This is short discussion of the policies and analysis that led to U. S. Intelligence failures in the Korean War. Unfortunately, no one believed North Korea had the guts to risk war with the U.S. and invade the South. Politicians and Senior leaders silenced anyone who dared to challenge this world view.
Policy – Korea a Low Priority
The year was 1949, and in the years after World War II (WW II), U.S. and Soviet forces were withdrawing from the Korean peninsula. American intelligence capabilities and responsibilities of the area were piecemeal (Finnegan, 2002). This drawdown reflected Korea’s low priority on the world stage.
Troop Withdrawals.
According to P. K. Rose with the Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Operations, “[By] January
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Army’s intelligence capabilities in the ROK were lacking as with the whole of the Intelligence Community (IC). On the other hand, a few organizations remained. This included some Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) offices and the Korean Liaison Office (KLO), a small organization maintained by FECOM’s head of intelligence (G-2). The Army dismantled most of their intelligence training programs by this time, and were neither prepared nor equipped to anticipate North Korea’s invasion. General James Van Fleet noted, “we have lost through neglect, disinterest, and possible jealousy, much of the effectiveness in intelligence work that we acquired so painfully in World War II (Finley, 1995).” Although these small offices monitored the North Korean/Soviet/Chinese threat, they didn’t have the full complement of intelligence disciplines. Instead, they relied on Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Imagery Intelligence …show more content…
The National Security Agency stood up in 1952 with the mission of decoding radio transmissions. One benefit of SIGINT is that it sometimes gives analysts closer access to source information (first/second-hand information vs. second/third-hand info) as well as more insight into the target’s intentions. Other reforms included a complete restructuring of the CIA to include offices dedicated to producing intelligence estimates and coordinating with other agencies. One reform to consider is what a 35Q could’ve brought to the intelligence effort. While it would be an interesting thought exercise, it would be better to consider what lessons can and should apply to the work of a 35Q today.
Cyberspace Intelligence operations should take away a few lessons from the Korean War. First, is the acknowledgement that cyber will only provide one perspective of information; not everything exists in cyberspace and intelligence analysis should call upon multiple domains/perspectives. Also, question assumptions. Determine ways to test and validate hypotheses. Lastly, invest in people and equipment. Several organizations were ill prepared or equipped for the warfighting task. Luckily, today’s analysts can learn from the past to prepare for the
Since, as he establishes, leadership’s political priorities were critical to the ultimate decision in the CIA’s actions, the degree to which the CIA actually concentrated on this mission of collection and analysis depended on the perceived threats from the top. Consequently, the actual level of reliable analysis deteriorated as demonstrated by the example of ORE analysists who were “normatively risk averse” and trying to “get it right,” and provide analysis that fit into the view of their leadership. Lacking trust in their analysists’ conclusions, the CIA proved unable to supply reliable intelligence and forge “collaboration and integration.” Rather than addressing institutional problems the CIA developed a pattern that continued throughout its entire history. Even though it refers to the Reagan era, Immerman’s conclusion that in a time of crisis the CIA deemed that they “required a change in leadership more than an institutional adjustment,” could easily apply to any other period. This application of psychology to history while enlightening does detract from the reader’s understanding of a formation of a CIA “culture” that limited its intelligence analysis efficiency. Without this fundamental comprehension of a CIA “culture,” some of Immerman’s later
The Korean War changed the face of American Cold War diplomacy forever. In the midst of all the political conflict and speculation worldwide, the nation had to choose between two proposed solutions, each one hoping to ensure that communism didn?t sweep across the globe and destroy American ideals of capitalism and democracy. General Douglas MacArthur takes the pro-active stance and says that, assuming it has the capability, the U.S. should attack communism everywhere. President Harry Truman, on the other hand, believed that containing the Soviet communists from Western Europe was the best and most important course of action, and that eliminating communism in Asia was not a priority.
Pearson, Lester B. "Documents on the Korean Crisis." University of Manitoba. January 24, 1951. http://www.umanitoba.ca/libraries/units/archives/canada_war/tribune/website/clippings/korea/Documents_on_the_Korean_Crisis1.shtml (accessed December 18, 2011).
Throughout the conflict Canada's naval contribution made a significant impact on coalition efforts to secure South Korea [5]. This was the first post-world...
In this article I will analyze the Korean People’s Army which represents the military forces of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea. The Korean People’s Army is composed of 5 branches, Korean People’s Army Ground Force, Korean People’s Navy, Korean People’s Air force, strategic rocket force, and North Korean Special Operation Force. In this paper I will look at the big three: Korean People’s Army Ground Force, Korean People’s Navy, and Korean People’s Air force. I will talk about the force strength and some of the equipment that each brings to the fight.
This was not our first intelligence failure. Looking back to 1941 when Pearl Harbor was bombed. We knew that there were indications that Japan was going to bomb us but the intelligence community failed to recognize the imminent attack. The Tet Offensive could be compared to the Battle of the Bulge where the German caught the US off guard; this was the same for Tet Offensive when the Vietcong and the NVA attacked unexpectedly during the Lunar New Year cease fire. After the Vietnam War, the United States almost reverted to isolationism of post WWI. From the Time that America pulled out of the Vietnam War until the Gulf War, as Americans we tried to avoid any conflicts that we compare to the Vietnam War. If only our intelligence information would have been analyzed fully we might not have impacted the United States public opinion so dramatically.
Weiner, Tim. Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. New York: Doubleday, 2007. Print.
Nedzi (D-Mich.), Luclen N. “Oversight or Overlook: Congress and the US Intelligence Agency.” A Congressman talk to the CIA senior seminar, November 14, 1979, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol18no2/pdf/v18i2a02p.pdf (accessed January 7, 2014).
Despite the fact that this was the age of Western imperialism and gunboat diplomacy, Korea failed to erect a large standing military and navy. Instead of uniting under the banner of protecting Korea’s sovereignty, some officials were more concerned with protecting their own privileges. Robinson wrote “The lack of consensus in domestic politics…inhibited any program to gather
President Johnson’s in-group avoided reconsidering its escalation policy when time and again the expectation on which they based their decisions turned out to be wrong. The policy-makers avoided the discussion of prior decisions and kept inventing new rationalizations to recommit themselves into defeating the North Vietnamese.
方玥雯[Fang Yue Wen] (2009). 北韓核武研發與東北亞安全：2002-2007. [The North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and the Security in Northeast Asia: 2002-2007] in台灣[Taiwan]: 國立政治大學[National Cheungchi University] Retrieved 18 July, 2013 from http://nccuir.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/37029
Since the end of the Korean War, the United States has enacted policies to isolate and undermine the Kim Dynasty in North Korea. A key development took place in the past several decades where North Korea broke away from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to develop their own nuclear weapons and while lacking launch capabilities, they have been successful in their development. During this process, the United States took active policies to deter the North Koreans in pursuit of their goals. It is easy to assume that the United States took this stance in order to maintain a military edge in the region. But under closer examination, this neo-realist perspective does not explain why the United States pursued this policy.
26 Oct. 1962. GWU.edu. -. National Security Archives, 2002. Web. The Web.
Tidd, J. M. (2008). From revolution to reform: A brief history of U.S. intelligence. The SAIS
On June 25th, 1950 at 4 a.m. the North Korean People’s Army (KPA) attacked across the 38th parallel, implementing a well-developed invasion plan (Lewis p.1). The KPA had a huge number of military men compare to the South Koreans. It had about 135,000 soldiers in 10 divisions, five separate infantry brigades, and one armor brigade with 120 soviet-made-T-34 tanks (Lewis p.1). The Republic of Korea (ROK) was taken by surprise and was not fully equipped with weapons like the KPA (Lewis p.1). So for that matter the ROK could not halt the invasion. But if the South Koreans would have had heavy artillery like the KPA then maybe the KPA’s invasion plan would had been a failure. The United Nations Security Council approved a US sponsored resolution that called fo...