Cause(s) of Accident The listed cause of the accident in the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (Presidential commision on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, 1986) as a failure of a joint in the right hand SRB (solid rocket booster) lower two sections. Specifically the O-Ring obliteration caused by hot gasses escaping from the joint. During the investigation focus was drawn to the assembly of the right hand SRB and possible damage from the handling and installation and it was further determined that the joint design was faulty and not damaged from the stacking process. Thiokol nor NASA accurately understood (even though discussed) the potential dangers due to the joint design. Despite the fact Thiokol acted prudently in notifying NASA of the warning signs, …show more content…
The main focus is the material and mechanical factors are in relation to temperature and the expansion and contraction properties. NASA stated that it is believed that the shuttle crew compartment remained relatively intact, until contact with the water, so the original break up was reportedly due to aerodynamic forces immediately following the explosion of the external tank and not something that could be tested for during design and certification phase. Contributing Factors The main contributing factor in the demise of STS 51-L were human factors and poor decision making on the part of Morton Thiokol and NASA management. I’ll touch on some of the more noted points that contributed to the launch mishap. To start, the NASA seemed to have a major push to demonstrate that its existence was justifiable and to validate that having a reusable spacecraft was in the best interest of the public. Secondly, during the launch of STS 51-L some of the highest known wind shear occurred for any of the preceding shuttle launches to date causing an increase in SRB flex which may have contributed to the joint
In a person’s lifetime, many things can happen including death. In 1986 seven individuals, Michael Smith, Dick Scobee, Judith Resnic, Ronald McNair, Ellison Onizuka, Gregory Jarvis, and Christa McAuliffe, lost their lives doing what they loved most. The tragedy of the shuttle challenger brought much pain to the nation that day. Along with the pain comes grieving. The nation grieved the loss of these seven wonderful individuals and hoped to find peace and comfort for the days to come. As Ronald Reagan prepared to give the state of the union address, things changed for worse, he unexpectedly had to give a speech on a horrific event. Reagan was devastated at the loss of the seven men and women that were on that space shuttle challenger.
Engineers and scientists began trying to find what went wrong almost right away. They studied the film of the take-off. When they studied the film, they noticed a small jet of flame coming from inside the casing for one of the rocket boosters. The flame got bigger and bigger. It started to touch a strut that connected the booster to the big fuel tank attached to the space shuttle. About two or three seconds later, hydrogen began leaking from the gigantic fuel tank. About seventy-two seconds after take-off, the hydrogen caught on fire and the booster swung around. That punctured the fuel tank, which caused a big explosion.
They’re where a lot of purposed recommendations from the commission to help ensure that any future shuttle missions would not experience the same catastrophic O-ring failure like the challenger shuttle. The first recommendation was to redesign the O-ring by improving “structural capability, seal redundancy, and thermal protection” (NASA, n/d). This change would also redesign the tang and clevis of the mating points of the rocket. The redesign not only used a third O-ring seal but also a newly redesigned “O-ring seals are designed to not leak under structural deflection of twice the expected values” (NASA, n/d)
Contextual analysis is made up of three basic components; intended audience, setting and most importantly purpose. Authors often times consider and work each contextual piece into the construction of their given argument. An argument is not powerful if audience preference is not a main concern, if the setting isn’t taken into consideration, or if the purpose is not relevant to the current situation. On January 28th, 1986 the shuttle challenger exploded 73 seconds into its take off. President Ronald Reagan wrote a critical speech to address the tragedy that had struck our nation that day. It is highly evident in his address that kept audience, setting, and purpose in mind. He comforts a worried public using calm tone and simple yet effective diction to convince the American nation that it’s necessary to go on and continue the space program and ultimately the scientific revolution.
As a result, pressure slowly started to leak out and the leading edge slats slowly started to retract. When the engine separated, the captain's control panel stopped working, which contained both of the slat disagreement systems. The destroyed hydraulic lines allowed the slats on the left wing to gradually retract, and the stall speed on the left wing rose considerably.
While some human errors can lead to accidental success, history has proven that human error comes down to lack of communication, not being observant, or not being cautious. Because when creating new technology such as NASA's Space Shuttle or the "unsinkable," the inventors fool themselves to believe that nothing can go wrong, when in most cases it's the complete opposite. Not listening to superiors and taking major warning signs into account, made them vulnerable to technological infallibility. Space Shuttle Challenger and the Titanic could have easily been avoided if people took warnings into account.
NASA has faced many tragedies during their time; but one can question if two of the tragedies were preventable by changing some critical decisions made by the organization. The investigation board looking at the decisions made for the space shuttle tragedies of the Columbia and Challenger noted that the “loss resulted as much from organizational as from technical failures” (Bolman & Deal, 2008, p. 191). The two space shuttle tragedies were about twenty years apart, they both had technical failures but politics also played a factor in to these two tragedies.
The disaster that took place on the Ocean Ranger had a very large effect on the way Newfoundlander's feel about the gas and oil industry. The government examined the safety issues that led to this disaster and has implemented numerous changes to enhance the safety of the offshore workforce. The Newfoundland and Canadian government set up a combined royal commission to investigate the disaster of the Ocean Ranger and to provide recommendations to improve safety. Two years after the disaster, the royal commission on the Ocean Ranger disaster concluded that the deaths resulted not only from the storm and flaws in the rig's design, but also from a lack of human knowledge.
Even though there were many factors contributing to the Challenger disaster, the most important issue was the lack of an effective risk management plan. The factors leading to the Challenger disaster are:
The Challenger disaster of 1986 was a shock felt around the country. During liftoff, the shuttle exploded, creating a fireball in the sky. The seven astronauts on board were killed and the shuttle was obliterated. Immediately after the catastrophe, blame was spread to various people who were in charge of creating the shuttle and the parts of the shuttle itself. The Presidential Commission was decisive in blaming the disaster on a faulty O-ring, used to connect the pieces of the craft. On the other hand, Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, in The Golem at Large, believe that blame cannot be isolated to any person or reason of failure. The authors prove that there are too many factors to decide concretely as to why the Challenger exploded. Collins and Pinch do believe that it was the organizational culture of NASA and Morton Thiokol that allowed the disaster. While NASA and Thiokol were deciding whether to launch, there was not a concrete reason to postpone the mission.
After the accident, a full-scale investigation was launched by the United States National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). It concluded that the accident was caused by metal fatigue exacerbated by crevice corrosion, the corrosion is exacerbated by the salt water and the age of the aircraft was already 19 years old as the plane operated in a salt water environment.
Rodney Rocha is a NASA engineer and co-chair of Debris Assessment Team (DTS). When possibility of wing damage appeared he requested an additional imagery to obtain more information in order to evaluate the damage. This demonstrates that he actually tried to resolve the issue. However, due to absence of clear organizational responsibilities in NASA those images were never received. Since foam issue was there for years and risk for the flights was estimated as low management decided not to proceed with this request. After learning of management decision Rocha wrote an e-mail there he stated that foam damage could carry grave hazard and have to be addressed. At the same time this e-mail was not send to the management team. Organizational culture at NASA could be described as highly bureaucratic with operations under standard procedures only. Low-end employees like Rocha are afraid to bring any safety-related issues to the management due to delay of the mission. They can be punished for bringing “bad news”. This type of relationship makes it impossible for two-way communication between engineers and managers, which are crucial for decision-making in complex env...
A few weeks after the explosion, investigations began. First to explore the tragic scene was the United Stats Naval Court of Inquiry, located in Key West. They discovered that a naval mine caused the explosion. Researchers, Del Peral and De Salas conducted another investigation the same year and collected information given to them by surviving...
At 11pm on the 16 January 1943, the 152m long T2 tanker 'Schenectady' broke in two amidships while lying at the outfitting dock in the constructor's yard in Portland, Oregon, USA. The temperature of the harbor water was about 4°C and the conditions were still. The air temperature was approximately -3°C and the winds were light. The failure was sudden and accompanied by a report that was heard a mile away. The fracture extended through the deck, the sides of the hull, the longitudinal bulkheads and the bottom girders.
The pilots may not have immediately detected the air turbine starter valve (ATSV) - Open light illumination because of its location, static appearance, and color. Once they detected the light, the pilots did not immediately respond to it because an open ATSV was considered an abnormal situation that did not require immediate action. 5. The pilots failed to properly allocate tasks, including checklist execution and radio communications, and they did not effectively manage their workload; adversely affecting their ability to conduct essential cockpit tasks, such as completing appropriate