Aquinas Ordered To The Common Good Analysis

Human law must always be ordered to the common good which commands all virtuous actions. Any and all virtue can be ordered to either the private or public good. Aquinas provides the example of courage and how courageous acts could either “preserve the political community or [uphold] the rights of one’s friends” (Regan, 63). Law commands courage for the purpose of preserving the political community and upholding the rights of the neighboring men and other like purposes. Since there is no virtue that could not be, in one way or another, ordered to the common good, every virtue is commanded by human law because all law ordered to the common good. By commanding every virtue, human laws do not necessitate every many to have every virtue. Men need

only to act virtuous enough “to obey the commands of the law” (Regan, 28). Thus law commands all virtue in that it command all men to act virtuous. However, whilst human law commands all virtue, it does not hold the authority to prohibit every vice.
As human law is strictly ordered to the common good, it can only punish that which is contrary to the common good. The only practical way to best judge what harms the common good is by limiting human law to govern only actions. Still, not all actions can be commanded or forbidden under human law, for prohibiting all vices would be disproportionate to man. The laws would force men to become virtuous at once, and imperfect men would not be able to follow the laws, creating potential for a worse evil to take place. Therefore, human laws prohibit serious vices that “without the prohibition of which human society could not be preserved” (Regan, 62). These serious vices Aquinas speaks of are those evils so grave that most men refrain from partaking in them. Human law has the authority to forbid such evils in that “law adapts itself not to the condition of the exceptional person, but to the condition of most people” since it orders a community to the common good (Budziszewski, 366). Furthermore, because vices which inflict harm on others damage the very society itself, human law has the authority to punish it. Therefore, abortion, when it is murder, is a grave evil which harms the society and thus is a matter that is punishable by law.
While human law is specifically more limited than other forms of law, it still retains the authority to punish abortion when it is murder. Due to its limits, human law is unable to exact perfect justice, leaving some vices unpunished. The internal vices and other unforbidden vices are not under the authority of human law, for human law cannot practically nor rightfully bring about perfect justice like the eternal and divine law. Grave vices, such as those that inflict harm on others, are punishable by human law because they directly harm the society. These grave vices include theft, assault, and murder.
Distinguishing between a Killing and Murder
As previously argued, murder is punishable by human law because it inflicts harm on others and is thus contrary to the common good. While the terms ‘killing’ and ‘murder’ are used interchangeably, the two terms are distinct from each other. A murder is a form of killing, but not every killing is a murder. Murders are distinguished by the end that is willed and the execution of the actions that caused the death. In a murder, the aggressor’s intent and purpose is to terminate a human life. However, if the death was an unintended effect of an action, the killing is referred to as accidental. Accidental killings are sometimes murder, but the conclusion of such is dependent not only on the will and intention of the aggressor but also the nature of the actions which are undertaken.
Accidental killings are those in which the death is an unintentional effect of one’s actions. If an accidental killing was not willed or intended in any way, then the killing is not murder. However, the death of another can be incidentally willed and intended. These killings can occur if one was participating in unlawful activities which led to another’s death or if one did not exercise enough caution to avoid the death from occurring. In the former case, one associated himself in unlawful activities which resulted in the death of another; in the latter case, one is not cautious enough in his actions to prevent the death (Regan, 172). Such unlawful activities are those which one ought to avoid, whether these activities are vices or are actually contrary to the established law. This lack of caution can be demonstrated through the example of Lamech whom Aquinas mentions. Lamech killed a man under the presumption that he was killing a wild beast, and in doing so, Aquinas judges that “Lamech did not take sufficient care to avoid homicide”(Regan, 172). In this situation, Aquinas rightly calls the accidental killing a murder because Lamech’s presumption blinded him into killing another man. However, a lack of caution can also be demonstrated in other such ways. If one chooses to overlook the potential danger of a situation and thus does not take proper precaution, a death that results from his or her actions is incidentally willed. Similarly, deaths are incidentally willed if one uses too much force and lacks caution in that sense.
Murders are killings that are either fully intended and willed or incidentally intended and willed. The deaths that resulted in both types of killings are caused by actions that lead to death which could and/or should have been completely avoided. In killings that were incidentally willed and intended, a participation in unlawful activities or a lack of proper caution make the accidental killing a murder. For most unintended and unwilled killings, the death that resulted from the actions of one cannot be called a murder since the killer had neither deliberately nor incidentally intended and willed to take away a life. However, like Lamech, even those who unknowingly take away a life can be guilty of murder.
Direct Abortions and Indirect Abortions
Although all abortions are killings, not all are murder. As distinguished above, direct abortion is the deliberate and direct termination of fetal life. By definition, direct abortions are murders because they willfully and intentionally kill the fetus. In indirect abortions, the death of the fetus is a consequence of another intended action. Indirect abortions can fall under either the unintended yet incidentally willed killings or the unintended and unwilled killings, but if the circumstances of the indirect abortion are that of incidentally willed killings, the indirect abortion is a form of murder.
In most every case, direct abortion is murder. Direct abortions are termed induced abortions by medical professionals. Induced abortions are cases in which “a procedure is done or medication is taken to end a pregnancy” (“Induced Abortion - FAQ”). The pregnancy is ended by deliberately and directly ending the life of the fetus. Whether the death of the fetus is an end or a means to an end, the performed direct abortion is still murder. The Guttmacher Institute found that the most common reasons that American women have abortions include an undesired potential interference with work or education and an inability or unwillingness to care for a child (“Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions”). These are elective abortions which are induced to deliberately and intentionally terminate fetal life and are thus murders.
Some rare critical situations require an induced abortion to alleviate medical risks.

Historically, these abortions were performed to save the life of the mother (Aries, “The Politics of Science”). These situations utilize abortion as a means to an end but are not murders. Aquinas would agree to this judgment because “it is natural for everything to keep itself in existence as far as possible...since they have a higher obligation to safeguard their own lives than the life of another” (Regan, 170). Although these therapeutic abortions are employed as a means to an end, they are not always murders. Just as a person who acts moderately in self-defense is not guilty of murder although their actions killed another, a mother who chooses her own life over her child’s is not guilty of murder. In both cases, the higher obligation to save one’s own life is paramount to the life of another. However, if a therapeutic abortion is performed although there are other viable options that would allow both the mother and the fetus to live, the therapeutic abortion is murder. The presence of other viable options makes the therapeutic abortion murder because “it is unlawful to use greater force than necessary to defend one’s life” (Regan, 170). Thus therapeutic abortion is murder in cases where other options are

viable.
There are certain cases in which indirect abortion is and is not a murder.

Just as in unintended killings, there are ways in which indirect abortion is and is not murder. Spontaneous abortions, commonly known as miscarriages, are fetal deaths that are not willfully induced. These fetal deaths can occur due to a number of unpreventable genetic disorders and defects within the fetus or even disorders and illnesses of the mother (Dulay, “Spontaneous Abortion”). If such reasons were the cause of the death of the fetus, the spontaneous and indirect abortion is not murder. However, substance abuse of cocaine, drugs, alcohol, and the like also have the potential to induce a spontaneous abortion (Dulay, “Spontaneous Abortion”). Since one ought to avoid such a vice, spontaneous abortions that result from substance abuse are

murder.
Elective abortions are deliberately induced to terminate unwanted pregnancies by terminating fetal life and are thus murders. Therapeutic abortions are cases in which direct abortion is not murder unless the abortion is performed even though other viable options in which both the mother and fetus can survive exist. Spontaneous abortions that occur due to unpreventable causes such as genetic defects and untreatable illnesses are unpreventable deaths and are not murder. However, spontaneous abortion is murder if the fetal death was incidentally induced by substance abuse. The abortions above which are murders are punishable by human laws whereas the abortions that are not murders cannot lawfully be punishable.
Punishing Abortion through Human Law
As a result, it becomes clear that there are some cases in which the abortion cannot be punished through human law. Since human laws are limited to only punishing the vices that harm the common good, human laws can only punish abortion when it is murder. However, when it is punishable by law, human law has an obligation to itself to punish it. Established laws on abortion should be framed in a certain way so as to generally punish the act but leaves room for particular cases in which the abortion could not be classified as murder.
In instances where the abortion is murder, human law holds the authority to punish it. Human law’s obligation to punishing abortion lies within its duty to forbid the vices that it can. Murder, in all of its forms, is one of the extreme vices that falls under the governance of human law, for it is an extreme vice which human law must forbid. As Aquinas says, “human laws, by not prohibiting some vices, rightly permit them” (Regan, 61). If human laws did not prohibit abortion, a form of murder would be permitted, and this would be contrary to human law’s end of preserving the common good. Furthermore, since human laws are derived from the natural and seek to preserve similar ends as the natural law, human laws ought pursue such ends to the fullest extent as possible within the parameters of human laws’ limits. Otherwise, human laws would not fulfill its purpose.