Schopenhauer's Criticism of Kant's Analysis of Object

Schopenhauer's Criticism of Kant's Analysis of Object

Schopenhauer makes it clear that he is indebted to Kant for his vision of transcendental idealism, and that his Critique of Pure Reason [2] is a work of genius. However, Schopenhauer argued that Kant made many mistakes when formulating his philosophy, and he set about the task of uncovering them in his Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy, an appendix to be found in The World as Will and Representation [1]. In this essay I wish to analyse the criticism made against Kant's determination of an object, since this is an important factor if we are to comprehend how we understand reality.

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason [2] is notoriously difficult to read and often unclear. Possibly, this is because Kant was in a hurry to complete the first edition. Schopenhauer comments on Kant's "want of adequate reflection with which he passes over such questions as: What is perception? What is concept? What is reason? What is understanding? What is object?" [1; p.434]. Kant failed to lay down a proper foundation for these fundamental notions, and this has led to ambiguities in his work.

Kant's Theory of Object

Kant gives a summary of the place of objects in our understanding, and how they are perceived, in section 1 of the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' [2; B33 to B36]. He divides all knowledge of objects into intuition and concepts. Objects are presented in intuition, and they are thought using concepts. As an illustration, if I look at a particular chair that I can see in the corner of the room I am in at this moment, it is presented immediately to my intuition as a series of colour and hue sensations occupying the space of my field of vision. As such, it is simply a collection of ...

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...ject duality. I do not see the need to formulate this condition since (1) it leads Schopenhauer to an over-complicated division of knowledge and (2) objectivity can be derived from Kant's doctrine of understanding in any case.

However, I believe Schopenhauer was correct to point out Kant's own implicit ambiguity when writing about object, and for making it clear that whatever the object is, it should not be confused with the thing-in-itself.

References

[1] Arthur Schopenhauer (1818) The World as Will and Representation Tr. E.F.J. Payne (Dover 1969)

[2] Immanuel Kant (1787) Critique of Pure Reason Tr. Norman Kemp Smith (Macmillan 1929)

[3] Rene Descartes (1641) A Discourse on Method Tr. John Veitch (Everyman 1912)

[4] Guven Guzeldere (1995) 'Consciousness: What it is & how to study it' Journal of Consciousness Studies vol.2, no.1; pp. 30-51