Is the goodness of an outcome purely a function of the amount of wellbeing (utility) it contains, or do other factors also matter in themselves? How, exactly, does equality matter?
The assessment of the goodness of an outcome depends not only on the amount of wellbeing contained, but also the presence of equality. I will argue that telic egalitarianism fails to capture the value of equality given the force of the levelling down objection. Furthermore, deontic egalitarianism is rejected because it requires an abandonment of our beliefs in cases like the divided world. Ultimately, I conclude that the objection that prioritarianism gives the wrong conclusion in intrapersonal cases is unconvincing. Therefore, equality matters in the way prescribed
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Firstly, under the broadest scope of telic egalitarianism, any inequality is bad, which leads to absurd moral guidelines. For instance, it is bad that some people have type 1 diabetes and others do not. By extension, telic egalitarianism morally authorises genetically modifying individuals to become diabetic. This is clearly excessive, thereby indicating that characterising the value of equality as intrinsic is troubling. Telic egalitarianism also encounters the levelling down objection. If inequality is in itself bad, then the disappearance of it must be better. Therefore, inequality may be reduced by decreasing the quality of life for individuals. For example, the Sydney storms earlier in the year resulted in significant damage to beachfront properties. According to telic egalitarians, this outcome is better than the non-arrival of the storm, in terms of equality, because the surplus resources of certain individuals were excised, thus reducing the disparity of wealth. Therefore, whilst equality matters in relation to the goodness of an outcome, it is unhelpful to frame it through the telic …show more content…
It has been contested that deontic egalitarianism is also susceptible to the levelling down objection, despite Parfit’s claim otherwise. Notably, O’Neill argues that a substantive version of the deontic view, states that our “duty to treat people on the basis of equality…involves a duty to promote distributive equality”, fails to avoid it. This substantive version permits distribution such that some individuals are made worse off and none better off, which is precisely the force of the levelling down objection. However, O’Neill does concede that Parfit provides a response to this critique given that deontic egalitarians only “have a reason to remove inequality only when, and only because, [their] way of doing so benefits the people who are worse off”. That is, this narrower deontic view only accepts reasons for levelling up towards equality but not levelling down and thereby avoids the levelling down objection. It is uncharitable of O’Neill to state that no “general case” of deontic egalitarianism can avoid the levelling down objection given that Parfit’s very prescription of the deontic view is identical to the narrower “formal version” of O’Neill’s. Therefore, deontic egalitarianism is in fact not susceptible to the same objection which unhinges the telic
Arguments about fairness and justice have been up for debate for centuries. "What do we deserve?", a question that has many individuals raising their brows to their efforts in their pursuit to achieve their goals. If it is said that we are all placed on an equal standard why are there individuals struggling to stay afloat? In Arora’s essay, he examines three forms of economic modals of social justices that question that idea of why the prosperous or the impecunious "deserve" their position or stature in life. Out of all of Arora's economic modals that he presents the Meritocratic System is the fairest because it gives everyone a fighting chance.
The first standard of equality is ontological equality which is the notion that everyone is created equal at birth. Ontological equality often justifies material inequality. In fact, this type of equality is sometimes used to put forth the notion that poverty is a virtue. A second standard of equality is equality of opportunity meaning that “everyone has an equal chance to achieve wealth, social prestige, and power because the rules of the game, so to speak, are the same for everyone”( Conley, 247). Therefore, any existing inequality is fair as long as everyone plays by the rules. The standard of equality is equality of condition, which is the idea that everyone should have an equal starting point. The last form of equality is equality of outcome which states, everyone should end up with the same outcome regardless of
Using seemingly sound steps of logic, David Parfit has come to the “Repugnant Conclusion” that a world of very many people with very good lives is worse than a world of vastly more people with lives that are barely worth living. I shall outline his argument and conclusion, and then explain how we may evade such a counter-intuitive notion by reconsidering the way we measure and compare people’s wellbeing. I argue that all people inherently deserve a certain amount of welfare that exceeds that in a life that is just barely worth living, and that cannot be compensated for by an increase in number of people.
“Convincing the non-elite that inequality is morally right. Those most advantaged are justified in giving orders and receiving a greater proportion of valued goods and services, or at least, creating doubts about alternatives. All, individuals strive for cognitive consistency and will develop principles of fairness, such as Distributive Justice. Lastly, there is some evidence for distribution based on need as a result of ability to understand the needs of others. This is called the process of legitimation […]” (2011:461).
Taking on Zozick’s construction of entitlement theory begs for a definition of justice, and it’s importance in this philosophical narrative. One’s liberty, that is one’s ability to do as he pleases without the persuasion or constraint of another, is the root of self-ownership (individual rights). Self-ownership also means one’s ownership over th...
What would actually happen if everyone was forced to be equal? Kurt Vonnegut envisioned the fatal outcome in his masterpiece, “Harrison Bergeron.” The story illustrates “what would happen if a government or some other power takes this notion serious” (Mowery). The protagonist, Harrison, who is arrest for “exuberant individuality,” escapes from prison and goes on national television station to declare himself emperor, only later to be killed by the handicap general Diane Moon. In “Harrison Bergeron,” Kurt Vonnegut satirizes the movement toward egalitarianism and the effect of television on people.
The bulk of Discourse on the Origin of Inequality is reliant on Rousseau’s definition o...
Wilkinson & Pickett, (W&P) assert that society on the whole would be healthier, more successful and happier if the gap between the affluent and the poor was tightened. The ‘Spirit Level Book’, written by them in 2010, is one of the most influential books on social policy to date and it argues that not only does inequality affect the ones down the bottom of the ladder but everyone across the board. Affluent countries perform better when social indicators are more equal across society. This essay will assess the validity of Wilkinson & Pickett’s conclusions by comparing the works of authors that support similar arguments, to the work of authors who disagree with them. A comparison of these different approaches, with a critical look at what and how inequality is being measured reveals that there is no definite answer to the problems raised by Wilkinson and Pickett, although many of their statements are valid.
Inequality is an issue which has been analyzed by political thinkers for centuries. Some thinkers have long been supporting the subordination of one gender, race, or class over another with religious, moral, ethical, and scientific factors to support their claims; others, however, argue against any subordination of any decree. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), a famous philosopher of the eighteenth century, defined inequality in two parts: natural and social. Natural inequalities are the differences in bodily and mental strengths. Social inequalities, however, are the differences that exist between individuals in wealth, power and honor. For Rousseau, social inequalities are justified when they are able to reflect natural inequalities.
Louis P. Pojman and Robert Westmoreland, eds., Equality: Selected Readings (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 1997), 33.
Why is it that a person has to offset his initial gain for the betterment of others? Rawls proposes this idea as the criterion for his second principle, the difference principle. What I argue however, is that the difference principle proposes to remove inequality from society but fails in this endeavor due to retaining enough inequality to benefit the disadvantaged, leaving the principle defective in its nature. This will be the question analyzed in this essay where I will first explain the two principles proposed by Rawls as well as the lexical order or priority, which is a central feature within A Theory of Justice. I...
Lamb, Kevin. "The Problem of Equality". The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies. v20, #4 (Winter 1995) 467-479.
Distributive justice requires the philosophical powers of reflection of the greatest theorists. In order to solve certain social issues, the most pragmatic solution must be concocted carefully to solve the biggest loopholes. Michael Walzer is no stranger to the complexity of social inequality. In his book A Defense of Pluralism and Equality, he argues that every society decides on the value of a social good and therefore should distribute those good according to the meanings they have. The social goods (healthcare, office, membership, money, politics, education) are divided into spheres each having their own distributive arguments. Walzer’s acceptance of the pluralistic nature of human group and ideology leads to his argument of a complex equality, one that contrasts the ideas of equality explicit in Rawlsian Liberalism.
In the United States, the gap between the rich and the poor has been substantially increasing over the years. This growth between the rich and poor illustrates the wealth inequality between the social classes in our nation. Although it is impractical to precisely measure the morality of wealth inequality, we can use philosophical thought to determine what makes a political and economic system just. By analyzing the theories of political philosophers, Robert Nozick and John Rawls, it is clear that wealth inequality is morally justified, as long as equal opportunity and concern for justice among a society is provided under certain conditions.
It is clear that Inequality of Opportunity and Inequality of Income intersect, but the main difference between these types of inequality can be explained as follows: Income Inequality depends on the efforts of a person, his or her work, while Inequality of Opportunity depends on external circumstances that a person can not influence (Molinas). At present, two approaches to Inequality of Opportunity are distinguished. One of them is called meritocratic and believes that people who make the same choice and apply the same effort should receive the same feedback (Molinas). The second one is called egalitarian, and its main idea is that outcomes should not depend on indicators and be equal (Molinas). Roemer actively developed this theory (Molinas). According to the scientist, there is no possibility to be sure that certain decisions made by a person were a consequence solely of her or his efforts, and not a consequence of errors and inequalities in the system. Following precisely this type of Inequality of Opportunity, one can expect that the respondents feel inequality in access and quality to education, the medical sphere, the labor market, living