After doing research in regards to interagency cooperation, it is in my personal opinion that all agencies work together in sharing intelligence to solve certain issues, but to do it carefully. Back in the early days, it was a problem among the agencies as some felt as though the other person couldn’t be trusted. In some cases, what if the intelligence ended up in the hands of someone that shouldn’t have gotten hold of it? Taken from the example of a previous reading, the author (Thomas B. Hunter) stated a valuable reason for agencies not to share intelligence and it may indeed be reasonable. “For example, while the CIA may be interested in obtaining information held by the FBI on a given individual, the FBI may be reluctant to part with that information for fear that the CIA’s use of that intelligence may compromise an ongoing investigation” (Hunter, 2004). When Mr. Hunter made that example, he definitely made a great point because the sharing of particular intelligence may blow the cover for this one agency, but is extremely helpful and valuable to another. This particular topic c...
...ary 1997, Earl Edwin Pitts plead guilty on two counts of espionage. On 23 June, Earl Edwin Pitts was sentenced to 27 years in prison by a Federal judge who stated that the former agent was guilty of “the most egregious abuse of trust.” When asked why he spied, Pitts cited a number of grievances he had against the Federal Bureau of Investigations and stated that he “wanted to pay them back.” (12) This could have been prevented if the Federal Bureau of Investigations had a program similar to the Army’s TARP (Threat Awareness Reporting Program) to train fellow employees what to look for and how to report on espionage indicators. Another preventive measure would be to work with employees on job preferences to duty locations, If Earl Edwin Pitts would not have been transferred he would not have thought to get payback and the nations secrets would still be secure today.
Since, as he establishes, leadership’s political priorities were critical to the ultimate decision in the CIA’s actions, the degree to which the CIA actually concentrated on this mission of collection and analysis depended on the perceived threats from the top. Consequently, the actual level of reliable analysis deteriorated as demonstrated by the example of ORE analysists who were “normatively risk averse” and trying to “get it right,” and provide analysis that fit into the view of their leadership. Lacking trust in their analysists’ conclusions, the CIA proved unable to supply reliable intelligence and forge “collaboration and integration.” Rather than addressing institutional problems the CIA developed a pattern that continued throughout its entire history. Even though it refers to the Reagan era, Immerman’s conclusion that in a time of crisis the CIA deemed that they “required a change in leadership more than an institutional adjustment,” could easily apply to any other period. This application of psychology to history while enlightening does detract from the reader’s understanding of a formation of a CIA “culture” that limited its intelligence analysis efficiency. Without this fundamental comprehension of a CIA “culture,” some of Immerman’s later
When a problem is noticed by parents or teachers a child gets diagnosed based on his/her difficulties. Sometimes a diagnosis may not be possible, or necessary. Many children with milder SLCN (speech, language and communication needs) can be supported well in their school or nursery setting, or respond well to general support strategies, and they don’t need specific help.
One of the main failures of law enforcement and intelligence agencies identified by both the authors of “The Cell” and Senator Richard Shelby was that the F.B.I. and C.I.A. acted in competition with one another to produce results, as opposed to in centralized collaboration. Gladwell points out that the intelligence community was structured in this manner in response to the failures of the Bay of Pigs operation, which had been based on highly centralized intelligence gathering. In turn, the structure of intelligence agencies at the time of the Bay of Pigs was in response to the failure of decentralized intelligence to identify the threat of an attack on Pearl Harbor. The iterative cycle of intelligence failures and subsequent reform efforts ignores the premise that the failures do not represent evidence of the limitations of intelligence agencies, but rather the limitations of intelligence itself. As Gladwell states, “in our zeal to correct what we believe to be the problems of the past, we end up creating new problems for the
The standards of the Joint Commission are a foundation for an objective evaluation process the may help healthcare organizations measure, assess and improve performance. These standards are focused on organizational functions that are key for providing safe high quality care services. The Joint Commission’s standards set goal expectations of reasonable, achievable and surveyable performance of an organization. Only new standards that are relative to patient safety or care quality, have positive impact on healthcare outcomes, and can be accurately measured are added. Input from healthcare professionals, providers, experts, consumers and government agencies develop these standards.
In assessing Du Pont’s capital structure after the Conoco merger that significantly increased the company’s debt to equity ratio, an analyst must look at all benefits and drawbacks of a high debt ratio. The main reason why Du Pont ended up with a high debt to equity ratio after acquiring Conoco was due to the timing and price at which they bought Conoco. Du Pont ended up buying the firm at its peak, just before coal and oil prices started to fall and at a time when economic recession hurt the chemical industry of Du Pont. The additional response from analysts and Du Pont stockholders also forced Du Pont to think twice about their new expansion. The thought of bringing the debt ratio back to 25% was brought on by the fact that the company saw that high levels of capital spending were vital to the success of the firm and that high debt levels may put them at higher risk for defaulting.
...that had helped the United States to be one of the greatest counties that it is today. Within the agency, there was no communications where they kept information from each other. The CIA agency had no idea what they were doing in regards to central intelligence and they were compromised where the enemies knew about the attack before the attack was fully implemented. These examples prove that some leaders had some positive outcomes for the United States, but the agency from within could not stay united as well as keeping communications about what was going on in the world. I agree with Tim Weiner’s thesis that the United States is one of the greatest countries in the world, but we cannot seem to create a great and efficient spy service to benefit the United States.
...e community have had conflicting views and opposing agendas. Lack of cooperation and communication between intelligence agencies; such as the FBI and the CIA refusing to share information prior to the terrorist attacks of 2001, resulted in limited information and failure on the part of the intelligence community and policy decisions regarding US safeguards against terrorist.
knowledge of the CIA and who would later would be involved in the clash between the
Nedzi (D-Mich.), Luclen N. “Oversight or Overlook: Congress and the US Intelligence Agency.” A Congressman talk to the CIA senior seminar, November 14, 1979, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol18no2/pdf/v18i2a02p.pdf (accessed January 7, 2014).
goals and values, provides mechanisms for continuous communication among caregivers, optimizes staff participation in clinical decision-making and fosters respect for the contribution of all disciplines” (Nolte, 2005, p. 4).
In today’s global world, multinational corporations (MNCs) need to find new markets to stay competitive. A way in which they can do this is through IJVs. Hyder and Ghauri (2000) estimate the growth of IJVs to be 25% annually.
Intelligence collection and apprehension of criminals have occurred for many years; however, with the exception of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, these actions were performed by different organizations. Nonetheless, roles and responsibilities have changed since the attacks on September 11, 2001. Intelligence-led policing and the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing program were incorporated, and fusion centers were established to help gather intelligence from different levels of the government. Although law enforcement at the local, state, and tribal levels aid in intelligence collection, it is important to ensure that intelligence gathered to protect national security and law enforcement intelligence are kept separately. Even though law enforcement operations can strengthen intelligence operations and vice versa, complications can arise when the two actions are combined. Government agencies must also ensure that sensitive and secret information does not leak or is not compromised when sharing intelligence. Therefore the purpose is to describe intelligence and law enforcement operations, discuss the expectations of prevention and punishment, and discuss the benefits and consequences of combining law enforcement and intelligence operations.
Interprofessional education and collaboration are essential to promoting health care utilization that results in safe, effective, quality and equitable care in an evolving health care arena in the United States. The purpose of this essay is to evaluate the evolution of interprofessional education (IPE) and collaboration, and characteristics of interprofessional collaboration (IPC). Additionally, an analysis of how IPC can impact patient safety and quality of care, along with implementation facilitators, barriers and sustainability will be discussed. Finally, opportunities for utilization of IPE and IPC in an organization with DNP-prepared APRNs will be explored.
In the United States the CIA or the Central Intelligence Agency is the main agency for gathering secret information and responsible for operations outside the United States. The FBI or Federal Bureau of Investigation has the primary responsibility for counterespionage activities within the United States. Counterespionage is when a country or an organization captures a hostile spy and turns them into a so-called “double agent” who sends false information to their own organization. It prevents other nations from gaining such information. Under international law, these activities are not illegal, but individual nations have laws against spying. However, spies are not considered with common or uncommon criminals. They are neither sinners nor international lawbreakers. If spies are caught they are either send back to their country, sent to jail or used as counterespionage (double agents).