Intuitively, a first person perspective is used to resolve a disagreement by allowing one to remain steadfast about their position. In his paper, Not Just a Truthometer: Taking Oneself Seriously (but not too seriously) in Cases of Peer Disagreement, Enoch describes that a first person perspective allows one to be steadfast, in the face of peer disagreement, because the perspective is ineliminable. He argues that the significance in the role of the first person perspective is its ineliminability, or being not-merely-a-truthometer. Enoch’s not-merely-a-truthometer strategy fails to provide a significant role for the first-person perspective in the epistemology of disagreement. Enoch accepts that his strategy is vulnerable to the problem of bootstrapping, but remains confident that it can avoid skepticism. I will argue that if Enoch accepts bootstrapping then he cannot avoid general skepticism because it leads to the problem of easy knowledge. Furthermore, if Enoch rejects bootstrapping because it is uninteresting and remains confident in his strategy, he will have to accept easy knowledge and reliabilism, which weakens his strategy altogether. To conclude I will propose that, when it comes to resolution, the first person perspective does not play a significant role in disagreement.
Firstly, Enoch specifies that he is arguing for what we should do in the face of disagreement with a peer, rather than what we actually do (Enoch, Pg. 955). Second, the types of disagreements he is focusing on are ones that are simply epistemological, or that occur when we cannot turn to metaphysical “non-factualisms” or relativism for resolution (Enoch, Pg. 955). Third, he is speaking of degrees of belief rather than all or nothing beliefs (Enoch, pg....
... middle of paper ...
... avoid unjustified beliefs. Second, like the equal weight view claims, a first person perspective does not give an argument asymmetry. Finally, the first person perspective as a role in disagreement is more inspective than detective. It can be used to show aspects such as peer hood and reliability, but it cannot deduce from these “inspections” that one’s view has more weight than their opponents because those deductions are unjustified.
References
(1) Enoch, David. "Not Just a Truthometer: Taking Oneself Seriously (but Not Too Seriously) in Cases of Peer Disagreement." Thesis. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2010. Mind 19 (2010): 953-97. Web.
(2) Goldman, Alvin. "Reliabilism." Stanford University. Stanford University, 21 Apr. 2008. Web. 28 Feb. 2014.
(3) Lammenranta, Markus. "Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy." Epistemic Circularity N.d. Web. Feb. 2014.
The chapter I will be summarizing is Chapter 23 from the Advanced Agreement section of “Thank you for Arguing” by Jay Heinrichs. In this chapter, the author focuses on describing Cicero’s five cannons of persuasion: invention, arrangement, style, memory and delivery. He explains that these were purposely placed in this logical order because, “First, invent what you intend to say. Then decide what order you want to say it in; determine how you’ll style it to suit your particular audience; put it all down in your brain or on your computer; and finally get up and wow your audience.” Throughout the whole chapter, he in detail, describes how to structure and write a persuasive speech using these cannons of persuasion. The first cannon of persuasion
Ansary draws multifariously from sources to corroborate his argument. For illustration, Ansary utilizes hadith to prove his points. Furthermore, Ansary admits that hadith may not be dependable, but Ansary focuses on that they demonstrate the quintessence of an attitude present in the masses. Normally...
...that what they believe might not be correct, it is what they believe but others do not have to believe that they are right.
C. Stephen Evans is stating there is a problem with the philosophy of religion having a neutral stance. Evans rejects both fideism as well as neutralism, and believes that by trying to have a, “neutral, disinterested posture,” a person could, “cut themselves off from the possibility of even understanding what religion is all about,” (Evans, 1985 p. 115). Evans notes that the view of faith and reason, by some religious believers think it is an impossibility to have “rational reflection” on religion. After his arguments that disprove many ideas in both fideism and neutralism, he proposes an alternative solution which he has named, “critical dialog”, that he hopes will, “preserve the strengths and eliminate the weaknesses of the initial theories,” (p. 115). “Correct thinking about religion is rather a genuine faith, a personal commitment,” (p. 116).
(1) Schafer, Karl. "Assessor Relativism and the Problem of Moral Disagreement." The Southern Journal of Philosophy 50.4 (2012): 602-20. Web.
... of the Christian faith front and center by uniting two camps of believers in one reading; a starting point. As illustrated by the authors, “Though we have not, of course, reached agreement, we are satisfied that we have eliminated misunderstandings, that is, that neither of us has misrepresented the other. We offer the result to the reader as a celebration of shared friendship, faith, and scholarship” (xi).
1. Conflicting views improve one’s moral reasoning, critical thinking, and mental dexterity, but difficult to accept because of their context and one’s cognitive dissonance (Dalton, Week 5).
...hal. Detroit: Greenhaven Press, 2009. Opposing Viewpoints. Rpt. from "Called to Love: Christian Witness Can Be the Best Response to Atheist Polemics." America 198 (2008): 23. Opposing Viewpoints in Context. Web. 8 Dec. 2013.
But because a man is not permitted without censure to follow his own thoughts in the search of truth, when they lead him ever so little out of the common road, I shall set down the reasons that made me doubt of the truth of that opinion, as an excuse for my mistake, if I be in one; which I leave to be considered by those who, with me, dispose themselves to embrace truth wherever they find it.
In this particular case, or any other cases that may occur in the future, further research can be accomplished by identifying the boundaries for each argument. Sometimes the issues are so closely related that the solution becomes difficult to distinguish. Other times, evaluating the opinions of others helps to gain a broad consensus of what the majority desires. With this further research, there could be a better understanding of individual’s opposing thoughts, which could help establish a common ground and a solution to different cases.
A good example of somebody having a certain perspective on a situation is Legolas and Gimli
Alcoff discusses whether social identity is relevant to epistemic assessment, but does not evaluate under what conditions social identity is relevant in. I wish to assess Alcoff’s issue regarding social identity in terms of testimony specifically as a source of knowledge, as well as lay out some criteria that are necessary for epistemic credibility. I will do this while discussing why the reductionist view is faulty because it allows for bias from the hearer when in reality, reliability of knowledge from a person who is in a minority group should not be diminished due to their social identity. Instead, I want to research the balance of power that is granted towards both hearer and speaker when the speaker is testifying.When testimony as a source of knowledge is applied to the daily life, I believe the credibility of the speaker is reduced when the speaker is in a marginalized group. What conditions must be met by both parties for justified belief to be imparted in a social context? My aim is that the final product answers all of these
There are many arguments for moral realism, one of which is presented by David Enoch, who posits a unique explanation of how normative truths can exist. He argues for moral realism by using his Indispensability Argument, which explains the necessity of normative facts in deliberation. I will argue that Enoch’s claim is valid in that it fairs well against opposition, however it shows weakness by not addressing moral subjectivity.
James, William. "Pragmatism." Columbia University, New York. January 1907. Lecture. Web. 24 Feb 2012.< http://www.authorama.com/book/pragmatism.html>
Judd, Daniel K. Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Controversial Issues in Religion (Taking Sides: Religion). New York: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2002.