Sir Karl Popper's Falsifiability Claim
Popper's claim that "the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability" (Klemke, 1988) may be viewed as an observation of, rather than a complete departure from, earlier criteria for science. Klemke states in his introduction to part one (p. 16) that defining science (or the scientific method) has traditionally consisted of utilizing seven criteria that must be met in a specific order. Criteria number (5) and (6) refer to deduction rather than induction, and will negate criterion (4) if not met. Specifically, if one is unable to "deduce other statements from these", or one is unable to "verify those statements by further observations", it is not science. Therefore, the difference between Popper's claim and earlier theories of what constitutes science may be in definition.
Popper himself states (Klemke, 1988, p.27) that observations are interpretations relative to the theory one wishes to support (or refute). One must define one's terms so that the theory itself is clear and open to rebuttal or verification. Perhaps the conflict between the earlier criteria for science and Popper's criterion is one of clarity, not theory.
Although traditional theory on what science consists of is viewed as inductive, it appears that at least some of the criteria are, in fact, deductive. Criterion (5) explicitly refers to deduction, and criterion (6) refers to verification of said deduction(s). It would seem that Popper's conflict with accepted theory may be relative to traditional criteria (1)- "making observations as accurate and definite as possible." If one approaches the criteria for science previously regarded to be inductive as deductive (since it is not science without all seven criteria being met), perhaps Popper's own claim (that in order to be scientific a claim must be falsifiable) is a test of the previous theory.
Accordingly, if one approaches Popper's claim as an attempt to falsify the previous theory of the criteria for science, one may address his theory somewhat differently. In Popper's own words (Klemke, p.27), " ... we may reject a law or theory on the basis of new evidence without necessarily discarding the old evidence which originally led us to accept it.". Popper rejects induction as the method of science and offers an alternative method - deduction. Using Popper's falsifiability criterion, the common theory of science as inductive has been rebutted. Popper's observation and testing of induction as a criterion for science has suggested a new criterion.
Any hypothesis, Gould says, begins with the collection of facts. In this early stage of a theory development bad science leads nowhere, since it contains either little or contradicting evidence. On the other hand, Gould suggests, testable proposals are accepted temporarily, furthermore, new collected facts confirm a hypothesis. That is how good science works. It is self-correcting and self-developing with the flow of time: new information improves a good theory and makes it more precise. Finally, good hypotheses create logical relations to other subjects and contribute to their expansion.
One of a few problems that hypothetico-deductivists would find in Chalmers statement is contained in the phrase, “Scientific theories in some rigorous way from the facts of experience acquired by the observation and experiment.’’ Theories are never produced strictly, Popper would say, but firstly crafted through the thought and feeling of a scientist in their given field. This then discards the idea that theories are the result of facts and it then forwards the idea that a theory will be manipulated by individual people as they are no more than a personal concept with reason. Furthermore if theories were derived meticulously from the facts the implication would then be made that the theory is virtually perfect. Yet these theories that are disproven all the time through falsifying this then demonstrates that these theories are not just part of a scientists thoughts but also that falsification is a more precise form of proof and justification than that of induction.
...is only really problematic when an unpalatable and unattainable definition of “reasonable” is used. I have shown that Black provides a good start to the problem, but that his solution is ultimately unconvincing to skeptics of induction. And I’ve attempted to address the problem that Salmon brings up; that is, I’ve attempted to show that it is improper and non-valuable to try to provide reasons for induction. My conclusion, then, is that as long as being reasonable is something that is possible to be, humans are, in fact, reasonable.
The unificationist account of explanation and the notion of ad hoc-ness as posited by Popper are very similar concepts, but there is a nuance between the two that is worth explaining. Although both notions seem to show why we choose certain explanatory theories over others, they differ in that the model of unification shows us what type of theory we should accept, while Popper’s notion of ad hoc-ness shows us what type of theory to reject. Together, these concepts help us better understand the explanatory model of unification which leads us to a better understanding of why we are inclined to accept certain scientific theories over others. In this paper, I will attempt to show that falsifying theories based on Popper’s ad hoc-ness criteria strengthens the idea of unification by giving people a more specific way of eliminating competing scientific theories in search of the most unified one. First, I will briefly describe the unificationist account of explanation, then I will explain the idea of ad hoc-ness as laid out by Popper, and finally I will show how ad hoc-ness can be used to strengthen the account of unification by means of increasing its objectivity and by providing simpler explanations.
The authority of the theory of evolution can be characterized by defining what qualifies as a scientific theory. Although there are several perspectives regarding what science is, they are based on the same premises. Karl Popper, a philosopher of science, claims that the process of “conjectures and refutations” is the method of science (46). In this process, a
Messenger, E., Gooch, J., & Seyler, D. U. (2011). Arguing About Science. Argument! (pp. 396-398). New York, NY: Mcgraw-Hill Co..
Such problem, according to David Papineau, holds no grounds given the doctrines of reliabilism. Reliabilism is an externalist account of knowledge, which defines knowledge as true belief caused by a reliable process. Papineau maintains that reliabilism offers a viable solution to the problem of induction, but concedes...
Since the mid-20th century, a central debate in the philosophy of science is the role of epistemic values when evaluating its bearing in scientific reasoning and method. In 1953, Richard Rudner published an influential article whose principal argument and title were “The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments” (Rudner 1-6). Rudner proposed that non-epistemic values are characteristically required when making inductive assertions on the rationalization of scientific hypotheses. This paper aims to explore Rudner’s arguments and Isaac Levi’s critique on his claims. Through objections to Levi’s dispute for value free ideal and highlighting the importance of non-epistemic values within the tenets and model development and in science and engineering,
In addition to logical consistency, testability is an important piece when evaluating a theory. According to Akers & Sellers (2013), “a theory must be testable by objective, repeatable evidence” (p.5); thus, if the theory is not testable then it has no scientific value. There are several reasons why a theory might not be testable; such as its concepts may not be observable or reportable events and tautology. Tautology refers to a statement or hypothesis that is tr...
The Chalmers's view against the Popperian hypothetico-deductive. Popper mentioned that people shouldn't concentrate our hopes on an unacceptable principle of induction.Also, he claimed that without relying on induction we still can work out how science works and why it is rational.1 Hence, I would like to said Popper would disagree with Chalmer's opinion. Also, I think Popperian might say Chalmers is wrong because his falsifiable in Popperian sense. Chalmers might be falsified if scientific knowledge is observed not reliable due to some experiment and observation might contain mistakes and we do not find them now. Furthermore, the Popperian might argue that science can not be prove but can justify the better theories or laws.1 We can justify which scientific laws or theories are better ones as there is falsified is found, or not scientific. When they are found falsified or not scientific, we can seek for novel bold hypot...
The following essay will discuss falsification, as discussed by Karl Popper, as well has his account of the scientific method. The idea whether any scientific theory can truly be falsified will also be approached by looking at the problems presented by Popper’s theory of falsification, and the impact this has on the scientific method and science as a whole.
In conclusion, if we attempt to characterize good vs. bad inductive arguments, every parameter chosen will be exhausted and ultimately found to be arbitrary. We must consider inductive logic to be something relative and I feel I have found a context that makes it universal at least for its practical uses. As far as science is concerned, when we view efficacy in terms of application, the inductive method has been proven empirically to be robust and is thus welcomed by society.
Science must be tested by the natural world, but what if the testing doesn’t prove anything? Some people believe that gaps in evidence disprove things. One of the prime factors that proves evolution is fossils. It can show us where we’ve come from, where other species have come from and so on. Some people believe that if there are breaks in the fossil records that means that evolution is disproved.
To consider a theory as truthful, it must be convincing which means the theory must stand the challenges that may occur such as persuading people for it being true, without any questioning about its value. Every individual will be convinced in a different type of way on different levels. For example, when one considers the large influence of media on our society today, some may think the news is as accurate as possible, and think every thing that is said must definitely be true. Only very basic descriptions and explanations may be required to convince someone that something is true or not. For others, detailed explanations with supporting facts may have to be provided, for them to believe what they hear, even if the theory is completely accurate. Another factor that is relevant is whether the individual is influenced by their subconscious tend or their intuition, this means whether they want to believe in the theory or not. Emotional bases and using reasoning are another two factors that may influence our beliefs. When looking at natural science, emotion does not play a large role, but rather reasoning because natural science is based on facts rather than individual interpretatio...
The major strength of science is that it has uncertainty and skepticism. Science never claims to be hundred percent accurate. There is always some degree of ambiguity and probability in science. The Heisenberg’s uncertainty in quantum mechanics is a good example of this. According to the Heisenberg’s uncertainty, we can never be sure of the position of the quantum particles. There is always a degree of fuzziness in nature and a fundamental limit to what we can understand about these particles and their behavior. We can only calculate the probability of the nature of the particle and ho...