Summary Of Evil And Omnipotence By J. L. Mackie

A CRITICAL ASSESSEMENT IN SUPPORT OF J. L. MACKIE’S ESSAY

‘EVIL AND OMNIPOTENCE’

By A. Chokroborty-Hoque

In the following paper, I will discuss ‘Evil and Omnipotence,’ an essay written by the Australian philosopher J.L. Mackie. First, I will summarize the core thesis of Mr. Mackie’s essay. I will then outline my reasons for endorsing his views by elaborating on some of the more salient points of his essay.

Mackie begins by informing the reader of the theist’s continued belief in God. While philosophers have criticized the traditional arguments for the existence of God, the theist attributes God’s existence to a non-rational explanation, beyond the reproach of reason.

Mackie proposes, in his opinion, a far more effective argument against the

existence of God, by confronting the theist with the traditional problem of evil. This problem is a direct attack on three core propositions held true by most theists, namely that, God is omnipotent, God is good and yet evil exists. If God is both omnipotent and good, the problem of evil is a logical conundrum because if any two of these propositions are true, the third proposition must be false. Mackie’s argument not only exposes the irrationality of religious beliefs but also the self-contradictory nature of theological doctrine.
Theists have put forward numerous solutions to the problem of evil. In his essay, Mackie points out a number of logical flaws in the unsuccessful attempts of the theists to adhere to each proposition both individually and collectively. For example, Mackie attempts to contextually qualify the terms ‘good,’ ‘evil,’ and ‘omnipotent.’ Good being opposed to evil eliminates it to the best of its limits and an omnipotent thing is limitless. Thus, a good, omnipotent thing eliminates evil completely. Hence the existence of a good and omnipotent thing, and evil are incompatible.
Mackie maintains that the problem of evil does not arise if the theist is willing to give up at least one of the three core propositions. However, theists have attempted to solve this problem surreptitiously by explicitly rejecting one of the propositions, only to covertly reassert it elsewhere in their arguments. One such example is when they restrict God’s omnipotence in certain cases but maintain it in others.
Mackie also points out the logical flaws in fallacious solutions, another class of potential arguments put forth by theists. Here, while all the core propositions are accepted, at least one of them is implicitly rejected in an ultimately illogical attempt to solve the problem of evil. Moreover, these solutions have unclear definitions about the terms good, evil, and omnipotence.
For example, when presented with the fallacious solution of ‘good cannot exist without evil’, one might enquire about the existence of evil in the first place.

Thus, if one is asking why evil at all exists, he or she automatically limits the omnipotence of God and thus God’s ability to do good. Mackie also considers the linguistic argument concerning good and evil, stressing that we give names to qualities only if they have real opposites. The qualitative nature of ‘good’ is linguistically necessary to differentiate itself from the qualitative nature of ‘evil,’ thereby confirming the existence of evil (as defined by theists). But, as Mackie points out, theists are unwilling to accept that the quantity of evil that exists in the world is calibrated at such a specific dose that it provides a necessary counter-point to the existence of

good.
Mackie also tackles the fallacious solution ‘evil is necessary as a means to good.’ In this case, theists are inadvertently restricting God’s powers, thereby denying the omnipotence of God or at the very least restricting the meaning of omnipotence. He exposes the weakness of this solution by putting it in the context of causal logic, which states that one cannot have a certain end without a certain means. If God has to introduce evil as a means to good, he himself must be subjected to causal laws, thereby negating his status as an omnipotent being.
Another fallacious solution forwarded by theists is the belief that the universe would be better with some evil in it that without it.

Specifically, physical evil such as pain and disease apparently exist, because it they forth in us the qualities of benevolence and sympathy. By accepting this solution one concludes that God not only, deliberately maintains pain and misery in order to encourage desirable qualities such as sympathy, but that God is more concerned with promoting sympathy and benevolence than with removing pain and disease. Mackie points to the many absurdities of this solution and the general unease with which some theists endorse

this.
Lastly, some theists ascribe the presence of evil to human freewill, pointing out that freewill is a freedom that has been granted to humans by God. Does this mean that, as Mackie highlights, God gives humans freewill in order for them to do more evil? If human freewill is really free, beyond the control of God, then he is not omnipotent. If God endows humans with freewill but chooses not to prevent humans from doing evil, then he is not good. Furthermore, Mackie focuses on the paradox of omnipotence that asks if an omnipotent being can make things that he or she cannot subsequently control. If yes, then God is not omnipotent, as he cannot control things once he has made them. If no, then once again, God is not omnipotent as he cannot do certain things.
Ultimately, I agree with Mackie’s conclusion that the problem of evil presents a logical conundrum for theists who infallibly believe in the three core propositions of their theological doctrine. Unless theists are willing to modify or do away with at least one of the three core propositions, they will forever struggle to explain the presence of evil when supposedly God is good and omnipotent.