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In Thomas Nagel’s book, Mind and Cosmos, Nagel argues that physical sciences cannot provide a full picture of life. A few of his arguments are that consciousness is naturally assigned to the brain, [Nagel 35] materialist arguments denying the mind means that the premise is false, [Nagel 15] and lastly, high cognitive functioning such as thinking can only be performed by beings that have a mind. [Nagel 73] When it comes to the consciousness being assigned to the brain, Nagel states “Subjective appearances, on the other hand- how this physical world appears to human perception- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers.” (Nagel 35) What he means when he says this, is that the way we see the world isn’t objective; another being could see the world in a completely different way. The …show more content…
[Nagel 71] He also states that their existence cannot be explained by a physically reductive evolutionary theory. Nagel stated “Even in the wild, it isn’t just perception and operant conditioning that have survival value. The capacity to generalize from experience and allow these generalizations, or general expectations, to be confirmed or disconfirmed by subsequent experience is also adaptive. [Nagel 71] His argument can be summed up by saying that natural selection would favor creatures that have higher-level cognition. In addition to this, higher-level cognition warrants the need for a mind. While this sounds good, it doesn’t prove that high-level cognition causes or requires consciousness. It still leaves the possibility open for life to operate, just without an operator, perhaps similar to a computer that can be programmed to loop a task and still be operating without the
One of the major differences between humans and animals is our ability to reason and differentiate our actions from our instincts (Barrett, 2011, p. 3). Justin Barrett further explains this distinction in the first chapter of his book, Cognitive Science Religion and Theology. He explains that cognitive science recognizes the uniqueness of the human mind and focuses on explaining the thinking processes that take place(Barrett, 2011, p. 5). This may seem similar to what the field of neuroscience aims to do but, cognitive science is not as interested with the biological functions of the brain. Instead of looking at physical structures Barrett writes, that cognitive science focuses on broader processes such as perception, attention, memory, reasoning and learning (Barrett, 2011, p. 7). All of these processes interact with each other to create the big questions asked in cognitive science. Some of these big underlying questions of cognitive science are explored in this first chapter, questions such as “What is innate?” or “How are mind and bodies
...what Richard Taylor might have already done. Nagel at no time in his essay made any strong points on the mind and brain being separate, but his points were built to disprove Taylor’s last point. Nagel’s statement about Martians being able to learn more about our brains than us allows us to reach the conclusion that at no point there is the necessity to believe that there is a soul or a mind separate from the body. What it proves is that science is still trying to better itself and cannot currently explain private psychological states or experiences, but that the mind is the brain and the brain is the body.
The mind-body problem can be a difficult issue to discuss due to the many opinions and issues that linger. The main issue behind the mind-body problem is the question regarding if us humans are only made up of matter, or a combination of both matter and mind. If we consist of both, how can we justify the interaction between the two? A significant philosophical issue that has been depicted by many, there are many prominent stances on the mind-body problem. I believe property dualism is a strong philosophical position on the mind-body issue, which can be defended through the knowledge argument against physicalism, also refuted through the problems of interaction.
Are minds physical things, or are they nonmaterial? If your beliefs and desires are caused by physical events outside of yourself, how can it be true that you act the way you do of your own free will? Are people genuinely moved by the welfare of others, or is all behavior, in reality, selfish? (Sober 203). These are questions relevant to philosophy of the mind and discussed through a variety of arguments. Two of the most important arguments with this discussion are Cartesian dualism and logical behaviorism, both of which argue the philosophy of the mind in two completely different ways. Robert Lane, a professor at the University of West Georgia, define the two as follows: Cartesian dualism is the theory that the mind and body are two totally different things, capable of existing separately, and logical behaviorism is the theory that our talk about beliefs, desires, and pains is not talk about ghostly or physical inner episodes, but instead about actual and potential patterns of behavior. Understanding of the two arguments is essential to interpret the decision making process; although dualism and behaviorism are prominent arguments for the philosophy of the mind, both have their strengths and weaknesses.
The 'mind-body' problem has troubled philosophers for centuries. This is because no human being has been able to sufficiently explain how the mind actually works and how this mind relates to the body - most importantly to the brain. If this were not true then there would not be such heated debates on the subject. No one objects to the notion that the Earth revolves around the sun because it is empirical fact. However, there is no current explanation on the mind that can be accepted as fact. In 'What is it like to be a bat?', Thomas Nagel does not attempt to solve this 'problem'. Instead, he attempts to reject the reductionist views with his argument on subjectivity. He examines the difficulties of the mind-body problem by investigating the conscious experience of an organism, which is usually ignored by the reductionists. Unfortunately, his arguments contain some flaws but they do shed some light as to why the physicalist view may never be able to solve the mind-body problem.
Searle claims the assumption is assuming the stance that if something is intrinsically mental, then it cannot be in any sense physical. His response to this is the claim that because “they are intrinsically mental, they are therefore a fortiori they are physical”(P115).He even goes further to say that terms are constrained in design, and as such are assumed to be a complete opposition. Due to this, we can conclude that consciousness is just a simple reductive biological feature of the brain. This assumption constrains his argument and assumes that reduction to a metaphysical level is not necessary in understanding Consciousness. Searle assumes this reduction is fully casual, and that if ontologically reduced, we lose the whole concept. However, what if we consider mental events as individual and subjective. We cannot assume a identical intrinsically mental event will have the identical physical impact on someone. Although the mental event may be the same, the reduction of this mental causation ...
This very intricate nature of consciousness led reductionist to not adequately addressing the difference between mind and body. For Nagel, what makes consciousness or the mind so difficult to grasp is its subjectivity. In the article “ What is it like to be a bat?”, Nagel argues that although science allows us to understand certain attributes and of their behaviours, one simply understands what it would be like to be a bat from a human perspective. This understanding is thus flawed as it is subjective to individual’s preconceptions. Angel asserts that the subjective nature of the minds acts as a barrier to understanding what it is truly like to be anything, other than one’s self. This subjective theory does not simply apply to animals, Nagel gives the example of a blind individual, although constitutionally similar to an individual with sight, there is no way a blind person could perceive or understand what the experience of seeing colour entails. As one’s perception of colour is described in a subjective point of view. One cannot to any sufficient detail, objectively describe what it is like to experience anything, as all experiences as based on
The approaches given by Pierce and Nagel to the epistemological questions of doubt and belief, though diverse in that they are strictly pragmatist and Cartesian, contain a similar underlying principle. They both serve to show that belief cannot come from any source that appeals to one’s feelings or purposes, experiences or impressions. Beliefs must arise from a non-personal means. Although this is a commonality between the two approaches in epistemology, they are greatly different arguments in their focuses. Pierce’s pragmatist approach surfaces along the lines of techniques people use to found their beliefs of reality, here assuming reality from the start, and using that as a foundation to delve into questions of the unknown. Nagel’s look at the Cartesian approach primarily doubts reality, and uses that as the grounds for the rest of his argument, asking how we can know anything beyond ourselves. These approaches lead to very different views on epistemology.
One may be able to conceive consciousness in the absence of higher-order states, but this does not mean that we can explain consciousness in the absence of higher-order states.
The desire to avoid dualism has been the driving motive behind much contemporary work on the mind-body problem. Gilbert Ryle made fun of it as the theory of 'the ghost in the machine', and various forms of behaviorism and materialism are designed to show that a place can be found for thoughts, sensations, feelings, and other mental phenomena in a purely physical world. But these theories have trouble accounting for consciousness and its subjective qualia. As the science develops and we discover facts, dualism does not seems likely to be true.
... sciences to be firm believers in organicism, the idea that the people were all part of a larger whole, a characteristic found in the hierarchy of all biological organisms. Another similarity they shared were their views that their current society was a compilation of the past and had evolved with the ever-changing needs of society and the individual’s quest for knowledge and truth.
Functionalism is a materialist stance in the philosophy of mind that argues that mental states are purely functional, and thus categorized by their input and output associations and causes, rather than by the physical makeup that constitutes its parts. In this manner, functionalism argues that as long as something operates as a conscious entity, then it is conscious. Block describes functionalism, discusses its inherent dilemmas, and then discusses a more scientifically-driven counter solution called psychofunctionalism and its failings as well. Although Block’s assertions are cogent and well-presented, the psychofunctionalist is able to provide counterarguments to support his viewpoint against Block’s criticisms. I shall argue that though both concepts are not without issue, functionalism appears to satisfy a more acceptable description that philosophers can admit over psychofunctionalism’s chauvinistic disposition that attempts to limit consciousness only to the human race.
Social scientists often reference Georg Hegel’s work in Phenomenology of Spirit, as he attempts to develop the notion of self and the limits of its autonomy in society. In it, he describes what is often termed the master-slave dialectic. The master-slave dialectic describes the internal, or if taken more literally, the external struggle of recognition between two figures, the master and the slave. Their relationship is at once both reflective and reflexive, as one begins to understand the other as the antithesis of his or herself, giving an identity not only to the other, but also to his or herself. This dialectic places the figures in conflict with one another, where the historically determined means for resolution is the social defeat of
While the great philosophical distinction between mind and body in western thought can be traced to the Greeks, it is to the influential work of René Descartes, French mathematician, philosopher, and physiologist, that we owe the first systematic account of the mind/body relationship. As the 19th century progressed, the problem of the relationship of mind to brain became ever more pressing.
Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind (1949) is a critique of the notion that the mind is distinct from the body, and is a rejection of the philosophical theory that mental states are distinct from physical states. Ryle argues that the traditional approach to the relation of mind and body (i.e., the approach which is taken by the philosophy of Descartes) assumes that there is a basic distinction between Mind and Matter. According to Ryle, this assumption is a basic 'category-mistake,' because it attempts to analyze the relation betwen 'mind' and 'body' as if they were terms of the same logical category. Furthermore, Ryle argues that traditional Idealism makes a basic 'category-mistake' by trying to reduce physical reality to the same status as mental reality, and that Materialism makes a basic 'category-mistake' by trying to reduce mental reality to the same status as physical reality.