5. Inductive risk is the risk of error. More specifically, it is the possibility of wrongly accepting a false hypothesis or falsely rejecting a correct hypothesis. For example, there is a new cancer drug on the market. There are two types of inductive risk in this scenario. The first, is that scientists presume that it is a safe, effective treatment when it is not, so it stays in the market. The second scenario is that scientists believe this treatment is ineffective and so it is pulled from the market, even though it is actually effective and could cure the cancer. When evaluating inductive risk, it is imperative to evaluate all possible consequences of various solutions before reaching a decision.
In Douglas’ article, she argues that “non-epistemic values are a required part of the internal aspects of scientific reasoning for cases where inductive risk includes risk of non-epistemic consequences (Douglas, p. 559). She continues on to explain the foundation for the term inductive risk, and how it came about. “Inductive risk, a term first used by Hempel [in 1965, it] is the chance that one will be wrong in accepting (or rejecting) a scientific hypothesis” (Douglas, p. 561). Apparently, traditional philosophers contend the values act as a precursor to scientific arguments. However, Hempel believed that these values should
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Miranda Fricker discusses epistemic injustice in her article, Epistemic Injustice and a Role for Virtue in the Politics of Knowing. More specifically, she refers to what is known as testimonial injustice. Fricker argues that by giving less credit than is due to a speaker giving testimony, the receiver of the testimony, whom is critically evaluating the speaker, is doing them an injustice. This theory is also known as credibility deficit. On the other hand, giving one too much credit than is due is referred to as credibility excess. While these two phenomena have fundamental differences, the logic behind why both result in an
In order to be considered a non-evidentialist, one must believe that actual evidence is not required for all of our beliefs. Pascal believ...
...w. There is nothing enabling a scientist to say that induction is a suitable arrangement of evidence in which there is no way to account for the evidence, therefor being no liability in using induction to verify the statement.
“Excuse me, miss, can I see your license and registration, please?” Great. Pulled over once again, except this time I don’t even know what I did wrong. Apparently I made an unsafe lane change that resulted in an improper U-turn. I tried asking the officer what I did wrong, but as soon as I began speaking, he started talking over me. “Are you even from around here?” he asked me. “You look like you should’ve never even gotten your license.”
Clifford’s arguments for this conclusion is that if we are gullible enough to believe something without evidence then we are not only harming our individual credibility and intellect but also polluting the rest of society...
I will show that Kelly's response to the question of epistemic significance of peer disagreement is not compelling. In my explanation of Kelly's argument, I will show that it is contradictory of him to assert the first persons perspective and the right reasons view. I will then examine the third person perspective, and show that this is more compatible with the right reasons view. Nevertheless I will propose an objection in the form of a question. Specifically, why should the difference between first person and third person change my thinking skeptically? Would this view only be attractive from the third person view? The third person perspective, the right reasons view as Kelly explains it, plus what I will call external Validation of a belief makes a more compelling argument.
A paradox stems from a statement that apparently contradicts itself yet might still be true. In most cases logical paradoxes are essentially known to be invalid but are used anyways to promote critical thinking. The Raven’s paradox is an example of a paradox that essentially goes against what most logical paradoxes stand for in that it tries to make a valid claim through inductive logic. Carl Hempel is known for his famous accepting of this paradox with minor adjustments by the use of the contraposition rule. In this paper, however, I argue that Hempel’s solution to the Raven’s paradox is actually unsuccessful because he fails to take into account a possible red herring that serves as evidence against his solution. Irvin John Good is responsible for the formulation of the red herring argument as he tries to prove that the observation of a black raven can potentially negate the Raven’s paradox as valid. In addition to Good’s claim, Karl Popper and his view of falsificationism also functions as evidence to reject Hempel’s solution. Using Popper’s view as a basis, Israel Scheffler and Nelson Goodman formulate the concept of selective confirmation to reject the contraposition rule used by Hempel. Based off of all of the rejections that Hempel’s solution has it can clearly be seen that the Raven’s paradox has flaws that principally lead it to it being invalid.
In my argument I presented an example of a business woman not being seen as credible in the eyes of the listener just because she is a woman. This reenforces my original argument that Fricker is correct because prejudice has the ability to increase or decrease the credibility of the speaker through testimonial injustice. Yet, couldn't it also be true that this particular business woman may not have valid credentials or has been consistently wrong in the past making the listener questions her credibility for reasons that have nothing to do with her gender? For this reason, one might consider the idea of testimonial injustice existing on its own, with prejudice being a whole different equation. They might reenforce this objection by arguing with Fricker’s notion that testimonial injustice exists between epistemology and political philosophy. Epistemology could be defined as a theory of knowledge that sheds light on the differences between justified beliefs and opinions. Thus, separating theoretical justifiable beliefs found in testimonial injustice and the invalid preconceived opinions found in prejudice. Political philosophy in this case, could be defined as the study of questioning the fundamentals of society. Such as how a society should be created and how people should act within that society. Here, we can see testimonial injustice standing on its own with the standard of political philosophy illuminating any prejudice that could influence testimonial
Upon reading Will to Believe, there is no doubt we will all begin to question how we’ve gotten to our beliefs and why we believe what we do. William James argues against forced beliefs and expresses the importance of choice. The idea of choice is one I strongly agree with. Although we are easily influenced by others, when it comes to beliefs free will must come into play. As far as the science method, which I have discussed, a belief is just as valid whether there is evidence or not because most scientific methods will never be one hundred percent proven and they will change over
Since the mid-20th century, a central debate in the philosophy of science is the role of epistemic values when evaluating its bearing in scientific reasoning and method. In 1953, Richard Rudner published an influential article whose principal argument and title were “The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments” (Rudner 1-6). Rudner proposed that non-epistemic values are characteristically required when making inductive assertions on the rationalization of scientific hypotheses. This paper aims to explore Rudner’s arguments and Isaac Levi’s critique on his claims. Through objections to Levi’s dispute for value free ideal and highlighting the importance of non-epistemic values within the tenets and model development and in science and engineering,
The Chalmers's view against the Popperian hypothetico-deductive. Popper mentioned that people shouldn't concentrate our hopes on an unacceptable principle of induction.Also, he claimed that without relying on induction we still can work out how science works and why it is rational.1 Hence, I would like to said Popper would disagree with Chalmer's opinion. Also, I think Popperian might say Chalmers is wrong because his falsifiable in Popperian sense. Chalmers might be falsified if scientific knowledge is observed not reliable due to some experiment and observation might contain mistakes and we do not find them now. Furthermore, the Popperian might argue that science can not be prove but can justify the better theories or laws.1 We can justify which scientific laws or theories are better ones as there is falsified is found, or not scientific. When they are found falsified or not scientific, we can seek for novel bold hypot...
The topic I wish to pursue for my thesis is to refute the Local Reductionist Claim made by Elizabeth Fricker when evaluating how social identity, specifically how being a member of a minority group, affects credibility of testimony. In doing so, I will expand upon Linda Alcoff’s focus on why an epistemic assessment of what constitutes testimonial knowledge in forming beliefs is important to look at in a social context. I will argue against Fricker’s claim that the hearer should hold all the power to decide whether the testimony from the speaker is a source of knowledge as the local reductionist claim states because it allows for bias to influence the judgement of the hearer and does not allow for true transmission of knowledge via testimony.
New York: Science Editions, 1994. Redhead, M.L.G. & Co., Inc. (1980, November ). The New York Times. A Bayesian Reconstruction of Methodology of Scientific Research Programs. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, pp.
Life generated risks are considered as risks that include but are not limited to, financial limitations, racism, environmental or social influential risks that can create substantial difficulties which victims may have no control. When a victim is already faced with life-generated risks, adding the dangers and threats from a violent partner has the ability to cause extreme, even life threatening affects on their safety. When there is a battered victim they are automatically more vulnerable because of the life-generated risks they already deal with. Their abusive partners become aware of these risks and struggles and then use them to highlight their authority and control, crafting the victim into believing they need or cannot live without their
As the first step, identify potential risks plays a crucial role in the risk management process. The core purpose of identifying risk is to figure out causes of risk and analyze result caused by the risks and its probability . Hence, risk identification can begin with the source of problem, or with the problem itself. The chosen method of identifying risk may depend on culture, industry practice and compliance. The identification
Logic is the study of the methods and principles used to distinguish correct from incorrect reasoning. When we reason about any matter, we produce arguments to support our conclusions. Logic studies if the conclusion follows from the premises used or assumed, and if the premises provide good enough reason for accepting the conclusions drawn. Using the methods and techniques of logic—one can distinguish reliably between sound and faulty reasoning.