The Ideant Of Peter Van Inwagen And The Consequence Argument

The Consequence Argument is an argument that concludes a hypothesis to be true or false based on whether the premise leads to desirable or undesirable consequences. This is based on an appeal to emotion, or a manipulation of one’s emotion in order to win an argument, especially in the absence of factual evidence. There are two sides in the Consequence Argument, compatibilism and determinism. Free will is the ability to either perform or restrain from actions based upon one’s decision. In the free will debate, Peter van Inwagen, a professor of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, takes on a compatibilist view by establishing that freedom can be present or absent in situations for any reasons, and that if determinism is true than one’s

Compatibilist like Peter van Inwagen believes that freedom can be present or absent in any situations. One of the famous Consequence Argument on compatibilism is by Peter van Inwagen who says: “If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us."1 The contradiction here is that human cannot refrain from performing free will. Therefore, determinism cannot abolish free will. He also mentions that if determinism is true then no one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature. Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future, and, also, have no control over the consequences of one’s behavior. For example, he expresses how compatibilism has been in existence before laws were even made. Since laws put certain restrictions on human’s free will, it should not stop humans from doing what he or she wants to do. He also expresses how society and nature should not determine one’s own free will because it can never be taken away from humans. Humans are incapable of knowing what the future looks like, therefore they cannot be morally responsible for the

[This, roughly speaking, is the principle of transfer of nonresponsibility.] Now, an argument ... can be generated to show that causal determinism rules out moral responsibility. Given that you are not morally responsible for the past, and you are not morally responsible for the laws of nature, and assuming the principle of transfer of blamelessness [the principle of transfer of nonresponsibility], causal determinism seems to rule out moral