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Hume induction essay
David hume theory of induction
Hume induction essay
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Does reliabilism offer a viable solution to the problem of induction? For the purpose of this paper I will refine the problem of induction to enumerative cases of induction. I shall explore whether reliabilism is a successful theory of knowledge, and propose that it is a viable solution to the problem of induction proposed by David Hume, but requires ad hoc amendments in attempt to satisfy the New Riddle of Induction put forth by Nelson Goodman. The problem of induction, most notably attached to Hume, is the philosophical question of whether inductive reasoning leads to knowledge, in which Hume concluded that inductive inferences from observed instances to a general conclusion can never yield knowledge. Traditional philosophical epistemology assumes that knowledge requires certainty. Given such stipulations, inductive inference would have to guarantee complete certainty to warrant it being knowledge. Hence, because universal generalisations (all Fs are Gs) apply to indefinitely many instances, but we can only observe finitely many instances; no number of observations can entail that universal generalisations are necessarily true (there may possibly be a case where an F isn’t a G). Thus, it is logically possible that the premises (every rose I have ever seen is red) be true but the inferred conclusion (all roses are red) be false; accordingly, inductive inference is logically invalid and cannot yield knowledge. Such problem, according to David Papineau, holds no grounds given the doctrines of reliabilism. Reliabilism is an externalist account of knowledge, which defines knowledge as true belief caused by a reliable process. Papineau maintains that reliabilism offers a viable solution to the problem of induction, but concedes... ... middle of paper ... ...regard certainty in the actual world. Subsequently all statements and claims, inductively inferred, are approximate, as opposed to being explicitly true. Reliabilism puts forward a viable solution to the traditional problem of induction proposed by Hume, showing that despite enumerative induction being logically invalid, it can convincingly yield knowledge. Similarly, it can be shown the circularity involved in establishing inductive inference does not trivially guarantee its conclusion, unlike premise circularity. Nevertheless, Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction poses serious threat to what reliabilism can actually state as knowledge. If the reliabilist is willing to concede that inductive inferences are beliefs of less than full degree, they are faced with conceding that only deductive inferences and analytical truths yield certain knowledge in the actual world.
The first premise is: “All ravens are black.” This premise is a hypothesis that takes a general form -- “all Fs are G”. The hypothesis “All ravens are black” is logically equivalent to the hypothesis “All non-black things are non-ravens.” Logical equivalence can be defined as: “P being logically equivalent to Q,” which means that P and Q are true or false in all the same situations and that each one is a valid argument for the other. In any instance, anything that confirms one confirms the other. Confirmation Theory of Instance says if while testing a hypothesis in the form “All Fs are G”, a particular F (for some instance) is discovered to also be G, then this evidence is enough (at least to some degree) to favor the hypothesis.
...ion. Hempel’s solution provides to give a reason as to how induction can lead to confirmation and how the logical gap can be filled through the use of logically equivalent statements. However, his view and answer to the paradox prove to be a stretch and lead to the issue of common sense being broken and illogical observations being made to confirm the hypothesis. Good successfully brings attention to this rather blatant error on the part of Hempel to eventually lead to the Raven paradox being invalid. Not only is Good effective in highlighting errors within Hempel’s solution, but Popper, Scheffler, and Goodman are all equally successful in negating individual parts of Hempel’s argument as well. In the end, it is the addition of all these counterarguments that prove to exhibit that Hempel is unsuccessful in trying to come up with a valid answer to the raven paradox.
The “grue paradox” presented by Nelson Goodman raises challenges for induction and makes us wonder why we make judgments and favor one hypothesis more than another. The “green” hypothesis is more compelling than the “grue” one in that “grue” is subject to changes in many circumstances.
In his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, David Hume attempts to uncover the ultimate truth about where our knowledge comes from. This leads him to suggest that all our ideas and knowledge arise from outward experiences and sensations. He attempts to prove this by solving the "problem of induction." I disagree with Hume's ideas, and in this essay I will explain why. I shall begin by explaining the problem of induction, and the sceptical doubts Hume raises concerning the inductive process. I will then explain how Hume solves the problem. Finally, I will conclude by offering a critique of Hume's doctrine, and explain why I find it to be inconsistent.
This paper purports to re-examine the Lucas-Penrose argument against Artificial Intelligence in the light of Complexity Theory. Arguments against strong AI based on some philosophical consequences derived from an interpretation of Gödel's proof have been around for many years since their initial formulation by Lucas (1961) and their recent revival by Penrose (1989,1994). For one thing, Penrose is right in sustaining that mental activity cannot be modeled as a Turing Machine. However, such a view does not have to follow from the uncomputable nature of some human cognitive capabilities such as mathematical intuition. In what follows I intend to show that even if mathematical intuition were mechanizable (as part of a conception of mental activity understood as the realization of an algorithm) the Turing Machine model of the human mind becomes self-refuting.
Induction is a form of reasoning where humans use past experiences to make future predictions.
The application of epistemology to practical life relies largely on a coherent set of parameters that determine whether someone has knowledge or not. While a traditional analysis at first glance seems to provide these parameters, this definition allows for cases to be considered knowledge though they are actually contrary to an intuitive definition of knowledge. In this paper, I will outline the traditional analysis of knowledge, present Gettier and Harman’s objections, analyze Harman’s proposed solutions in principles P and Q; and critique the necessity and consequences of Principle Q.
In this paper I will argue that Roderick Chisholm gives a correct solution to the problem of the criterion. The philosophical problem with criterion is that we cannot know the extent of knowledge without knowing criteria, and vice versa. Chisholm approaches the problem of criterion by saying that in order to know whether things are as they seem to be we must have a procedure for recognizing things that are true from things that are false. He then states that to know if the procedure is a good one, we have to know if it really recognizes things that are true from things that are false. From that we cannot know whether it really does succeed unless we already know what things are true and what things are false. His two questions are more easily comprehended by asking what do we know, and how do we know that. He believes in the idea of particularism, this means that he thinks that paricularists have the answer the first question therefore giving them access to determine the answer to the second question. Chusholm’s main point is to be able to answer the question “What is the proper method for deciding which are the good beliefs and which are the bad ones— which beliefs are genuine cases of knowledge and which beliefs are not?” (3).
The true-justified-belief theory of knowledge is an attempt to subject knowledge to analysis. The theory falls under the category of Epistemology, a branch of philosophy dealing with knowledge. The theory, in short, seeks to answer the question, what does it mean to know something? What parts lead up to a point, when someone can claim to have knowledge of something? The true-justified-belief theory of knowledge or “JTB” has three such components seeking to answer the aforementioned questions. The three components make up the theory’s analysis of knowledge. The analysis claims to demonstrate that in order to have sufficiency for knowledge, there must be a necessary justified, true belief.
(2) Goldman, Alvin. "Reliabilism." Stanford University. Stanford University, 21 Apr. 2008. Web. 28 Feb. 2014.
Knowledge can be achieved either through the justification of a true belief or for the substantive externalist, through a “natural or law like connection between the truth of what is believed and the person’s belief” (P.135). Suppose a man named George was implanted with a chip at birth, which causes him to utter the time in a rare Russian dialect. His girlfriend Irina, who happens to speak the same Russian dialect, realizes that every time she taps his shoulder, he tells her the time and he is always right. She knows that he is right because she checks her watch. Because she thinks this is cute, she never tells him what it is that he is saying. One day, Irina’s watch breaks but instead of getting it fixed, she just taps George on the shoulder whenever she needs to ask for the time.
The problem of induction has a close relation with the inductive reasoning and such expression as “a posteriori”. There are two distinct methods of reasoning: deductive and inductive approaches. A deductive argument is the truth preserving in which if the premises are true than it follows that the conclusion will be true too. The deductive reasoning goes from the general to the specific things. On the other hand, an inductive argument is an argument that may contain true premises and still has a false conclusion. Induction or the inductive reasoning is the form of reasoning in which we make a conclusion about future experience or about presence based on the past experience. The problem of induction also has a connection with the expressions as “a priori” and “a posteriori”. The truth in a priori statement is embedded in the statement itself, and the truth is considered to be as common knowledge or justification without the need to experience. Whereas, in order to determine if a pos...
In summary he remarks that the ground of knowledge is a demonstrative syllogism and the ground of that syllogism is premises so we must know (be convinced of) the primary premises better than the conclusion. Nothing can be better known to a man who seeks knowledge through demonstration than the basic truths.
In the first Gettier counterexample, Smith is justified in believing that Jones is the man who will get the job. Smith’s also justified in believing that Jones has ten coins in his pocket. From that he infers and has a justified belief that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. It turns out that the man who gets the job is not Jones but Smith, and Smith does in fact have ten coins in his pocket. Smith has a justified true belief that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. However, this shouldn’t count as knowledge.
In answering the above question I would firstly clarify it 's meaning or my interpretation of it. My argument is not based on the question of whether induction itself is rational, as in is it a logical process. The answer to that question is no, however can it be rationally justified? in other words can a rational argument be made to justify its use in relation to acquiring knowledge I will argue that yes it can. Furthermore I will argue that this is indeed what Hume meant when he made the distinction between applying induction as an agent and logically critiquing induction from the perspective of the philosopher. I will begin by explaining induction and deduction, how both methods of inference are applied by humankind and within nature and what separates them. From there I will underline the issues when attempting to justify induction and present my argument as to why it can be rationally justified. In doing so I will show how Hume 's critical assessment of induction, whilst presenting its shortcomings, also acknowledges its unavoidable function.