In Freedom and Science, David Cockburn does not provide a moral argument in defense of free will. Instead, the philosopher argues against the neuroscientific challenge to freedom of will, which argues that our actions are simply causal functions of uncontrollable chemicals in our brains. Drawing on an example of a man who commits murder as a result of his unknowing exposure to chemicals, Cockburn investigates whether the chemical caused or enabled his violent behavior. In the case of this man, to an ordinary observer, had the chemical not been present the man would not have killed. Moreover, since the man had no control of whether or not the chemical was in the room, it follows that he was not free to choose whether or not to murder. Cockburn complicates this logic by offering an alternative scenario. Imagine that a diabetic man is on trial for murder who frequently needs insulin in order to prevent him from falling into a coma. By random chance, a chemical he is exposed to at work has the same effect as insulin. As a result, he does not collapse …show more content…
Notably, viewing events without presuppositions is to maintain presuppositions. In this particular case, Cockburn argues that since we held assumptions, we must state precisely what would adequately show that an individual was not free. Second, he argues that our assumptions stop us from seeing the logical fallacy we are engaged in. He asserts that it does not logically follow that an individual cannot be held responsible for an action, had it not been for a certain chemical process in the brain. While we cannot stop our hearts from beating despite them being a part of us, it does not follow that we are suddenly “not responsible for what” we do. Finally, Cockburn argues that while the presence of the chemical in the second case enabled the man to kill, it obviously did not cause him to do
I think that even when our acts are driven by an automated machinery - the brain, that should not be an excuse to exculpate us but instead an approach to find solutions. II. Why blameworthiness is the wrong question. Eagleman states that the question no longer makes sense because a person and its biology are now understood to be the same.
There is the question of what acts are voluntary. The Model Penal Code defines an “act” as a “bodily movement whether voluntary or involuntary” (Section 1.13 (2).) Even with this definition it makes distinguishing between whether an act “involuntary” or “voluntary” difficult in certain cases. The rationale of the voluntary act requirement and the reason for excluding criminal liability in the absence of voluntary action is explained in the case book as it being fundamental that a civilized society does not punish for thoughts alone. It continues to say that people whose involuntary move...
In this essay, I will argue that though Strawson’s Basic Argument is sound, society has constructed a more applicable version of the term “acting morally responsible” which holds us all accountable for our actions. Firstly, I will provide a brief overview of the Basic Argument as well as distinguish between Strawson’s and society’s definitions of being morally responsible. Secondly, I will justify Strawson’s first premise. Finally, I will raise and refute the response of author Ian McEwan. In short, Strawson’s Basic Argument proves that we cannot ultimately be morally responsible for what we do.
In “Luck Swallows Everything” and “Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility” Galen Strawson and Susan Wolf’s explain the concept of responsibility in both a compatibilist and determinist view. Strawson argued that change was not possible at all when it comes to responsibility due to an individual’s mental nature, while Wolf argues that change is possible for an individual when it comes to responsibility. This essay will be focusing on the criticism of Wolf’s work.
In Roderick Chisholm’s essay Human Freedom and the Self he makes the reader aware of an interesting paradox which is not normally associated with the theory of free will. Chisholm outlines the metaphysical problem of human freedom as the fact that we claim human beings to be the responsible agents in their lives yet this directly opposes both the deterministic (that every action was caused by a previous action) and the indeterministic (that every act is not caused by anything in particular) view of human action. To hold the theory that humans are the responsible agents in regards to their actions is to discredit hundreds of years of philosophical intuition and insight.
This topic is crucial when considering the decision to penalize a criminal for a felony. Scientifically speaking, there is a difference between the brains of individuals, causing some people to be more aggressive than others. As Gazzaniga (2005) states in his book, "Whether through neurochemical imbalances or lesions, brain function can become distorted, perhaps explaining certain violent or criminal behavior" (p.89). If all people with such neurochemical imbalances displayed similar types of behavior, the conclusion would be obvious. However, not all people who have lesions or schizophrenia are violent. (Gazzaniga, 2005, p.95) An inconsistency in behavioral outcomes requires an alternate explanation of the concept of free will. Some philosophers criticize neuroscientists, arguing that, according to the article Neuroscience vs. Philosophy, "researchers have not quite grasped the concept that they say they are debunking" (Neuroscience vs. Philosophy: Taking an Aim at free will, 2011). In order to fully understand the concept of free will, it must be understood from synthesizing lessons from human experiences. Aristotle spoke of an internal moral compass that all humans possess; one that guides the concept of what is good (Eshleman, 2014, p.3). It becomes a necessity to compile the scientific perspective of a moral dilemma with the philosophical perspective in order to draw a reasonable
In this essay I shall argue that Paul Rée is correct in saying that free will is just an illusion. Throughout the reading entitled “The Illusion of Free Will,” Rée makes numerous great points about how we believe we have free will but we really do not. He discusses how one’s childhood upbringing determines his actions for the rest of his life, which, as a result, diminishes his freedom of will. He brings about the major issues with the common thought that since you could have acted in a different way than you actually did, you have free will. Another main argument was the proof of the reality of the law of causality, which can also be referred to as determinism.
In “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, Harry Frankfurt illustrates the concepts of freedom of will and freedom of action, but more importantly, Frankfurt has refined the compatibilism theory. Compatibilism allows the freedom of will to exist in the deterministic world. According to determinism theory, the future state of worlds is determined by some events in the distant past (E) and the laws of nature (L). More specifically, E refers to the history, such as experiences or states whereas L refers to scientific or physical law like gravity. For example, an alcoholic’s action is determined that he will not stop drinking. Here E is that he had been drinking in the past, and L is the physiological addiction effect caused by alcohol. As we can control neither E nor L, then it follows that we can never act free. The thesis of compatibilist, however, states that we may have free will, even if all of our actions are determined by forces beyond our controls.
The second, and more complicated, of Campbell’s requirements is to define what constitutes a “free act.” There are two parts to this definition. The first necessitates “that the act must be one of which the person judged can be regarded as the sole author” (378). This point raises the question of how one can determine authorship. For certainly “the raw material of impulses and capacities that constitute [one’s] hereditary endowment” cannot be determined by the individual and surely have an impact on his inner acts (378). Further, the individual cannot control “the material and social environment in which he is destined to live” and these factors must influence his inner acts as well (378). Campbell allows that, while these aspects do have an impact on one’s inner acts, people in general “make allowances” for them, and still feel morally responsible for one’s self (378). In other words, one recognizes the effects of hereditary and environment on his inner acts, but acknowledges that his self can and should still be held morally responsible, as it can overcome these factors. Thus, Campbell claims, sole authorship of an act is possible. The second part of this definition of a “free act” requires that one could have acted otherwise because one could have chosen otherwise (380). With this final presupposition, Campbell states that an act is a free act if and only if...
The problem of free will and determinism is a mystery about what human beings are able to do. The best way to describe it is to think of the alternatives taken into consideration when someone is deciding what to do, as being parts of various “alternative features” (Van-Inwagen). Robert Kane argues for a new version of libertarianism with an indeterminist element. He believes that deeper freedom is not an illusion. Derk Pereboom takes an agnostic approach about causal determinism and sees himself as a hard incompatibilist. I will argue against Kane and for Pereboom, because I believe that Kane struggles to present an argument that is compatible with the latest scientific views of the world.
The choices an individual makes are often believed to be by their own doing; there is nothing forcing one action to be done in lieu of another, and the responsibility of one’s actions are on him alone. This idea of Free Will, supported by libertarians and is the belief one is entirely responsible for their own actions, is challenged by Necessity, otherwise known as determinism. Those championing determinism argue every action and event are because of some prior cause. This causation may be by an external driving force, such as a divine power, or simply a chain of events leading up to a specific moment. The problem is then further divided into those believing the two may both exist, compatibilism, or one cannot exist with the other, incompatibilism. In his work, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, David Hume presents an argument for the former, believing it is possible for both Free Will and Necessity to exist simultaneously. This presentation in favor of compatibilism, which he refers to as the reconciling problem, is founded on a fundamental understanding of knowledge and causation, which are supported by other empiricists such as John Locke. Throughout this paper, I will be analyzing and supporting Hume’s argument for compatibilism. I will also be defending his work from select arguments against his theory. Because causation and both conditions for human freedom exist, Hume is able to argue everything is determined and Free Will is possible.
In fact, it seemed that her entire argument focused on the conditions needed to be a responsible agent, rather than a free-willed agent. She critiques arguments based on the deep-self view of free will for not setting conditions that requires an individual to be responsible, but the arguments were not about responsibility, they were about free will. In the example she used, she stated that JoJo is not held responsible for his actions, but he is still free to do what he wants. Not being held responsible has nothing to do with being free to make your own choices. Even individual who suffer from psychosis are free to do as they please within the realm of their distorted perception (granted that during their psychotic episode they do not perceive that they are being forcibly or violently
It is true that our behaviour is the result of certain external forces. What is not true is that our behaviour is manipulated to such an extent where our actions are not regarded as free. Murder is an act which is universally acknowledged as a reprehensible act. If external forces do truly subjugate and manipulate our intrinsic beliefs and desires, no one would not commit murder. This is because for one to commit the act of murder they would have to eliminate the external societal forces which prevent one from committing this act. If it is then possible for one to eliminate an external force which does not align with one’s beliefs and desires, then external forces are evidently an influence on one’s actions not the sole explanation for their actions, nor a manipulation. The inherent predisposition for Leopold and Loeb to commit murder was indeed amplified by certain external forces which aligned with their beliefs and desires. Leopold and Loeb’s decision to murder was externally influenced to a certain degree but they both allowed the external forces to freely propagate within their minds and the ultimate decision to commit murder was a result of their free
When looking to the nature of free will, many want to argue that free will in decision making and actions is absolute. Everyone faces endless routes of decision making everyday, and so thus, prima facie, it seems that total freedom of will is a correct assumption to have. This is why, in fact, positions such as hard determinism come across to most as radical and furthermore face fierce opposition. I want to not only explain and assert that hard determinism is the correct view on freedom of the will, but also defend against the most relevant objections of hard determinism. Theories on freedom of will tend to seek to explain how much choice individuals have in relation to actions, and moreover their responsibility for said actions.
Freedom, or the concept of free will seems to be an elusive theory, yet many of us believe in it implicitly. On the opposite end of the spectrum of philosophical theories regarding freedom is determinism, which poses a direct threat to human free will. If outside forces of which I have no control over influence everything I do throughout my life, I cannot say I am a free agent and the author of my own actions. Since I have neither the power to change the laws of nature, nor to change the past, I am unable to attribute freedom of choice to myself. However, understanding the meaning of free will is necessary in order to decide whether or not it exists (Orloff, 2002).