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Universalism and particularism
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In this paper I will argue that Roderick Chisholm gives a correct solution to the problem of the criterion. The philosophical problem with criterion is that we cannot know the extent of knowledge without knowing criteria, and vice versa. Chisholm approaches the problem of criterion by saying that in order to know whether things are as they seem to be we must have a procedure for recognizing things that are true from things that are false. He then states that to know if the procedure is a good one, we have to know if it really recognizes things that are true from things that are false. From that we cannot know whether it really does succeed unless we already know what things are true and what things are false. His two questions are more easily comprehended by asking what do we know, and how do we know that. He believes in the idea of particularism, this means that he thinks that paricularists have the answer the first question therefore giving them access to determine the answer to the second question. Chusholm’s main point is to be able to answer the question “What is the proper method for deciding which are the good beliefs and which are the bad ones— which beliefs are genuine cases of knowledge and which beliefs are not?” (3).
Particularism can be scrutinized for having many objections. Philosopher’s struggle to recognize that we can deal with the problem only by asking the question. If philosophers recognize this then is easy for us to pretend it isn’t true. To understand this more clearly if you think about the second question alone “how do we know?”. The way that someone knows “how” he or she know is by using what he or she know to help guide them. Another objection to begs the question of “ how can we relate what is known ...
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...uestions then there would not be in the position to be confident that an proposed criterion of knowledge was correct. Chisholm advocates particularism because he believes that, unless one knows to begin with what ought to count as an instance of knowledge; any choice of a criterion is ungrounded and thus arbitrary.
In conclusion, I have given the details to Roderick Chisholms article entitled The Problem of the Criterion, in which he philosophizes possible solutions to the question itself. He posses two questions that he believes criterion is based on. Chusholms is a particularist, he believes he has the answer to what we know, and by having that answer he can determine how we know it. I objected his theory because I don’t think you can logically connect the two. I end on Chisholms ability to advocate for particularize as a solution to the problem of the criterion.
As we delve deeper into the Philosophical understanding of William Clifford and Blaise Pascal we gain a new understanding of evidentialism and non-evidentialism. Having studied both Pascal and Clifford I lean more with Pascal and his thoughts and teachings that you do not need to have evidence to believe in a higher power. This paper will continue to give more examples of Pascals teachings of non-evidentialism and why I agree with them.
In Compatibilist Response in the article Problems from Philosophy by James Rachels, he examines the topic
John Greco in, The Nature of Ability and the Purpose of Knowledge, argues that, “...knowledge is a true belief grounded in intellectual ability” (Greco 1). Now, this is categorically a 'virtue reliabilist' or more specifically, an 'agent reliabilist' claim. The purpose of this paper to analyze Greco's virtue reliablism. Moreover, to articulate one strong objection to Greco's view and to argue that Greco's defense of virtue reliablism fails. Specifically, the argument will be made that the newly instantiated 'Sea Race Objection' example effectively refutes Greco's version of virtue reliablism.
Rationalists would claim that knowledge comes from reason or ideas, while empiricists would answer that knowledge is derived from the senses or impressions. The difference between these two philosophical schools of thought, with respect to the distinction between ideas and impressions, can be examined in order to determine how these schools determine the source of knowledge. The distinguishing factor that determines the perspective on the foundation of knowledge is the concept of the divine.
American Philosophical Quarterly 21, no. 3 (1984): 227-36.
ABSTRACT: The attempt to hold both anti-individualism and privileged self-knowledge may have the absurd consequence that someone could know a priori propositions that are knowable only empirically. This would be so if such an attempt entailed that one could know a priori both the contents of one’s own thoughts and the anti-individualistic entailments from those thought-contents to the world. For then one could also come to know a priori (by simple deduction) the empirical conditions entailed by one’s thoughts. But I argue that there is no construal of a priori knowledge that could be used to raise an incompatibility problem of this sort. First, I suggest that the incompatibilist a priori must be a stipulative one, since in none of the main philosophical traditions does knowledge of the contents of one’s thoughts count as a priori. Then, I show that under various possible construals of a priori, the incompatibilist argument would be invalid: either a fallacy of equivocation or an argument without a plausible closure principle guaranteeing transmission of epistemic status from premises to conclusion. Finally, I maintain that the only possible construal of the property of being knowable a priori that avoids invalidity is one that fails to generate the intended reductio.
...omprehensible knowledge of a particular sort. After derisively comparing those believers in sense-certainty's capabilities of Knowledge to animals and Eleusinian devotees, Hegel returns to his theme of Knowledge as communication through language, insisting that to make a claim about the knowledge contained in sense-certainty is: "not to know what one is saying, to be unaware that one is saying the opposite of what one wants to say" (Hegel, 109). Left with the thingness or being of sense-certainty as an undifferentiated, universal and unintelligible generality, Hegel concludes by abandoning sense-certainty in its own right and moving on to the next level of complexity, namely perception, or thingness as understood the properties that define it.
This paper will dispute that scientific beliefs are not the right way to accept a belief and it will question if we should let one accept their rights to their own beliefs. In Williams James article Will to Believe, we accept his perspective on how we set and fix our beliefs. This paper will first outline his overview on the argument that someone does not choose their belief but rather one just has them. Following, it will outline my perspective on how we set our beliefs and agreement with purse. Then it will explain how other methodologies such as science cannot conclude to one’s true beliefs. Science has been seen as a way to perceive life and taken to consideration as the truth. This paper should conclude that humans define ourselves by
In the selection, ‘Skeptical doubts concerning the operations of the understanding’, David Hume poses a problem for knowledge about the world. This question is related to the problem of induction. David Hume was one of the first who decided to analyze this problem. He starts the selection by providing his form of dividing the human knowledge, and later discusses reasoning and its dependence on experience. Hume states that people believe that the future will resemble the past, but we have no evidence to support this belief. In this paper, I will clarify the forms of knowledge and reasoning and examine Hume’s problem of induction, which is a challenge to Justified True Belief account because we lack a justification for our beliefs.
After reviewing the skepticisms that arise from the standard philosophical approach, Davidson suggests that we need a theory that will accommodate all three models while making sense of their relationships among each other; anything else will leave us with the question: how can we know the world in three completely different ways? Davidson’s argument begins with an exploration of why the three kinds of knowledge are each in their own right necessary and irreducible to the other two forms. His argument is on the basis that we simply could not go on without knowledge of the mental states of others, or knowledge of our own mental states.
This essay is written to introduce the Russell’s Theory on Definite Description. The main content of this essay including: the definition of definite description, the puzzles concerning definite description, Russell’s Theory on Definite Description, how this theory solves the puzzles, Strawson’s objection to this theory, my evaluation on the convincingness of Strawson’s objection and my evaluation on the convincingness of Russell’s Theory of Definite Description.
Some of the objections, such as the ones made by Edmund Gettier, claim that three conditions are not nearly enough to justify a true belief, and that at the very least a fourth must be added. Gettier presents a very valid criticism of the JTB theory of knowledge, and his counter examples highlight flaws in the JTB theory that make it an inadequate theory of knowledge. Gettier claims takes an issue with the third part of the JTB theory, which states that proposition P must be true. Gettier makes the interesting observation that person S may very well be justified in believing in proposition P even if P is false
The argument that is used in the idea of skepticism has comparable and incompatible views given from Augustine and Al-Ghazali. Both monologues cover and explain the doubts one should have, due to the
Richard Brandt will agree that there are definitely faults in Firth’s Ideal Observer theory such as an Ideal Observer being absolutist, omniscient, omnipercipient, consistent, disinterested, and dispassionate. Brandt argues that there can be other multiple Ideal Observers who may disagree with the main Ideal Observer’s observation of “X is right.” Firth in response to Brandt has counter argued that “it seems to me that if I thought that I were an ideal observer, I should refuse to admit that someone who had conflicting moral experience was also an ideal observer: I should assume that one of us lacked complete knowledge, disinterestedness, or dispassionateness, and by hypothesis it would have to be the other person” (Firth 416). It seems that Firth is
Robinson, R. R. (1994). Some methodological approaches to the unexplained points. Philosophy 2B/3B (pp. 27-34). Melbourne: La Trobe University.