Ayer’s essay discusses what degree of freedom is required for us to be held morally responsible for our actions, for which he uses a compatibilist approach.
If we have free will, then with the action we choose, we must be morally responsible. Accordingly, if one is unable to avoid an action, one is not morally responsible. What is evident is the belief that people act freely, and it is this ‘feeling,’ by virtue of morality, why philosophers aim to prove that behaviour is not decided causally. Causal laws oppose free will, they are the idea that an event is necessitated by antecedent events alongside the laws of nature (necessity). Ayer says that if our behaviour is governed by these laws it is uncertain that, or how any actions, can be avoided. If the cause of an action is different, one may have acted differently, but because the cause was what it was, it seems one has been obligated to act as he did.
It is assumed that men are competent on acting freely, in the way in which requires them to be morally responsible and that behaviour is administered by causal laws. The conflict between acting freely enough to be morally responsible opposed to behaviour being conducted by causal laws gives rise to the problem of free will.
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Either our choices are causally determined, or they are accidental, both deny moral responsibility. If one acts through an accident, then it is merely due to chance that one did not choose the alternative, and so it is irrational to be held responsible. If it is not due to chance, there must be a causally determined explanation for the behaviour. A moralist will object, as to them, choice is dependent on character. We are free in the sense that we are responsible for ourselves, but only through the connection of our past and what we do now. So, if our actions are consistent, meaning predictable, consequently we are responsible for our
“Are we free agents? Can we be responsible for what we do” (Strawson 225) This is the issue that Strawson brings to light in his essay. He begins to explain the notion of free will and responsibility in a compatibilist’s view. They believe that free will and determinism are compatible
In Roderick Chisholm’s essay Human Freedom and the Self he makes the reader aware of an interesting paradox which is not normally associated with the theory of free will. Chisholm outlines the metaphysical problem of human freedom as the fact that we claim human beings to be the responsible agents in their lives yet this directly opposes both the deterministic (that every action was caused by a previous action) and the indeterministic (that every act is not caused by anything in particular) view of human action. To hold the theory that humans are the responsible agents in regards to their actions is to discredit hundreds of years of philosophical intuition and insight.
Furthermore, free will has been closely connected to the moral responsibility, in that one acts knowing they will be res for their own actions. There should be philosophical conditions regarding responsibility such like the alternatives that one has for action and moral significance of those alternatives. Nevertheless, moral responsibility does not exhaust the implication of free will.
In “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”, Harry Frankfurt attempts to falsify the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. The Principle of Alternate Possibilities is the principle where a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. A person would be morally responsible for their own actions if done by themselves. If someone else had forced that person to do the action, then the person doing the action is not morally responsible. Frankfurt does not believe this to be true and that the person doing the action is morally responsible. Frankfurt’s objections towards the Principle of Alternate Possibilities shows the refutation of natural intuition and places moral responsibility upon those who deserve it.
In respect to the arguments of Ayer and Holbach, the dilemma of determinism and its compatibility with that of free will are found to be in question. Holbach makes a strong case for hard determinism in his System of Nature, in which he defines determinism to be a doctrine that everything and most importantly human actions are caused, and it follows that we are not free and therefore haven’t any moral responsibility in regard to our actions. For Ayer, a compatibilist believing that free will is compatible with determinism, it is the reconciliation and dissolution of the problem of determinism and moral responsibility with free willing that is argued. Ayer believes that this problem can be dissolved by the clarification of language usage and the clarification of what freedom is in relationship to those things that oppose freedom or restrain it. In either case, what is at stake is the free will of an agent, and whether or not that agent is morally responsible. What is to be seen from a discussion of these arguments is the applicability and validity of these two philosophies to situations where one must make a choice, and whether or not that person is acting freely and is thus responsible given his current situation. In this vein, the case of Socrates’ imprisonment and whether or not he acted freely in respect to his decision to leave or stay in prison can be evaluated by the discussion of the arguments presented in respect to the nature of free will in its reconciliation with determinism in the compatibilist vein and its absence in the causality of hard determinism.
...reserving the principle of autonomous decisions could be considered somewhat more plausible. Essentially the only fault being addressed is the conflicting action, as a conflict no longer occurs. Objections remain based on the inclusion of moral agents exclusively and the promoting of individual’s goals, while introducing the additional problem of self-interest that accompanies prominent autonomy. The theory remains at fault, as it cannot be adequately amended by a single change. Sally’s prescriptive moral theory “picks and choses” from other existing theories and combines them to make a hybrid theory. Doing so creates difficulties as the overlap reduces clarity and limits the strength of any individual argument. This is a challenge that cannot be overlooked; Sally’s theory fails to show structural reliability and is hence too problematic to have sound moral worth.
The second, and more complicated, of Campbell’s requirements is to define what constitutes a “free act.” There are two parts to this definition. The first necessitates “that the act must be one of which the person judged can be regarded as the sole author” (378). This point raises the question of how one can determine authorship. For certainly “the raw material of impulses and capacities that constitute [one’s] hereditary endowment” cannot be determined by the individual and surely have an impact on his inner acts (378). Further, the individual cannot control “the material and social environment in which he is destined to live” and these factors must influence his inner acts as well (378). Campbell allows that, while these aspects do have an impact on one’s inner acts, people in general “make allowances” for them, and still feel morally responsible for one’s self (378). In other words, one recognizes the effects of hereditary and environment on his inner acts, but acknowledges that his self can and should still be held morally responsible, as it can overcome these factors. Thus, Campbell claims, sole authorship of an act is possible. The second part of this definition of a “free act” requires that one could have acted otherwise because one could have chosen otherwise (380). With this final presupposition, Campbell states that an act is a free act if and only if...
All in all, each view of the philosophy of free will and determinism has many propositions, objects and counter-objections. In this essay, I have shown the best propositions for Libertarianism, as well as one opposition for which I gave a counter-objection. Additionally, I have explained the Compatabalistic and Hard Deterministic views to which I gave objections. In the end, whether it is determinism or indeterminism, both are loaded with difficulties; however, I have provided the best explanation to free will and determinism and to an agent being morally responsible.
In Freedom and Science, David Cockburn does not provide a moral argument in defense of free will. Instead, the philosopher argues against the neuroscientific challenge to freedom of will, which argues that our actions are simply causal functions of uncontrollable chemicals in our brains. Drawing on an example of a man who commits murder as a result of his unknowing exposure to chemicals, Cockburn investigates whether the chemical caused or enabled his violent behavior. In the case of this man, to an ordinary observer, had the chemical not been present the man would not have killed. Moreover, since the man had no control of whether or not the chemical was in the room, it follows that he was not free to choose whether or not to murder.
Moral responsibility is a concept that claims because people have the freedom of choice, individuals are responsible for at least some actions they may choose to do that are objectively immoral. Individuals can choose to not do morally depraved actions, and so when they do choose to do such actions we should hold them responsible for doing something objectively morally wrong. This view seems rather logical because in society today we not only have some sort of general consensus on the plausibility of there being moral facts, but we also find it commonplace to hold individuals accountable for such actions that are morally reprehensible. You can imagine a case in which we throw a person in prison for murdering someone because murder seems to be an objectively immoral and reprehensible action, in which we believe the person chose to do and can be held accountable for. This common view of objective morality and moral responsibility is one that seems not compatible with hard determinism.
Some Philosophers believe that free will is not required in moral responsibility. John Fischer states that “human agents do not have free will, but they are still morally responsible for their choices and actions.” Fischer is basically saying that moral responsibility is not as strong as free will (Timpe).
Argumentative Essay Professor Distelzweig 12/13/2016 Dima Aunan Free Will or the Emotions Humans are sometimes (or never) morally responsible for their actions. Symbolism 1.
The negation of free will disempowered man. If free will is an illusion, how can anyone be held responsible? How can one judge from an ethical point of view an
The philosophical problem that arises comes from the fact that all actions have causes from which they follow yet humans are “free”. With these definitions at hand we can now discuss the sense in which one acts as a moral agent according to Millian Utilitarianism, Kant, and Aristotle. John Stuart
When considering freedom of action and moral responsibility in free will, it's always important to never confuse the two. For example, practicing free action and free will can be a man, who's name is Sam, by contemplating whether or not he wants to go to his mother's house for dinner. He doesn't have anything else to do but just doesn't want to deal with the drive to his moms. He knows he should and he does because