In this paper, I will discuss how the reality of qualia does, indeed, indicate that physicalist theories are false because these theories cannot sufficiently explain qualia. We all experience qualia: the hurtfulness of pain, the redness of a tomato, the spiciness of a curry, the smell of freshly-cut grass. Qualia is the term used to describe our subjective experience; the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives (Gazzaniga & Ivry 2014, p. 618). It would seem obvious that qualia exist as non-physical, mental entities. On the contrary, physicalism asserts that everything is physical, or everything supervenes on the physical. Physicalists argue that the mind is a purely physical construct, and will eventually be explained …show more content…
Physicalism is the philosophical position that everything which exists is no more extensive than its physical properties, and that the only existing property is physical (Stoljar, 2015). This theory posits that the mind and mental states are no more than physical properties. There are two categories of physicalism: reductive and non-reductive. Reductive physicalism claims that all mental states and properties will eventually be explained by scientific accounts of physiological processes and states. Behaviourism (mental states are just descriptions of observable behaviours), Identity Theory (mental states are brain states, pain is no more than synapse X), and Functionalism (mental states constituted solely by their functional role, can be sufficiently explained without a physical medium) are all examples of reductive physicalist theories. Non-reductive physicalism asserts that mental states supervene on physical states. Eliminativism is a non-reductive theory that holds that people’s common-sense understanding of the mind will eventually be replaced (eliminated) by an alternative, such as neuroscience (Stoljar, 2015). However, I think that physicalism is hopelessly flawed; there is an apparent contradiction between the existence of qualia and physicalism. Qualia is left out of the physicalist …show more content…
Suppose that we accept the functionalist depiction of states as functional states. Imagine you are in pain, you are in a state brought about by tissue damage, or pressure, or extremes of temperature, and one that brings about a range of characteristic “pain responses”, behavioural and mental: you recoil, you form the belief that you are in pain, you take steps to alleviate the pain (Heil 2003, p. 121). However, when you experience pain, your experience has a characteristic “feel”. It is this “what it is like”, the qualitative dimension of pain, that is missing from the functionalist story. What a functionalist must deny is that this qualitative dimension of pain is what makes pain pain (Heil 2003, p.121). Is it possible for any human to deny that? Pain is pain because of what we feel, not how we behave, nor how the neurons in our brain respond. Some modules in the brain may be more likely to be computational, more functional (e.g. the visual system) compared to others, such as creativity or romantic love. Yet, qualia such as these, and thus, consciousness, are not computational (McDermott 2007, p.1). Therefore functionalism, hence, physicalism, are
Barbara Montero is an associate professor of philosophy at the City University of New York. In her article “Post-Physicalism” she aims to convince people, mainly physicalists, to begin thinking of the mind/body problem from a new perspective. Montero reasons that the term “physical” is too difficult a term to define, which leads to a serious flaw of the direction of physicalist arguments. Her main idea is that the mind/body problem is really the problem of finding a place for mentality in a fundamentally nonmental world, not a fundamentally physical world. Directing the question towards “Is mentality a fundamental feature of the world?”, in her opinion, relieves the conflict between naturalism and ontological significance, and paves the way
In this paper, I will argue that it is more likely that the qualia of colour could be explained by physicalism rather than by property dualism. Qualia are subjective experiences, such as our senses (pg. 3). Physicalism views every property as physical, and can be explained by science (pg. 29). Property dualism refers to the philosophical view that minds are made out of one substance, but contain physical properties, and a non-physical mind (qualia) that are not related to each other (pg. 29).
Smart argues from the stance of identity theorist and believes that mental sensations are identical to a corresponding brain-process. Much of Smart’s paper is a counter argument against an identity theorist’s greatest rival, the dualist. Most of the human body has been explained by science in terms of biology, chemistry, and physics; though the brain remains largely mysterious. Recent technological advances regarding the research of the brain has allowed us to understand the mind in much better ways which is why Smart feels “that science is increasingly giving us a viewpoint whereby organisms are able to be seen as physicochemical mechanism” (61). He introduces the concept of Ockham’s razor and feels that scientists use it to introduce simplicity into their theories, which makes their explanations of concepts simpler. This simplicity is preferred because it also adds a sense of beauty to the laws discovered. With regards to his lightning example, Smart highlights how our experience of lightning is the physical process of discharged electrons from the ionization of water vapor in the atmosphere. Important to note here is that the two cannot be separated; you will not have a flash of lightning and then an electric discharge, rather lightning is electric discharge. This metaphor is crucial essay’s argument that sensations are identical to brain-processes. Ockham’s razor eliminates unnecessary nomological danglers from scientific theories, so why not apply the same concept to a theory of mind? We wouldn’t describe in our theory of lightning the ‘flashiness’ or ‘jaggedne...
The Absent Qualia Argument’s counterexample suggests functionalism is susceptible to similar problems behaviorism faces. The additional requirement functionalism holds, namely functionally equivalent internal states, mental states possibly differ. Block argues it is plausible to not only have type identical behavior states, but also functionally equivalent mental states. However, functionally equivalent functional states cannot ensure equivalent mental states. So, functionalist theories of mental states are insufficient theories of the nature of mental
Jackson’s Knowledge Argument, while relying on the validity of epiphenomenalism, manages to stand to arguments of physicalism. The ability of conceivable ‘zombies’ to register qualia without experiencing it responds to the claims of acquaintance arguments. Furthermore, beliefs that qualia would provoke physical changes and reactions are accompanied by flawed assertions of attempting to capture the nature of causation. Qualia and the necessity of non-physical knowledge to their existence provide valid arguments to upholding dualist beliefs.
In this paper I will explain how Nagel uses his master argument premise to defend an anti-physicalist approach that in order to experience qualia it can only be done through a subjective point of view. Furthermore, he states differences between subjective and objective points of view, adding on to this he also suggests that by attempting to move towards objectiveness one must take a step back from subjectiveness.
The mind-body problem can be a difficult issue to discuss due to the many opinions and issues that linger. The main issue behind the mind-body problem is the question regarding if us humans are only made up of matter, or a combination of both matter and mind. If we consist of both, how can we justify the interaction between the two? A significant philosophical issue that has been depicted by many, there are many prominent stances on the mind-body problem. I believe property dualism is a strong philosophical position on the mind-body issue, which can be defended through the knowledge argument against physicalism, also refuted through the problems of interaction.
Are minds physical things, or are they nonmaterial? If your beliefs and desires are caused by physical events outside of yourself, how can it be true that you act the way you do of your own free will? Are people genuinely moved by the welfare of others, or is all behavior, in reality, selfish? (Sober 203). These are questions relevant to philosophy of the mind and discussed through a variety of arguments. Two of the most important arguments with this discussion are Cartesian dualism and logical behaviorism, both of which argue the philosophy of the mind in two completely different ways. Robert Lane, a professor at the University of West Georgia, define the two as follows: Cartesian dualism is the theory that the mind and body are two totally different things, capable of existing separately, and logical behaviorism is the theory that our talk about beliefs, desires, and pains is not talk about ghostly or physical inner episodes, but instead about actual and potential patterns of behavior. Understanding of the two arguments is essential to interpret the decision making process; although dualism and behaviorism are prominent arguments for the philosophy of the mind, both have their strengths and weaknesses.
The 'mind-body' problem has troubled philosophers for centuries. This is because no human being has been able to sufficiently explain how the mind actually works and how this mind relates to the body - most importantly to the brain. If this were not true then there would not be such heated debates on the subject. No one objects to the notion that the Earth revolves around the sun because it is empirical fact. However, there is no current explanation on the mind that can be accepted as fact. In 'What is it like to be a bat?', Thomas Nagel does not attempt to solve this 'problem'. Instead, he attempts to reject the reductionist views with his argument on subjectivity. He examines the difficulties of the mind-body problem by investigating the conscious experience of an organism, which is usually ignored by the reductionists. Unfortunately, his arguments contain some flaws but they do shed some light as to why the physicalist view may never be able to solve the mind-body problem.
Physicalism, to further specify, states that everything is dependent upon the physical world, and that there is nothing over and above the physical world. It states that everything can be defined in purely physical terms. This view has many implications, especially within the philosophy of mind, where it stands in stark contrast to dualism which puts the mind above the physical world. This focus on the philosophy of mind is, in part, due to it producing most of the objections that appear against physicalism. Within the philosophy of mind, physicalism states that all mental states can be equated to some physical state. Note that this does not necessarily imply the identity hypothesis, or the idea that a specific mental state is associated with a spe...
Physicalists believe in the philosophical position that everything, which exists, is no more extensive than its physical properties, and that the only existing substance is physical (Mastin 2008). Another term used to describe two-way interactive substance dualism is Cartesian dualism, which was defended by Descartes. Cartesian dualism is the idea that mind is not the same thing as matter, although they do causally affect each other.
Fodor develops the idea of functionalism by combining certain parts of logical behaviorism and the central-state identity theory. From logical behaviorism, Fodor incorporates the idea that mental processes can be represented by physical if-then statements. As such, behavior and mental causation are no longer distinct and unable to interact. Also, logical behaviorism provides a way for mental causes to interact with other mental causes. This, in turn, may result in a behavioral effect. The last point is also a characteristic of the central-state identity theory. One doctrine of the central-state identity theory is called "token physicalism." Token physicalism states that all mental states that currently exist are neurophysiological. Thus, token physicalism does not place physical restrictions on the type of substance capable of having mental properties. When the points of logical behaviorism and the central-state identity theory, as described here, are combined, functionalism is the result. The theory of functionalism supposes that a m...
. There are two kinds of dualism. One is Substance dualism which holds that the mind or soul is a separate, non-physical entity, but there is also property dualism, according to which there is no soul distinct from the body, but only one thing, the person, that has two irreducibly different types of properties, mental and physical. Substance dualism leaves room for the possibility that the soul might be able to exist apart from the body, either before birth or after death; property dualism does not. A substance dualism is something with "an independent existence". It can exist on its own. This holds that each distinct non-physical entity mind composed a different kind of substance to material objects. Substance dualist believed only spiritual substances can have mental properties. It is “soul” along with certain memory and psychological continuities that constitutes the survival of the person. Physical properties of property dualism are properties like having a certain weight, conducting electricity and mental properties are properties like believing that 1+1=2, being in love, feeling pain, and etc. Property dualism allows for the compatibility of mental and physical causation, since the cause of an action might under one aspect is describable as a physical event in the brain and under another aspect as a desire, emotion, or thought; substance dualism usually requires causal interaction between the soul and the body. Dualistic theories at least acknowledge the serious difficulty of locating consciousness in a modern scientific conception of the physical world, but they really give metaphysical expression to the problem rather than solving it.
Functionalism is a materialist stance in the philosophy of mind that argues that mental states are purely functional, and thus categorized by their input and output associations and causes, rather than by the physical makeup that constitutes its parts. In this manner, functionalism argues that as long as something operates as a conscious entity, then it is conscious. Block describes functionalism, discusses its inherent dilemmas, and then discusses a more scientifically-driven counter solution called psychofunctionalism and its failings as well. Although Block’s assertions are cogent and well-presented, the psychofunctionalist is able to provide counterarguments to support his viewpoint against Block’s criticisms. I shall argue that though both concepts are not without issue, functionalism appears to satisfy a more acceptable description that philosophers can admit over psychofunctionalism’s chauvinistic disposition that attempts to limit consciousness only to the human race.
But, “human persons have an ‘inner’ dimension that is just as important as the ‘outer’ embodiment” (Cortez, 71). The “inner” element cannot be wholly explained by the “outer” embodiment, but it does give rise to inimitable facets of the human life, such as human dignity and personal identity. The mind-body problem entails two theories, dualism and physicalism. Dualism contends that distinct mental and physical realms exist, and they both must be taken into account. Its counterpart (weak) physicalism views the human as being completely bodily and physical, encompassing no non-physical, or spiritual, substances.