Werner Rahn's Pact Analysis

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Werner Rahn served as in the German Navy, attending the Naval Academy Murwik, and retiring from active duty in 1997 as a Captain. He received a Ph.D. in history from Hamburg University and went on to be the head of the Second World War Research Department, Military History Research Office of the German Armed Forces, Freiburg in Breeisgau, Germany. He also served as a Secretary of the Navy Research Fellow at the Naval War College from late 1991 to early 1992. CPT Rahn has many written works, to include “Japan und der Krieg in Europa”, from which this paper is adapted.
THESIS AND KEY ARGUMENTS
In the spring and summer of 1940, as Japan watched German and Italian forces defeat the Netherlands, Belgium, and France, they fully believed that Great Britain would be next to fall. Hoping to include the United States in the list of defeated enemies, Japan saw an opportunity to join forces with Germany and Italy in the fight against Western Powers. The Tripartite Pact was signed on 27 September 2940 and the Axis powers agreed to support each other militarily. The Axis powers, specifically Germany and Japan, agreed to communicate openly with each other and coordinate joint operations. However, this proved to be a near-impossible feat as both sides were unable to develop a common …show more content…

In Adolf Hitler’s “Directive No. 24 Regarding Cooperation with Japan” (March 1941), it was expressed that the aim of Germany policy was to “bring Japan into active operations in the Far East as soon as possible. ” But at the same time, this directive prohibited the sharing of any information with the Japanese about upcoming operations. Meanwhile, Japan definitively did not want to enter into a war in the Far East, specifically in the Soviet Union, due to competing requirements for the ongoing war in China that was “draining the industrial and financial resources of

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