Argument Against Hard Determinism

When looking to the nature of free will, many want to argue that free will in decision making and actions is absolute. Everyone faces endless routes of decision making everyday, and so thus, prima facie, it seems that total freedom of will is a correct assumption to have. This is why, in fact, positions such as hard determinism come across to most as radical and furthermore face fierce opposition. I want to not only explain and assert that hard determinism is the correct view on freedom of the will, but also defend against the most relevant objections of hard determinism. Theories on freedom of will tend to seek to explain how much choice individuals have in relation to actions, and moreover their responsibility for said actions. Hard determinism

Moral responsibility is a concept that claims because people have the freedom of choice, individuals are responsible for at least some actions they may choose to do that are objectively immoral. Individuals can choose to not do morally depraved actions, and so when they do choose to do such actions we should hold them responsible for doing something objectively morally wrong. This view seems rather logical because in society today we not only have some sort of general consensus on the plausibility of there being moral facts, but we also find it commonplace to hold individuals accountable for such actions that are morally reprehensible. You can imagine a case in which we throw a person in prison for murdering someone because murder seems to be an objectively immoral and reprehensible action, in which we believe the person chose to do and can be held accountable for. This common view of objective morality and moral responsibility is one that seems not compatible with hard determinism. The argument of objective morality is as follows: If hard determinism is true, we can never do- and so are never obliged to do- any act other than the one we can in fact do. If we are never obligated to do an act other than the act we in fact do, we never do anything objectively immoral. Some actions are objectively immoral, and so hard determinism is false. This argument I believe has two assumptions that seem to be incompatible with hard determinism. The first is the assumption that objective morality is true. Thus, the argument asserts that if objective morality is true, then hard determinism must be false. The second claim I want to address is the implied argument of no responsibility. The argument asserts that we are not obligated to do certain actions because we can only do acts in which we in fact can do. Since we are not obligated to do certain things we would logically have no