The Sensation-Brain Process Identity Theory

U.T. Place and J.J.C. Smart defend the view that a sensation state is a type of brain process. The ‘Sensation-Brain Process Identity Theory’ states: For any type of sensation state S, there is a type of brain state B such that: S = B. For Place, conscious experience is nothing but a brain process. Place and Smart argue against the view that acceptance of inner processes entails dualism (Place 44). Instead they hold conscious qualities can effectively be reduced to physical processes which are conscious states. A sensation state is an inner process. Inner processes according to Place and Smart are nothing ‘over and above’ brain processes. Under their view, the experience one has when tasting vanilla is the same thing as the object undergoing

The change in physical states is what we are reporting on when we talk about sensation states. The thing we refer to when describing our sensation states is identical to the thing we refer to when talking about types of brain processes. Though we describe the same object with different modes of presentation (introspective and Scientific) the thing(s) we are referring to are really one and the same. The same component is being referred to when talking about a type of brain process or the sensation state. This thesis claims that “in so far as a sensation statement is a report of something, that something is in fact a brain

Mary’s case has been popularized more so I will focus on her. Mary is a brilliant neuroscientist who, we suppose, knows all the physical facts concerning color vision. Additionally Mary has yet to have been exposed to color. She is instead forced to explore the world from a black and white room. Despite Mary’s knowledge of all of her physical facts, she is, until her release from the black and white room effectively colorblind. Upon her release Mary views red for the first. It is accepted by most that Mary will learn something when viewing color for the first time. Mainly what she learns is what it is like to view red. This being the case Jackson concludes the physicalist picture is inconsistent. First she had all the physical facts. Second she had deficit of experience. Lastly the argument concludes Mary’s previous knowledge was incomplete. If there is more than physical facts for Mary to learn Physicalism is false (Jackson