Tsuyoshi Hasegawa’s Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan sheds new light on the decision by the United States, at the end of the Second World War, to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki Japan. Hasegawa argues that the decision to drop the atomic bombs was made in order to keep the Soviet Union from making large gains in the Pacific Theater, thus it was the first of many Cold War chess matches. In the first chapter of his book “Triangular Relations and the Pacific War” Hasegawa details American, Japanese, and Russian Relations prior to the Second World War up until shortly after the Yalta Conference. He summarizes Russo-Japanese relations from the founding of Vladivostok to the Russian loss in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, presenting the ominous background in diplomatic relations before the founding of the Soviet Union. Hasegawa then details the aggressive actions taken by Japan in China and the Pacific during the 1930s, along with the hardline stance taken by the United States against such actions in comparison with the Soviet strategy of appeasement. The promise by the Soviet Union to join the Pacific War as well as the Manhattan project and Japanese peace activists are discussed as Hasegawa details wartime relations. In chapter two “Stalin, Truman, and Hirohito Face New Challenges” Hasegawa takes ample time to discuss key policy decisions as the war came to a close. Beginning with the planning of the American invasion of Japan to commence on November 1, 1945, and the staggering American casualties at Okinawa causing planners to rethink invasion. The key to this chapter however, is the transition of power from Roosevelt to Truman. As Truman inherited wartime America, he had difficult decisions... ... middle of paper ... ...khalin, the Kuril Islands, and parts of China before American troops could land. Stalin and Truman clashed over this, but in the end came to agreement as the Yalta terms were more or less respected. Hasegawa’s argument attributing the Japanese surrender to Soviet aggression is at times compelling. His book clearly presents that Japanese surrender cannot entirely be attributed to the atomic bombings, however it also cannot be entirely attributed to Soviet aggression either. The lack of a hasty surrender by the Japanese seems better attributed to the extreme internal partisanship and indecision amongst the Japanese leadership, even when faced with Soviet invasion and American annihilation from the air. Works Cited Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. Racing the enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the surrender of Japan. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005.
Clausewitz’s thoughts on war termination effectively summarize the situation for the Japanese and Russian Empires preceding peace negotiations, “Inability to carry on the struggle can, in practice, be replaced by two other grounds for making peace: the first is the improbability of victory; the second is its unacceptable cost.” (Clausewitz, 91). The Japanese effectively identified their culminating point of victory and predicted that continued success would be highly improbable. The Russian Empire had the means to eventually turn the tide of the war, but the cost to do this was unacceptable. As a result, both chose to negotiate peace while continuing to take steps to improve their negotiating position. The Russo-Japanese War highlights the Japanese Empire’s ability to effectively plan, execute and negotiate the termination of a war, despite being considered a vastly inferior power at the onset of war.
The primary goal of this extreme force was to bring a swift end to the war in the Pacific, (Walker) but a secondary goal was to display the military and technological might of the United States to allies and rivals around the world (Walker). The use of multiple nuclear weapons made it clear to Japan and the world that Truman's threat of “utter destruction” was intended to be carried out unless Japan delivered what the United States wantedunconditional surrender (Cite). The potential use of atomic weapons against the Japanese was appealing to the United States because it was seen as a dramatic and decisive way to end the war (Walker, ). Prior to the decision to use nuclear weapons, Japan and the United States were at odds over the terms by which the Japanese would surrender to the Americans, which did nothing but prolong the military conflict (Walker, ). Japanese leadership had expressed its desire to end the war to third parties, but could not come to an agreement over what terms would be acceptable for their surrender (Walker, 47)....
In Prompt and Utter Destruction, J. Samuel Walker provides the reader with an elaborate analysis of President Truman’s decision behind using the atomic bomb in Japan. He provokes the reader to answer the question for himself about whether the use of the bomb was necessary to end the war quickly and without the loss of many American lives. Walker offers historical and political evidence for and against the use of the weapon, making the reader think critically about the issue. He puts the average American into the shoes of the Commander and Chief of the United States of America and forces us to think about the difficulty of Truman’s decision.
In 1945, the United States was facing severe causalities in the war in the Pacific. Over 12,000 soldiers had already lost their lives, including 7,000 Army and Marine soldiers and 5,000 sailors (32). The United States was eager to end the war against Japan, and to prevent more American causalities (92). An invasion of Japan could result in hundreds of thousands killed, wounded and missing soldiers, and there was still no clear path to an unconditional surrender. President Truman sought advice from his cabinet members over how to approach the war in the Pacific. Although there were alternatives to the use of atomic weapons, the evidence, or lack thereof, shows that the bombs were created for the purpose of use in the war against Japan. Both the political members, such as Henry L. Stimson and James F. Byrnes, and military advisors George C. Marshall and George F. Kennan showed little objection to completely wiping out these Japanese cities with atomic weapons (92-97). The alternatives to this tactic included invading Japanese c...
Although WW II ended over 50 years ago there is still much discussion as to the events which ended the War in the Pacific. The primary event which historians attribute to this end are the use of atomic bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Although the bombing of these cities did force the Japanese to surrender, many people today ask “Was the use of the atomic bomb necessary to end the war?” and more importantly “Why was the decision to use the bomb made?” Ronald Takaki examines these questions in his book Hiroshima.
Grodzins, Morton. Americans Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese Evacuation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949. Print
The United States of America’s use of the atomic bomb on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has spurred much debate concerning the necessity, effectiveness, and morality of the decision since August 1945. After assessing a range of arguments about the importance of the atomic bomb in the termination of the Second World War, it can be concluded that the use of the atomic bomb served as the predominant factor in the end of the Second World War, as its use lowered the morale, industrial resources, and military strength of Japan. The Allied decision to use the atomic bomb not only caused irreparable physical damage to two major Japanese cities, but its use also minimized the Japanese will to continue fighting. These two factors along with the Japanese neglect of the Soviet Invasion of Manchuria, proved that the Allied use of the atomic bomb was the definitive factor in the Japanese decision to surrender.
Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. “Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman and the Surrender of Japan.” Taking Sides: Clashing View in United States History. Ed. Larry Madaras & James SoRelle. 15th ed. New York, NY. 2012. 289-298.
Criticisms of Truman’s actions fail to consider that he entered a leadership position set on an ideological collision course, was forced to further an established plan for an atomic monopoly, and dealt with a legacy of US-Russian tensions mobilized by Roosevelt prior to his death, all while being influenced by an alarmist and aggressive cabinet. Upon reviewing criticisms of Truman’s negotiations with Soviet diplomat Vyacheslav Molotov and his involvement in the atomic bomb drop, the influence of Roosevelt’s legacy and Truman’s cabinet will be discussed in order to minimize his blame for starting the Cold War. History does not often remember President Harry Truman fondly, with many revisionist scholars characterizing him as an ornery and undiplomatic politico who severely damaged US and Soviet relations.... ... middle of paper ...
One of the most argued topics today, the end of World War II and the dropping of the atomic bombs still rings in the American ear. Recent studies by historians have argued that point that the United States really did not make the right choice when they chose to drop the atomic bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Also with the release of once classified documents, we can see that the United States ...
However, it was not the case, the Soviets acknowledged the atomic bomb and wanted to create as many as possible so they could yield the control not only in the Pacific, but in the Eastern Europe. In the words of former US senator from South Carolina, James F. Byrnes, claimed “the bomb provided a unique opportunity to check Soviet control of Eastern Europe and Asia in the postwar years, and he very much wanted to delay or avert the entry of the Soviet Union into the war with Japan” (59). In the Potsdam Declaration on July 26, all the Allied countries, except the Soviets, stood together in preparing for the end of the World War 2. President Truman, learning of the success of the Manhattan project, and understanding that he must make a choice whether to drop the atomic bomb or not turned out to be the most difficult decision to make in his life. They came up with a decision to make Japan “unconditional surrender” (59) but they were afraid the Japan would not step down and refused to give up their fight.
...feat of Japan in World War 2). With the changes of the nature of power, Japan by balancing out aggressive economic policies and a quiet military buildup, was able to build herself up to become a prominent player in the international sphere today. In closing, while Japan’s policies today in general have been skewered towards the arguments of the ‘Gentleman’, increasingly Japan has considered more realist concerns of security in the escalation of tensions of the East Asian geopolitical sphere. Chomin’s Discourse has nonetheless served as a prophetic blueprint for more than a century of Japan policy-making.
"Was the Atomic Bombing of Japan Justifiable?" The Pacific War 1941-43. Web. 10 June 2010.
Japan surrendered in several places from September 7th to September 16th. Works Cited O’Neill, William L. World War II Student Companion. 1 ed. of the book. William H. Chafe, b. 1875.
The American public’s perception of Unconditional Surrender was not necessarily the perception of the nation’s leaders, though. In fact, most post-war planners in Washington saw America’s Unconditional Surrender policy as flexible (James 725) . However, the President did not choose to share his actual views on Unconditional Surrender with the public. To do so, would have been to negate the violent imperative behind America’s total war against Japan.