications for senators are as follows: “They may be male or female, over 30 years of age, own at least $4000 in property, and be residents of the respective provinces

they represent.” These requirements allow the Prime Minister to appoint individuals whom they believe would benefit the current government, and the regions they represent.
However, many Canadians believe that the Senate is inadequate.

Party ties allow for partisan values to influence the choices of the Senate, and their ability to properly represent the regions has diminished greatly since 1867. Reform was first discussed in 1874, “when some Canadians felt that provincial governments would be better placed to select their federal Senators.” This feeling has gradually increased throughout the history of Canada. Elections have been offered as a solution to the inadequacy within the Canadian Senate. Much like the House of Commons, this idea would involve having regions vote members of parliament into the Senate. This is meant to ensure proper regional representation and less partisan values. However, elections also offer several unignorable issues that would emerge within the legislative branch of the Canadian government. This paper will argue that Canadian senators should not be elected because of unnecessary cost and poor voter turnout, lack of concrete resolution, and competition over priority between the Senate and House of

Commons.
Cost and voter turnout of elections in Canada are among the main concerns of every political party that runs for government. If Canada decides to hold elections for individual members of Senate, these numbers would become even more concerning. Recent polls concluded that “over 60 per cent of Canadians do not consider Senate reform a high priority.” This is due to a lack of education on the subject. With low voter turnout, it is likely that funding for the election would become non-existent. The Prime Minister is not likely to discuss the subject and is unwilling to give up the partisan benefits that come with their appointment of party-affiliated senators. The House of Commons is also unlikely to bring up reform because they view the Senate as a type of “retirement home” with benefits and rewards from the party they have been loyal to. This lack of education could also turn the elections into a popularity contest rather than an informed political decision.
The only way to reform the Senate is to amend the Canadian Constitution, which is extremely difficult to do. There are several requirements that must be met for amendments, including “approval of at least two thirds of the provinces and 50% of the population.” If the majority of the Canadian population does not see Senate reform as a concern and is not educated on the subject, these amendments will be nearly impossible. There have only been three major constitutional changes to the Senate: “a mandatory retirement age of 75, a suspensive veto over certain constitutional amendments, and an increase in the number of seats to 105.” Senate reform has been debated since 1874, however it is rarely acted upon since the Canadian population does not see it as a pressing issue. This lack of support would mean that a change in the appointment of senators would be nearly impossible, and even if there were a change, it would not be supported by society. Putting another election in place could also negatively influence federal elections, since Canadians would not be willing to vote several times. The unnecessary cost of these elections would not be supplemented by voters. Senate elections are therefore not feasible due to high cost and lack of voter turnout.
Secondly, it is difficult to ensure that elections would provide a concrete resolution to the problems the Senate experiences with regional representation.

The highly decentralized Canadian federal government could impose voting, but due to the problems with the education of society, as stated above, elections would not guarantee that chosen senators are the best people for the job. Elections may involve senators explicitly siding with a particular party. This is evident in Australia, where “senators are elected with partisan party labels and conflict is often not between the centre and peripheral regions’ representatives, but between partisan political actors.” If senators are influenced by the ideology behind the party, they may not have their region’s best interest in mind. The Canadian electoral system is referred to as the “first-past-the-post” plurality system. In this system, the person with the most votes wins, however, they do not need the majority. This system could leave the majority of a region without representation in the government. Instating elections would allow some Canadians to have an active voice in politics, however, it does not concretely resolve the problems the Senate faces regarding regional

representation.
Lastly, an elected Senate would prove to be detrimental to the balance of the Canadian Parliament. The Senate was created to work in a system of checks and balances with the House of Commons. “Checking” involves reviewing legislation passed by the Commons and ensuring it serves the best interests of the people. The Senate acts as a “sober second thought” on the House of Commons, which entails reviewing legislation that the House has already passed, and making adjustments as necessary. “Balancing” refers to balancing out the democratic nature of the Executive branch by deferring leadership from the Commons. Because the Senate is not held accountable through elections, they are able to make unpopular decisions for the betterment of the people without fear of not being re-elected. By contrast, the Commons is held accountable through elections. This system allows the Senate to function as a form of government accountability for the Commons and the Executive; it also takes away from the centralized power of the Executive. If the Senate were to become an elected body, it would no longer be able to hold the government accountable due to threat of defeat in an election. Some may argue that the Senate should be elected, however, “The Senate should not be a duplicate of the House of Commons, but a complement: a somewhat less partisan, more technical forum with a longer-term perspective.” The election of Canadian Senators would decrease government accountability, and hence defeat the purpose the Senate was created to fulfill.
The election of Senators would also create considerable problems within the Legislative branch of Parliament. An elected Senate could contain party labels, and hence create a more partisan body. Because Party discipline in Canada is so strong, an elected official would likely be forced to vote in accordance with their party. In a situation where the political leaning of the legislative bodies did not align, this would create a competition between the Commons and the Senate over the passing of legislation: “Even if an elected upper House were to be created, political analysts in both countries [Canada and Britain] agree that there would exist the probability of deadlock and/or voting on partisan lines.” This exact problem of parliamentary paralysis can be seen in Australia’s Constitutional Crisis in 1975; in which the Australian elected Senate was responsible for creating multiple political stalemates: “This was the famous ‘Double Dissolution’ crisis which was brought about by the Senate’s attempt to force an election by blocking an executive order. Between May 1974 and December 1975, the Senate rejected twenty-one pieces of legislation originating in the Lower House.” As highlighted by Australia’s senatorial crisis, an elected Senate could be detrimental to the functioning of the federal government due to competition within the legislative branch.
Although some Canadians have expressed dissatisfaction with the Canadian Senate, an elected body would not provide a feasible solution; it would, in fact, create an abundance of new issues within Parliament. A Senate election would be a costly process, all while decreasing voter turnout in major federal elections; amending the Constitution would prove to be an impossible job, as many Canadians do not consider Senate reform to be a pressing issue. An elected Senate would also fail to address the current problems facing the Senate, such as regional representation. It would also disrupt the balance of power within the Parliament, while failing to perform its duty of ensuring government accountability. The elected body could also lead to a competition within the Legislative branch, resulting in Parliamentary paralysis. Senatorial reform is one of the most significant issues discussed in contemporary Canadian politics; however, education on the issue is severely lacking. It is important to understand the role of the Senate, as well as the issues that an elected Senate would pose, before action can be taken.